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Abstract 
At least since Duchamp's Boîte-en-valise (1935-68), ar tists have been making 
work claiming the label of Museum.  Marcel Broodthaers, Claes Oldenburg, Ilya 
Kabakov, and Michael Blum explore this form, alongside David and Diana Wilson 
and Nobel Prize-winning novelist Orhan Pamuk.  Assembling ar tefacts and labels 
in carefully authored contexts, these works fuse museum poetics with the means 
of literature and conceptual ar t, operating as fictive museums.  Adapting the 
concept of fictive art from Antoinette LaFarge, the thesis develops the fictive as 
an as-if cognitive mode, problematising distinctions between literal and figurative, 
and revealing meaning to be an inherently spatial matter. 
 
This research identifies, (mis)labels, and takes par t in the fictive museum as a 
genre of contemporary ar t practice, accessioning it as a performative method to 
ask what fictive museums can do.  The John Affey Museum (JAM) explores 
alternative modes of museum poetics to address the same questions.  Using 
social media as performance platforms to restage research-as-practice, JAM 
forms a collection~assemblage of things: references; images; writing; 
performances; sculptures; academic publications; temporary exhibitions in gallery 
and performance spaces; and a long-term installation in Warrington Museum’s 
ethnology collection.  JAM is accompanied by a museum catalogue in the form 
of an anthology of quotations, and by this thesis, comprising twenty shor t essays 
or (mis)labels for the fictive museum.  The thesis proposes a sculptural, 
diagrammatic approach to knowledge production: an Image of thought (Deleuze), 
reimagined as associative constellation in fictive space.  
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Visitor Guide 
Project Outline 
Through collecting and archiving, appropriating museum display conventions, or 
interventions in the institution, many ar tworks engage with museums.1 We 
explore contemporary ar tworks that are not only about museums or situated 
within museums, but claim to be museums themselves.  We2 limit our enquiry to 
ar tworks making this self-instituting, performative3 gesture.  A survey of 
ar tworks labelled The Museum of___ would find dozens from the mid-twentieth 
century on, besides the many idiosyncratic micromuseums4 that could be 
included.  Instead, we investigate the problematics and potentials of fictive 
museums by working with one––the John Affey Museum (JAM).  We assemble a 
constellation of cultural reference points to explore its field of operation, 
modelling a fictive space, proposing a model of the fictive museum as method.  
The linked concepts of fictive museum, associative constellation, and fictive space 
are developed through thesis and practice, linking ideas from contemporary ar t, 
literature, cognitive linguistics, and philosophy – a perspective broadly aligned 
with New Materialism5 – to make a new conceptual contribution to this field. 
 
Following ar tist and educator Antoinette LaFarge’s term fictive art – ‘plausible 
fictions created through production of real-world objects, events, and entities’6 – 
we label fictive museums as a coherent genre of ar t practice.  Genre suggests an 
informal grouping, modelled on natural language categories, functioning ‘in terms 
of prototypes, not in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions’.7 We collect 
prototypes from Marcel Broodthaers’s Musée de l’Art Moderne (1968-72) 
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present.  Special attention is given to four examples. Due to its minimalist 
intensity, Claes Oldenburg’s Mouse Museum / Ray Gun Wing (1965–77) exposes 
key fictive museum operations.  Two permanent institutions – David & Diana 
Wilson’s Museum of Jurassic Technology (1988–present) and Orhan Pamuk’s 
Museum of Innocence (2012–present) – operating beyond frame of 
contemporary ar t as living institutions in their own rights, revealing the agency 
of the fictive.  Finally, working with JAM –the practice-led component of this 
research –experiments with live institutions and tests out some alternatives to 
the normative label|ar tefact structure in museum practice. 
 
There are three aspects: 
 
The John Affey Museum A fictive museum based on the unrealised 
project of Antarctic whaler and amateur 
ethnographer John Henry Affey (1905–
1969).  A body of ar tistic practice online, in 
print and in physical collections, including 
fictive publications in peer-reviewed 
academic journals. 
~8 
The JAM Dice & Catalogue An edition of twelve-sided Accessioning Dice 
used to number the JAM collection, and an 
anthology of 144 quotations, numbered using 
the dice. 
~ 
The Fictive Museum This thesis, an associative constellation of 
twenty interconnected essays, introducing 
different facets of the fictive museum. 
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The John Affey Museum 
Born in the nineteenth century, the modernist museum is still a force to be reckoned 
with.  But the idea of the museum is being reborn… The post-museum will retain 
some of the characteristics of its parent, but it will reshape them to its own ends… 
Where the modernist museum was (and is) imagined as a building, the museum in the 
future may be imagined as a process, or an experience…9 
JAM is a heritage and ar ts consultancy and museum of ethnography, focusing on 
British-Antarctic whaling.  It is a distributed institution, with multiple online and 
offline components: texts; images; models; audio recordings; social media 
accounts; installations; performances.  Networked into wider cultures of 
knowledge production through par ticipation and publication, JAM is 
agglutinative,10 without clear boundaries.  Museums resemble Espen Aarseth’s 
ergodic literature, where readers must work (ergon) to generate their own path 
(hodos) through the material.11 Following links, JAM visitors generate research 
methods, fictive heuristics, experiential modes of knowing-by-association.  In 
preference to established terms – por tfolio, documentation, digital ar twork, 
transmedia installation – we label JAM associative constellation.  Modernist 
museum practice reifies a label|ar tefact binary:12 texts label ar tefacts, not the 
other way around; labels are not par t of the collection.  JAM’s nonbinary 
method deconstructs this hierarchy: constellations of accessions label each other 
through association.   
 
 
 
 
Accessioning something means to take it into the museum.  This is a 
serious step […] Once an object is accessioned into a museum collection 
it takes on a whole new life…’ 
Slide 3E8.1: Daniel B. Reibel, Registration Methods for the 
Small Museum 
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The performative museum practices of labelling and accessioning are key 
operations for JAM as a body of work, and for this thesis.  Accessioning is an 
institutional form of appropriation, ‘the relocation, annexation or theft of cultural 
proper ties’,13 common to museum practice and contemporary ar t after 
Conceptualism.  The tensions of appropriation as a colonising act run 
throughout, exposed in A Line Joining Moments and Making Uncomfor table 
Parallels.  Things14 are accessioned into JAM using Accessioning Dice, described 
below.  While accessions take on new life, every accession also alters the 
collection as a whole––the museum’s centre of gravity shifts.  This double 
causality (see A Minor Paranoia and Looping Topology) signals the decolonising15 
potential of accessioning in the fictive museum, reframing and resisting the 
kyriarchal16 conditions of knowledge. 
 
JAM may be explored online by typing “John Affey Museum” with quotation 
marks into a search engine.  This generates a branching collection of links, 
including: 
The John Affey Museum Tumblr 
https://johnaffeymuseum.tumblr.com/ 
The John Affey Museum Twitter 
https://twitter.com/JohnAffeyMuseum/ 
‘Fictive Museums and the Poetics of Mislabelling’ 
Performance Research 20.1 (2015a), 36–47 
 ‘Slipping off the Sealskin: Gender, Species, and Fictive Kinship in Selkie Folktales’ 
Gender Forum , 55 (2015b) 55–82 
 ‘Two Slide Cases’ 
The Oxford Artistic and Practice Based Research Journal 2 (2017), 168–175 
Roots Between the Tides: JAM Remixes Warrington Museum 
Vimeo: Clair Le Couteur 
https://vimeo.com/215212777/ 
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Slide 490.0: JAM logo, based on the nautical 
chart symbol for part-submerged wrecks 
JAM is a modular ar twork,17 comprised of a transmedia collection.  JAM’s 
accessions are not pre-existing nodes, connected through exterior, secondary 
transactions – they are knots of associations, relations, intra-actions.18 Each 
identification of a thing-to-be-accessioned, each cognitive act of 
decontextualisation, frames a multifaceted, relational ar tefact, generative of and 
generated by the fictive museum.  This reciprocal condition is most clearly 
embodied in JAM’s collection of slides: contingent acts of framing fuse discovery 
and creation; jumps between one slide and the next flicker between implicit and 
explicit associations. 
 
Though no elements in the JAM collection are more central, some are more 
elaborate.  Roots Between the Tides (RBTT) is one of the most developed: a 
research residency in Warrington Museum and Ar t Gallery, resulting in a 
network of 144 slides installed in the Ethnology Hall, on long-term loan to the 
museum.  An accompanying catalogue and digital photogrammetry model of the 
installation are available online via the Tumblr site.  RBTT and Warrington 
Museum are discussed in Making Uncomfor table Parallels. 
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Slide 051.0: Roots Between the Tides (2016)  
Installation view, World Stories Gallery, Warrington Museum 
 
 
 
15 
 
Slide 167.0: Roots Between the Tides (2016)  
Installation view, Fish Gallery mezzanine, Warrington Museum 
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JAM Dice and Catalogue 
JAM assigns semi-random accession numbers to its collection using twelve-sided 
dice: the dice themselves are a series numbered 000 (see The John Affey 
Museum).  This convention has been followed while numbering the slides of this 
thesis: images, figures, diagrams, and quotations.  The dice are things for thinking 
the project, used to generate, structure, and navigate practice and thesis.  
Accompanying the submission as neither practice nor thesis, but as a tool for 
praxis – supplementary yet vital to the generation of both – the dice are a 
cognitive prosthetic, something easy to hold in the hand, in order to model 
something challenging to bear in mind.19 The dice are generated from STL files, 
3D printed from co-ordinates in fictive space. 
 
 
Slide 102.7:  JAM Accessioning Dice, 50th Anniversary Edition  
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The dice exist in association with a network of inter textual references, an 
agglutinative diagrammatic assemblage outlined in A Constellation Saturated 
With Tensions and The John Affey Museum.  An accompanying digital anthology 
or ar tist’s book – The Fictive Museum Catalogue, hosted on issuu.com and 
available via the JAM Tumblr – presents a constellation of 144 accessioned 
quotations. 20  The Catalogue develops the spatial, fictive mode of citation used in 
the notes, epigraphs, or exergues of the thesis into a conceptual piece.21 
Inter textual associations between thesis and Catalogue are included as accession 
numbers in the notes to The Museum is the Performance and A Theorist’s 
Fiction. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
According to a proven convention, the exergue plays with citation.  To cite before 
beginning is to give the key through the resonance of a few words, the meaning or 
form of which ought to set the stage.  In other words, the exergue consists in 
capitalizing on an ellipsis. In accumulating capital in advance and preparing the 
surplus value of an archive.’ 
Slide 782.2: Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever 
(Derrida, 1998, 12) 
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The Fictive Museum 
[Walter] Benjamin’s use of constellation as a method or as an ‘epistemological principle’ is in no 
way meant metaphorically.  Rather, constellation is Benjamin’s method of reading, writing and 
philosophizing… [C]ritical insight, for Benjamin, means to ‘grasp the constellation’.22 
How the Thesis is Structured 
This thesis is a collection of twenty labels for the fictive museum, one for each 
corner of the Accessioning Dice.  Each text is titled with a phrase from an 
accessioned quotation, accompanied by a slide diagramming the associative 
constellations used to generate the writing.  While echoing the traditional 
sequence of academic writing (introduction-argument-conclusion), each section 
is a point connected to others. Rather than attempting a static synthesis, 
collapsing heterogeneity into unity, conceptual labels remain mobile, maintaining 
tension between quotations, perspectives, and voices.  The constellation of 
twenty essays, themselves smaller constellations of reference points, collectively 
generate a space of association, a form that thinks,23 assembled to frame a 
question: What are fictive museums, and what might they reveal about the 
production of knowledge? 
 
These essays contextualise JAM, linking key works with concepts from critical 
theory, museum studies, philosophy, literature, and cognitive science to propose 
the fictive museum as a coherent genre of contemporary ar t practice.  The voice 
borrows from models of alternative scholarship including Steven Shaviro’s 
Connected (2003) and Calum Storrie’s The Delirious Museum (2006): an 
associative, spatial mode of writing, a networked collection of transdisciplinary 
reference points.   Taking the fictive museum as both subject and method of 
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study, we join Wolfgang Iser’s call for a ‘heuristics for human self-interpretation’, 
which ‘must not be taken from other disciplines and imposed’ on the fictive.24  
Modelling such an heuristic, we associate freely among multiple areas of cultural 
practice to explore the fictive museum on its own terms.  We conclude that 
taking up fictive museums as method exposes spatial, sculptural conditions of 
knowledge beyond oppositional categories.  
 
The essay Drugged With History and Ar t introduces the fictive museum in 
contemporary ar t from Broodthaers to the present, and some of the challenges 
it presents to traditional notions of criticality.  Foremost among these is the 
shor t-circuiting of critical distance, and its commonsensical cognates objectivity 
and impartiality.  Fictive museums practice a radical flattening, where distinctions 
between fiction and fact, figurative and literal meaning, aesthetic and non-
aesthetic, theory and practice dissolve.  Two first-person accounts of research 
trips to fictive museums explore this condition.  A Chain of Flowers describes 
paranoid structures of meaning in the Museum of Jurassic Technology (MJT).  A 
Line Joining Moments explores the recently opened Museum of Innocence 
(MOI) in Istanbul with a close reading of the museum and accompanying novel 
in the context of colonial misogyny.  The relation of paranoia, museums, and the 
colonial subject is extended in Making Uncomfor table Parallels, introducing our 
work with JAM in the ethnology hall of Warrington Museum, one of the first 
municipal museums in Britain.  A Minor Paranoia studies typology and meaning 
in Oldenburg’s Ray Gun Wing, finding museum poetics complicit in a 
hallucinatory, apophenic process that decentres the critical subject.  
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A Sudden Change in the Pattern resituates the questions of cognition, meaning,  
and knowledge.  Drawing on cognitive linguistics and contemporary embodied 
and distributed approaches to cognition, the dualisms of mind|body and 
literal|figurative are contested,  eroding the special status of criticality in the 
context of institutional knowledge production.  The Myth of the Museum argues 
the ideology of dualism and an uncritical model of representation is central to 
the operation of museum knowledge: the label|ar tefact pair is a constitutive 
symbol of representation.  In A Consensual Hallucination, we examine the 
intensification of this situation in the post-internet condition, and alternatives 
offered by ar tistic research as constellation.  Crystals on a Chandelier explores 
some ar t theorists’ critiques of associative constellation, and the challenge posed 
to criticality by works that dismantle the line between ar twork and commentary: 
potential critique is drawn into the web of implicit meaning.  This Form That 
Thinks revisits Ray Gun Wing and the MJT in light of contemporary interest in 
the constellation work of Walter Benjamin,25 Aby Warburg, and André Malraux.  
Looping Topology and Mappings Between the Pairs connect the constellation 
method to New Materialism’s challenges to dualism and Gilles Deleuze’s critique 
of the Image of Thought, revealing meaning to be an inherently spatial concern.  
An Unbridgeable Chasm reads a display in the MJT in light of the critique of 
dualism, concluding that dualism itself relies on the production of fictive space. 
 
A Constellation Saturated With Tensions juxtaposes insights from New 
Materialism, Benjamin’s constellation, DeLanda’s assemblage theory and cognitive 
archaeology to generate an associative constellation model.  Here our model of 
the fictive approaches the limits of language, experimenting with spatial aspects 
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of writing in context to test the implicit|explicit opposition.  The Fictive as an 
Operational Mode compares Wolfgang Iser’s work with usages from other fields 
to propose the fictive as a concept in its own right.  A Theorist’s Fiction discusses 
associative constellation as a process that generates fictive space, drawing 
together threads from Iser and Pamuk with Daniel Dennet’s analogic ‘centre of 
gravity’.  The John Affey Museum outlines the special features of Affey’s 
proposals for museum practice, and how they can be situated in the fictive 
museum as a field.  The Museum is the Performance addresses the question of 
how and under what conditions the voice of the museum is generated, how this 
institutional We26 is accessioned by the research and reframed in terms of 
doubtful practices––irony, refusal, resistance and contrariness.  Drawing 
Conclusions collects reference points across the constellation to argue for fictive 
space as a foundational condition of knowledge production, not only in fictive 
museum works but in human knowing more generally.  We propose fictive 
museums and the associative constellation as methods for alternative 
scholarship, resisting the colonial, kyriarchal conditions of the institutional voice. 
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Associative Constellations, Criticality, and Academic Research 
Fictive museums are research-based ar tistic practices, where information is 
material and medium.  Many are ‘models of pedantic scholarship’,27 incorporating 
labelling and commentaries into the work as a ‘unified organism’.28 The formal 
conventions and poetics of traditional ‘knowledge-producing institutions’ are 
appropriated, exaggerated and ironised: Latinate verbiage, seemingly-technical 
terminology, digressive descriptions, etc.29 In this respect, fictive museums 
perform a mock-academic style, with an outmoded, pseudo-historic whiff.  
Consequently, researching fictive museums is ‘destabilising for scholarship.’30  This 
is par ticular ly true for a practice-led doctoral thesis exploring the poetics of 
institutional knowledge production and its limits, experimenting with writing as 
practice, and practice as academic writing, destabilising their opposition.  An 
accompanying publication31 addresses the question of academic validity and 
associative constellation as research method, using a network of internal on the 
Oxford Artistic Research Platform.  Other, more traditional peer-reviewed journal 
ar ticles with fictive content are included in the body of ar tistic practice.32  With 
the body of practice, the thesis generates a fictive space of knowledge 
production ‘which does not take modalities of criticality as given… [but] 
experiments with non-division between practice and theory, criticism and 
creativity’.33 
 
This foregrounds some foundational problematics.  In a fictive mode – where 
firm category distinctions between fact and fiction, ar tefact and text dissolve – 
what happens to the academic criteria of criticality and validity?  Why is this an 
academic project rather than a moment of practice?  What constitutes research 
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and knowledge?  To claim this project as doctoral research necessitates 
methodological commitments: remaining responsive to critique; acknowledging 
and addressing existing work in the field; and the transparent collection and 
citation of references.  Judith Butler argues that the academic freedom to 
explore ‘open and critical inquiry’ justifies disciplinary norms, rather than the 
other way around.34  Commitment to academic inquiry beyond normative rules 
requires a focus on par ticipatory practices: the framing of questions within a 
disciplinary context.  Central to this are accountability, connectivity, and agency.  
This research was exposed to the specialist critical context of post-graduate fine 
ar t research by practice in several UK institutions, and to wider academic 
communities, par ticipating in the structures of peer-reviewed publication and 
conference presentation.   
 
Alongside archival research into the texts and ar tworks connected to fictive 
museum practices, and research visits to significant examples, interviews were 
conducted with ar tists, theorists and museum professionals.35  The findings of 
these primary research activities were followed up through mutually-informing 
processes of thinking, discussing, reading, writing, and making, contributing to the 
theoretical contribution of the research: the fictive museum as a cognitive space 
of association or associative constellation.  Throughout the process, resonant 
reference points were collected: ar tworks, museum ar tefacts, quotations from a 
wide range of disciplinary discourses.  An edited selection of these were 
assembled through a heuristic process that felt highly spatial ~ diagramming 
connectivity on paper, looking for patterns of similarity and opposition ~ adding 
and removing ~ trying the weight and fit of one thing and then another ~ 
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keeping the associative constellation balanced, no element taking centre stage ~ 
leaving the centre open as an emergent, shifting ‘interrogative point’36 continually 
reframing ‘silent questions’. 37 
 
In The Museum is the Performance and A Theorist’s Fiction, we outline the as-if 
positions of critical complicity required to approach fictive museums on their 
own terms.  As Rachel Haidu argues of Broodthaers, this ‘opens the very 
premises of critique to investigation.’38 Bruno Latour and Karen Barad advocate 
abandoning critique as a stereotypical ‘over-rated’ and ‘destructive…practice of 
negativity’ that ‘misses the mark’ of reading and writing as ‘ethical practices’.39 
However, Carrie Lambert-Beatty, whose essay on parafiction remains a key text 
for our field, recognises another possibility: 
One of the disturbing things about the parafiction is the split between the trap-laying artist and 
the specifically unwitting viewer, who thinks she is involved in one kind of experience (historical 
museum…) while actually participating in another (fiction-based installation; cultural 
critique)…Parafiction is an antidote to vanity… forever chang[ing] one’s interface with the 
media, art, museums, and scholarship.  The difference is a certain critical outlook, but one that 
should be differentiated from models of criticality as skepticism.  Rancière talks about a “poetics 
of knowledge” opposed to “critique as suspicion”.  Something like this attitude takes shape, I 
think, as a post-parafictional alertness to the possibility of play.40 
Lamber t-Beatty’s critical outlook based on the poetics of knowledge, doubtful 
irony, and play echoes Paolo Freire’s definition of knowledge as ‘problem-
posing’––a ‘critical awareness’ bringing the ‘zone of background intutitions’ to 
concsiousness.  Butler’s reading of Theodor Adorno likewise distinguishes a 
pseudo-critical judgement that ‘fetishizes isolated categories’ from the praxis of 
criticality that exposes ‘constellations of power’ and ‘asks after the occlusive 
constitution of the fields of categories themselves.’41 For Gilles Deleuze such an 
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‘occlusive’ category is what he labels the image of thought,42 stereotyped thinking 
founded on oppositional dualisms, par ticularly true|false, discussed in Mappings 
Between the Pairs.  For Butler, criticality resides in framing questions that can 
only be ‘posed by breaking through a cer tain prohibition…the implicit and 
defining limit’ to what can be stated.43  The fictive museum undermines this 
true|false structure, fundamental to academic research: the prohibition against 
falsehood, irony, and allusive meaning. 
 
 Adorno warns that the paradox of pseudo-critical judgement is that the 
separation of idea from object, the very distancing strategy by which it seeks 
independence, ‘threatens to succumb to the thinglike… a collection of ideas on 
display.’44 As we outline in A Constellation Saturated With Tensions and An 
Unbridgeable Chasm, New Materialism and thing theor y resist this dualistic 
form|substance, mind|body, label|ar tefact, literal|figurative separation, providing a 
new philosophical approach.  Hal Foster identifies a fur ther paradox in 
Broodthaers’s work: the fictive museum appropriates ‘cultural reification only to 
transform it into a critical poetic…at once literal and allegorical, in a word, 
reflexive.’45  Associating these perspectives from Foster, Lamber t-Beatty, Adorno, 
Freire, Deleuze and Butler, we assemble a different model of criticality from that 
rejected by Barad: an emergent ‘rogue viewpoint… undermin[ing] the idea of 
the viewpoint’.46 In place of critical distance, we have criticality as an embodied, 
involved praxis, bringing constellations of power to consciousness by taking up 
the very material poetics of knowledge production that usually serve to reify 
category distinctions, and posing implicit questions ‘about the proper bounds’.47 
Hence it is the very embeddedness of our position which provides a renewed 
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critical potential––our praxis not of distant judgement but entangled exposition 
of the material-discursive constellations at play in the fictive museum.48 
 
In the process of sketch-mapping a context for the fictive museum, some new 
philosophical concepts are assembled.  Associative constellation is a key 
contribution of this research project, the focus of A Theorist’s Fiction.  Drawing 
on Manuel DeLanda’s reworking of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, we 
propose associative constellation as a kind of assemblage49 in 
embodied~cognitive fictive space.50 Just as cognition51 is material, distributed and 
communal, so associative constellation is generated among things, discourses, 
places, communities, nervous systems.  Daniel Dennett uses ‘a theorist’s fiction’ 
to describe the concept of the centre of gravity: a fictive position, ‘a sor t of 
abstraction, something whose existence was not in the slightest impugned by its 
invisibility.’52  The centre of gravity of this research is the fictive museum. 
 
 
1 For surveys, see: Schaffner & Winzen (1998) on archival practices; Putnam (2001) on 
museum as medium; Alberro & Stimson (2009) on institutional critique. 
2 ‘[T]hat object of desire, non-innocence, and craft called “we”…’ is used throughout to 
signal the fictive institutional voice of this text (Haraway, in King, 2011, xi).  We write as-if 
we are the John Affey Museum, foregrounding the coercive complicity of the institutional 
first-person plural.  See The Museum is the Performance. 
3 Following Jacques Derrida’s and Judith Butler’s re-castings of J. L. Austin’s work, the 
performative simultaneously describes and enacts: ‘I now pronounce you man and wife’ 
(Butler, 1993, 17–18).  Performative acts operate through ‘a chain of binding conventions’: 
networks of repetition and citation, both conferring and constraining authority (18), a 
condition shared by the museum label and the academic text. 
4 See Candlin, 2016. 
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5 This perspective is an assemblage of insights accessioned from Karen Barad, Donna 
Haraway, Katie King, Tim Ingold, for which Manuel DeLanda and Rosi Braidotti coined 
New Materialism: ‘the mind is always already material… matter is necessarily something of 
the mind… nature and culture are always already "naturecultures" (Donna Haraway's term). 
New materialism opposes… transcendental and humanist traditions, which are manifold yet 
consistently predicated on dualist structures…. What can be labelled “new materialism” 
shifts these dualist structures by allowing for the conceptualization of the travelling of the 
fluxes of nature and culture, matter and mind, and opening up active theory formation.’ 
(Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, 48). 
6 LaFarge, 2007. 
7 Rohrer, 2010, 26. 
8 The ‘~’ sign, tilde (from L. titulus, title) was used as a ‘mark of suspension’ in medieval 
Latin, indicating the omission of one or more letters.  It is often used in dictionary definitions 
in place of the word being defined. In mathematics, it has two distinct uses.  In formal logic, 
it means ‘not’ (e.g. ~p).  In relational mathematics, it means ‘is equivalent to’ (e.g. x~y).  In 
this section of the thesis, we’re using ~ to indicate a linking caesura between elements in the 
constellation. 
9 Hooper-Greenhill, 2002, 152. 
10 Maharaj (2009, 4) takes up agglutinative to label ‘thinking through the visual’––a mode in 
artistic research ‘beyond the organising, classifying spirit… bring[ing] into play associative 
manoeuvres, juxtaposition, blend and splice… constellating assemblages.’  While we take up 
his proposal of the agglutinative, we question Maharaj’s conceptions of the cognitive and the 
algorithmic as disembodied modes necessarily aligned with ‘corticalization’ and 
‘institutional captivity’––pressures resisted by the self-instituting nature fictive museums 
practices.  See A Sudden Change in the Pattern, A Minor Paranoia, This Form that 
Thinks, and Drawing Conclusions. 
11 Aarseth, 1997, 3–4. 
12 Binary opposition is either/or, while dualism is a one-dimensional space in which any 
departure from one is a move toward the other, e.g. light|dark. See Mappings Between the 
Pairs. 
13  Welschman, 2001, 1–2. 
14 Our use of thing follows the work of ‘thing theorists’ including Tim Ingold and Bill Brown 
to describe agential, dynamic views of matter, which the word object lacks. ‘[T]he thing has 
the character not of an externally bounded entity, set over and against the world, but of a 
knot whose constituent threads, far from being contained within it, trail beyond, only to 
become caught with other threads in other knots.’ (Ingold, 2010, 3.)  Thing Theory is a 
perspective aligned with New Materialism that contests form|substance dualism and the 
passivity of matter (Brown, 2001).  See A Constellation Saturated With Tensions. 
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15 Taking part in trans-national decolonizing and queering movements is an ethical 
imperative for me, both politically and personally.  As a white, middle class researcher with 
English, Irish and Settler Australian ancestry, I am deeply embedded in colonial cultures.  
My pansexuality, non-binary trans gender and largely invisible disabilities (an artificial eye, 
dyslexic/dyspraxic spectrum) mean I can pass as ‘healthy straight British male’, although 
being read in this way erases my identity, causing considerable anguish.  I spent over thirty 
years of my life hiding who I was under threat of verbal and physical abuse.  I join Bal, 
Freire, Haraway, Harney & Moten, Heumann-Gurian, Plumwood, Vásquez and others in 
stressing the need to resist and unpick the deeply ingrained epistemic violences of our 
postcolonial condition.  At the heart of this cruel, colonizing culture is dualism, the 
ideological mechanism behind both ongoing racial injustices, and endemic transphobia.  On 
the relation between museums and the postcolonial condition, see Thomas, 2010. 
16 Kyriarchy is a term proposed by Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza in response to the 
inadequacy of patriarchy to adequately encompass the intersectional workings of power: 
‘[I]n Western societies, the system of domination and exploitation is not just patriarchal but 
kyriarchal––that is, it is defined not only by gender but also by race, class, ethnicity, 
imperialism, and age.’ (Schüssler Fiorenza, 2017, 2, Note 5). 
17 ‘[M]odularity is an extremely important aspect of the fictive art projects […] I see fictive 
art as a deeply generative way of working.’ (LaFarge & Le Couteur, 2017). 
18 Karen Barad’s work joining critical theory and experimental physics addresses the radical 
potential of the ‘intra-actions’ of material things, co-producing one another.  See Barad, 
2003. 
19 ‘I would like those who are not versed in anatomy to take the trouble, before reading this, 
to have the heart of some large animal with lungs dissected in front of them.’ (Descartes, 
1920, 37). 
20 All these accessioned quotations are freely available elsewhere online. 
21 When not explicitly discussed, epigraphs are not protected by the usual ‘fair dealing’ 
exemptions of copyright for academic criticism and review.  To the extent they add ‘literary 
merit’ or ‘qualitative value,’ permissions must be obtained (Oxford University Press, n.d.). 
Our Benjaminian tactic of collecting and displaying contextual quotations is hence not only a 
gesture of anti-establishment scholarship, but an unlawful act of civil disobedience.  In 
keeping with the nature of fictive museum works, this is protest or provocation as proposal.  
22 Sahraoui & Sauter, 2018, xi. 
23 See This Form That Thinks. 
24 Iser, 1993, xiii. 
25 On contemporary interest in Benjamin’s constellation as a philosophical principle, see 
Sahraoui & Sauter, 2018. 
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26 ‘[T]hat object of desire, non-innocence, and craft called “we”’ is used throughout to signal 
the fictive voice of this text, foregrounding the coercive complicity of the institutional first-
person plural (Haraway, in King, 2011, xi).  See The Museum is the Performance. 
27 Rothstein, 2012. 
28 Kabakov, 2000, 257. 
29 The use of Latinate language in knowledge production is itself one of our conditions of 
kyriarchal coloniality. Today, Latinate language remains a marker of kyriarchal inequalities; 
that penis has such a dramatically different sphere of usage from cock is symptomatic of 
language as a colonised space. Latin and French loan words retain their status as the only 
terminology appropriate to formal discourse, and ‘emotive’ Anglo-Germanic words relegated 
to the ‘vulgar,’ the bodily, and the domestic (Corson,1995, 87).  The English language is 
marked by its contingent history as a post-colonial tongue shaped by occupation by Roman 
imperial Latin, by the Anglo-Norman French of an invading aristocracy – whose descendants 
still retain considerable wealth and political influence compared to the descendants of their 
subjects (Clark & Cummins, 2014)  – and again by medieval Latin as lingua franca––the 
transnational medium of legal, scholarly, and religious communication.   
30 Lambert-Beatty, 2009, 83. 
31 Le Couteur, 2017. 
32 Le Couteur, 2015a, 2015b. 
33 Fusco, 2016. 
34 Butler, 2009, 776. 
35 These include: Sherwood & Le Couteur, 2016; Beard & Le Couteur, 2017; and LaFarge & 
Le Couteur, 2017. 
36 Beard & Le Couteur, 2017. 
37 Whitehead, 2012, 175. 
38 Haidu, 2010, xxx. 
39 Barad, quoted in Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, 49. 
40 Lambert-Beatty, 2009, 82–3. 
41 Butler, 2004, 303. 
42 Deleuze, 1994, xvi. The Image of thought is a complex philosophical idea which Deleuze 
develops in Ch. 3 of Difference and Repetition, discussed in more detail below.  Deleuze 
gave this precis: ‘We live with a particular image of thought, that is to say, before we begin 
to think, we have a vague idea of what it means to think, its means and its ends.  And then 
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someone comes along and proposes another idea, a whole other image… From then on, 
thought is no longer carried on by a voluntary self, but by involuntary forces, the “effects” of 
machines.’ (Deleuze, 2004, 139). 
43 Butler, 2009, 777. 
44 Adorno, quoted in Butler, 2004, 303. 
45 Foster, 1996, 23. 
46 Butler, 2009, 777. 
47 Butler, 2009, 777. 
48 Many alternative models of criticality exist – including renewed interest in Dalí’s 
‘paranoiac-critical method’ – and their relations to contemporary art practices are complex 
and often contentious (see Maimon, 2009).  On the paranoiac-critical method in relation to 
education and play, see Gude, 2015.  On the ‘interval’ between paranoid criticality and 
rational theory, see Hunt, 1999. 
49 Assemblage – the usual translation of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s agencement – 
has two shortcomings: it lacks a sense of generative agency; and it reads as a noun naming 
an object, rather than a verb naming a process of components fitting together (DeLanda, 
2016, 1).  Our use of assemblage in general and the more focused associative constellation is 
indebted to Assemblage Theory (2016), DeLanda’s summary and continuation of Deleuze & 
Guattari’s work. 
50 The concept of fictive space is elaborated throughout this thesis.  For an introduction to the 
fictive, see The Fictive as an Operational Mode 
51 See A Sudden Change in the Pattern. 
52 Dennett, 1993, 431. 
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Drugged with History and Art 
Contemporary Art and the Fictive Museum 
To talk about my museum means discussing the ways and means of analysing fraud.  
The ordinary museum and its representatives simply present one form of truth.  To 
talk about this museum means speaking about the conditions of truth.  It is also 
impor tant…whether or not the fictional museum casts a new light on the mechanisms 
of ar t, the artistic life, and society.  I pose the question with my museum.  Therefore I 
do not find it necessary to produce the answer.53 
Now seems a timely moment to study fictive museums, though they have 
existed since the emergence of contemporary ar t in the late 1960s.  In 2012, as 
this research began, Orhan Pamuk’s Museum of Innocence opened in Istanbul.  
In 2017, two very different fictive museums graced contemporary ar t fairs.  
Made in collaboration with Professor Mary Beard, ‘Hauser & Wir th: BRONZE 
AGE c. 3500 BC – AD 2017’ at Frieze London ‘recreated a fictional bronze age 
presentation from a forgotten museum’.54 This elaborate institutional scene – 
complete with carpet tiles, scuffed baseboards and fire exit – grouped bronzes 
from famous ar tists, loans from minor museums and private collections, and 
dubious eBay antiquities.  Meanwhile, the Venice Biennale hosted Damien Hirst’s 
Treasures from the Wreck of the Unbelievable, the largest, most expensive fictive 
installation ever made55––‘an extravaganza of “post-truth” ar t’56 with museum-
style labels.  The label for a mammoth skull in Carrara marble informed visitors 
the trunk socket inspired cyclops mythology, echoing a label in the Natural 
History Museum.57 Hirst’s appropriation foregrounds an essential museum 
structure, the long-established dyad on which museums rely: the performative 
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juxtaposition of ar tefact and label to assemble associative constellations of 
meaning value. 
 
Marcel Broodthaers’ Musée de l’Art Moderne (1968-72), a transmedia assemblage 
of objects, texts, installations, and performances, remains a key reference point 
for the fictive museum as a genre––‘a foundational work of institutional 
critique’.58 In claiming he does not ‘find it necessary to produce the answer’ to 
questions posed by his museum, Broodthaers demonstrates his characteristic 
‘anti-establishment’, ‘fiercely enigmatic’, and ‘not literal but rather rhetorical’ 
mode of address.59 Broodthaers points to the fictive museum’s value, exposing 
not truth itself but its conditions, the mechanisms of ar t and ‘the ordinary 
museum’.  Above, Broodthaers does not distinguish between fictive and fictional.  
Yet fictional museum does not convey how real the ‘fraud’ may become, apparent 
in two contemporary examples, the Museum of Jurassic Technology in Los 
Angeles (1988–present), and the Museum of Innocence in Istanbul (2012–
present).  These institutions are not fictional.  They have long-term physical 
premises, adapted to their purposes.  They employ staff, publish books, house 
permanent collections, win museum awards––they have gift shops.  Though 
taking par t in the same ironic, reflexive practices as Broodthaers, these are 
actual museums.  Here we depar t from Broodthaers, generating an associative 
constellation around the fictive that resists dualistic fact|fiction opposition, even 
in ironic terms. 
 
The press release of Broodthaers’s Düsseldorf Kunsthalle incarnation of his 
Musée at documenta V (1972) states: ‘the fictive museum takes its point of 
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depar ture from the identity of ar t and eagle’.60 For Rosalind Kraus, Broodthaers’s 
‘identity-flattening eagle principle’61 describes a radical de-categorisation, 
associated with Fredric Jameson’s homogenization of all values and relations 
under the ‘perceptual system of late capitalism’.62 Broodthaers’ ‘sale on account 
of bankruptcy’ in Section Financière (1970–71) – an ‘unlimited edition’ of gold 
ingots, stamped with the eagle brand of his museum, and priced at double the 
market value – seems an uncannily prescient gesture.63 Intentionally counter-
cultural practices of ‘Institutional Critique’ in the mid-twentieth century appear 
to have been adopted very successfully by the ar t market.  ‘The kind of whimsy 
represented’ at both shows has been popular among collectors, with Hauser & 
Wir th selling near ly $1.5 million at the VIP event,64 and Hirst far more.65  
 
Notions of critique warp under the strain of the colossal market forces involved.  
Are the Roman spoons ‘from the wreck’ real antiques, careful museum-grade 
reproductions, or even painted plaster?  Hirst’s financial and cultural power is 
such that the question becomes oddly immaterial.  All that remains for Jonathan 
Jones is ‘the combination of intricate detail and stonking, mind-blowing scale and 
quantity’, leaving the complicit visitor ‘drugged with history and ar t’.  The 
‘sculptures in rollicking bad taste’ contrast with vitrines ‘contain[ing] things of 
apparent antiquity and historical meaning, arranged – as they might be in a very 
beautiful museum – by a fastidious curator… How do we classify and know 
anything at all, and what drives people to do it?’66 Critiquing the constructed 
nature of museum narratives becomes another excuse for the gay abandon of 
neoliberal culture industries; an ironic reaffirmation of the kyriarchy. 
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Echoing Broodthaers, for Mary Beard, BRONZE AGE ‘raised questions about the 
conventions of the museum’ by making ‘interrogative points’, primarily through 
the juxtaposition of bronzes with very different provenances.67 The display’s 
spatial arrangement belies this critical potential; within the vitrines, velvet-
covered platforms and similar framing devices carefully separated different 
classes of ar tefact.  While eBay vendors’ descriptions were repeated verbatim on 
anachronistic typewritten label cards, this fictive museum retained its own model 
of cer tainty.  The specialist knowledge and value construction of the connoisseur 
underwrites stable category distinctions, and establishment hierarchies are 
reaffirmed through the gallery’s price list.  For Hauser & Wir th’s Frieze exhibit, 
the fictive museum is a playful, profitable structure, using gentle, knowing irony 
to reaffirm the knowledge production of the minor institution as a system of 
value, from which the eBay vendor and the visitor are equally estranged.  Though 
fictive museums such as the Museum of Jurassic Technology and the Museum of 
Innocence appear equally invested in nostalgic museum poetics, they have the 
potential to be more deeply unsettling, not least through their avoidance of the 
ar t market.  Both are financed through admission fees, publications, donations 
and grants; neither frame themselves as ar tworks. 
 
In Hirst’s work, the associations between aesthetic, taste, wealth, cultural power, 
and control of meaning are clear.  It is less clear how this ancient kyriarchal 
system might be contested or reimagined.  Rather than a call to scholarship or 
critical thinking, the ‘drugging’ seems to mobilise against it.  We know the 
narrative we are being fed is a confection, but we don’t know whether individual 
things are real; that knowledge has lost all relevance beyond an appraisal service 
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for luxury items.  Criticality is overwhelmed by spectacle and desire.  The fictive 
operates as a licence, pretext, or set-up for revelling in the real fantasy of 
excess; historical tidbits are as much of an adornment as gold leaf, or diamonds.  
To call out Hirst’s fictive museum with an exposé of its questionable financial 
involvements, the conditions of its production, or similar socio-political 
accusations of immorality or complicity is unthinkable, laughable precisely 
because it is so overwhelmingly evident.  For some commentators, the fictive 
museum has lost any right it might once have had to label itself subversive, 
thought-provoking, or even unusual––‘It’s not just boring, it’s meaningless.’68  The 
concern with meaning is a central one, pointed to by Claire Bishop’s essay 
‘History Depletes Itself ’.69  Do irony, pastiche and exaggeration shor t-circuit 
criticality through complicity?  Is knowledge meaningful without an honest 
commitment to seeking the truth?  These are some interrogative points posed 
by fictive museums, but seldom answered by them.70  
 
Alongside these big-ticket works are innumerable minor fictive museum projects; 
a huge variety in Britain alone, from Stuar t Brisley’s Museum of Ordure to BBC 
Radio 4’s Museum of Lost Objects series.  Having entered the mainstream, the 
fictive museum work is arguably no longer an experimental or truly 
contemporary concern.  For the cognoscenti, familiar with fifty years of 
institutional critique and museum theory, the genre may not represent anything 
new.  But according to Beard’s assessment, ‘most people actually are not familiar 
with fictive museum displays.  The reaction to the BRONZE AGE booth suggests 
that it had the capacity to make people think’.71 Beard’s position is suppor ted by 
the relative scarcity of research on fictive museums.  The majority of literary-
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academic responses have focused on individual works, such as Ralph Rugoff ’s 
and Lawrence Weschler’s books on the Museum of Jurassic Technology, both 
from the mid-1990s.  Current terms for ar tworks involving fictions – Antoinette 
LaFarge’s fictive art and Carrie Lamber t-Beatty’s parafiction – were established in 
isolated papers; both authors are currently writing book-length studies.72  The 
first extended research project, a 2000 practice-based PhD disser tation by 
Australian ar tist Peter Hill on superfictions, focused on Hill’s own practice, 
including a section specifically on superfictional museum institutions.  Building on 
his work with the Museum of Contemporar y Ideas (1989–present),73 Hill 
produced The Art Fair Murders (1996–2000) a series of installations and 
performances and a written novel ‘worked on in tandem…each evolved from 
ideas generated by the other.’74  Simultaneously, Orhan Pamuk was working on 
his own two decade novel-and-installation project, publishing the novel The 
Museum of Innocence (2008), then opening his public museum in 2012. 
 
Crediting Marcel Duchamp’s fictive R. Mutt75 and the readymade with opening 
the territory, Hill joins Krauss in identifying Broodthaers’ eagle principle as 
marking the definitive shift into Contemporary Ar t and the post-medium 
condition of appropriation.  Standing ironically for ‘ar t’ or ‘idea’, Broodthaers’ 
eagle is for Krauss ‘no longer a figure of nobility, becom[ing] a sign of the figure, 
the mark – that is – of pure exchange’.76 Paradoxically, Krauss accuses this very 
‘principle of levelling’ not only of ‘leeching of the aesthetic out into the social 
field in general’, but of collapsing ‘the difference between the aesthetic and the 
commodified’.  Krauss echoes Jameson’s argument: as everything becomes 
aestheticised, the once-sublime realm of the aesthetic is drained, destablising 
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museum knoweldge: ‘the tour of the museum calls for th [only] aleatory 
perceptions…space assembling and disassembling itself oneirically around you’.77 
According to Krauss’s analysis, this leads to ‘installation and intermedia work, in 
which ar t essentially finds itself complicit with a globalisation of the image in the 
service of capital’.78 As contemporary ar t-fair fictive museums demonstrate, this 
could be equally said of the bronze, which has retained and even intensified its 
long-held status as a luxury commodity.  The fictive component in both of these 
shows points to the impor tance of narrative framing not only for intermedia 
installation work, but for the ostensibly pure æsthetics of Modernism.79  Without 
faith in dualism’s myths of progress and perfect representation – in the novelty of 
the postmodern world of networked Capital – mourning a prelapsarian 
condition of pure aesthetics simply does not make much sense.  The most 
striking experience for ar tist-researchers of the present generation, reading 
again the genre of apocalyptic postmodernism of Jameson and Krauss, is how 
naïve and idealistic it sounds.  How impossible it is not only to imagine anything 
different, but to believe anything was ever different.  Paradoxically, Krauss and 
Jameson’s critique seems to retroactively affirm an aesthetic sublime, located in a 
fictive prior state, a mythical pre-Capitalist Eden in which ar t and museums 
functioned differently, with ar tworks as mile-markers along the teleological road 
of History. 
 
Beard points to a challenge of the fictive museum: it can fracture audiences.  As 
a genre bridging ar t and museum practice, one that does not explicitly label 
itself Art, the fictive museum has relevance beyond the concerns of an exper t 
ar t audience, for whom the novelty may have worn off.80 As a genre, the fictive 
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museum spans both openly ironic works like Broodthaers’ Musée, and Michael 
Blum’s A Tribute to Safiye Behar, an ostensibly documentary installation in the 
style of a house museum, made for the ninth Istanbul Biennial (2005).  Both 
imply ‘silent questions’,81 interrogative points proposed through mappings onto 
the established practices and structures of Broodthaers’s ‘ordinary museum’.  
Rachel Haidu argues, ‘[w]hile the Musée’s presumably “fictive” status allows 
Broodthaers to sidestep the clichés that surround the concept of socially or 
politically oriented critique, he opens the very premises of critique to 
investigation’.82 Carrie Lamber t-Beatty observes that critics of what she labels 
Blum’s ‘parafictional’ museum are as likely to complain of his ‘flat-footed’ 
appropriation of Behar as an otherwise interesting historical figure, as others 
were of Behar’s unconvincing, self-betraying ‘fictionality’.83 Claire Robins takes up 
Lamber t-Beatty’s label of parafiction for this kind of work, identifying ‘an 
intention to dupe’ combined with ‘an absence of humour’ as the ‘distinguishing 
factor’.  These responses miss Blum’s invitation to experience the fictive as a 
mode of practice ~ questioned whether Behar was real or not, Blum responds: 
‘she was real to me’.84 
 
53 Broodthaers, quoted in Carruthers, 2009, 20. 
54 Hauser & Wirth, 2017. 
55 Hirst’s show spans two museums, thousands of square feet, almost two hundred large art 
works, and twenty-one vitrines.  The conceit is that Hirst paid to recover these ‘treasures’ 
from the sunken wreck of an ancient ship named Unbelievable. The aesthetic matches the 
fiction, with sculptures encrusted with colourful coral-like growths, appropriating 
stereotyped ancient styles from Mayan stone-carving and sculptures of Indian gods to 
colossal Greek bronzes.   
56 Reyburn, 2017. 
57 Jones, 2017a. 
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58 Haidu, 2010, xxx. 
59 Jon Knowles, quoted in Carruthers, 2009, 22. 
60 Broodthaers, quoted in Carruthers, 2009, 22. 
61 Krauss, 2000, 20. 
62 Krauss, 2000, 19–22. 
63 Schultz, 2007, 84. 
64 Halperin, 2014. 
65 Hirst marketed three versions of each work on display: ‘Coral (as if just retrieved from the 
sea), Treasure (as if just restored) and Copy (like a museum reproduction), each made in an 
edition of three, with two extra reserved for the artist.’ (Reyburn, 2017).  While Hirst spent at 
least $65 million on the Venice project, to say nothing of the investment by his dealers, 
reports indicate that multiple editions have sold out.   
66 Jones, 2017a. 
67 Beard & Le Couteur, 2017. 
68 Jones, 2017b. 
69 For an exploration of similar ideas, see the discussion of Claire Bishop’s argument in 
Crystals on a Chandelier. 
70 As discussed in The Fictive as an Operational Mode, we do not employ ‘fictive 
museum’ as an exclusionary, technical label, but as an open genre. While the Hauser & Wirth 
and Hirst exhibits are not fictive museums in the fuller sense of the MJT or MOI, they claim 
– however ironically – the status of museums, operating as-if constituting an institution. 
71 Beard & Le Couteur, 2017. 
72 While there is a large body of critical literature on Institutional Critique in general, and on 
artistic interventions in museums, there is comparatively little about artworks claimed as 
museums. Key works include: Schaffner & Winzen’s Deep Storage: Collecting, Storing, and 
Archiving in Art (1998); James Putnam’s Art and Artifact: The Museum as Medium (2001); 
and Calum Storrie’s The Delirious Museum (2006). 
73 Antoinette LaFarge likewise founded her own fictive museum project, the Museum of 
Forgery (1990–2008), which since 1993 has been online at <http://yin.arts.uci.edu/~mof/>. 
LaFarge traces her theoretical interest in fictive art to these museum experiments (LaFarge, 
2015). 
74 Hill, 2000. 
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75 Higgs (2015) suggests R. Mutt and his famous Fountain were actually the work of 
Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven. 
76 Krauss, 2000, 20. 
77 Jameson, 1998, 110–12. 
78 Krauss, 2000, 64. 
79 The artist’s studio, persona and reputation, the agents and gallerists, collectors and 
collections, gallery spaces and museums have always been part of the picture, though 
traditionally they did not intrude into the frame. 
80 The question of novelty points to a general condition of knowledge: our cultural obsession 
with primacy and recency, origins and with the cutting edge, which Mary Midgley associates 
with our colonial progress mythology, discussed in The Myth of a Museum.  Primacy and 
recency effects are cognitive biases; we are influenced by the first information we receive on 
a subject, and consider the most recent information more accurate than that preceding it 
(Duffy & Crawford, 2008). 
81 Whitehead, 2012, 175. 
82 Haidu, 2010, xxx. 
83 Lambert-Beatty, 2009, 53–4. 
84 Blum, quoted in Robins, 2017, 116. 
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A Chain of Flowers 
A Visit to The Museum of Jurassic Technology, Los Angeles, August 2014 
Clair Le Couteur 
“At 9341 Venice Boulevard, halfway between Los Angeles and Santa Monica, in a 
warren of rooms behind an innocuous stucco storefront, is perhaps the best-
known fictive museum in the world.  Its website states the Museum of Jurassic 
Technology (MJT) is ‘an educational institution dedicated to the advancement of 
knowledge and the public appreciation of the Lower Jurassic’, providing ‘the 
academic community with a specialised repository of relics and ar tefacts,’ and 
‘the visitor a hands-on experience’.85 Just what the Lower Jurassic is – let alone 
its technology – is never explained, though a map labelled “JURASSIC” on the 
website and framed in the museum’s entrance looks a lot like Egypt.  Founded in 
1988, David and Diana Wilson's museum is the publisher of unusual texts, 
‘models of pedantic scholarship with elaborate citations, some of which lead to 
nonexistent sources, others pointing to extraordinary historical figures.’86 In 
these, as in the labelled vitrines, we find that queer blend – fiction in the guise of 
scholarship, scholarship in the guise of fiction – so loved by fans of Jorge Luis 
Borges.  The method is what Iain Sinclair, describing the ‘Robinson’ films of 
Patrick Keiller, called ‘a fabulation backed by congeries of improbable fact’.87 
Many of these facts – like a fungal spore that takes over the brain of ants,88 or a 
museum founded by eccentric gardeners – behave as-if metaphorical, seeming 
allusions, models or microcosms of the MJT itself. 
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“It began, as Mr. Wilson told me when I visited, as lecture performances and a 
travelling vitrine exhibit.  He still lectures, but after one too many near-misses 
carrying large sheets of glass up and down stairs, he decided in the ear ly 
nineties to rent a space and build his museum in earnest.  Mr. Wilson told me 
this in his car, an old model and clear ly well used, as he drove me to meet a 
friend of his.  I'd mentioned my own museum was about the polar regions, and 
he insisted we visit the hand-painted Velaslavasay Panorama, one of the few left 
in the world.  Like the MJT, the Panorama is a rented site, an old cinema 
transformed by thousands of hours of invested care.  Above the cinema, up a 
small spiral staircase, is a rotunda.  The visitor stands on a circular railed 
platform, looking out over simulated vistas.  Model ice floes merged into painted 
ones, and a soundtrack of the hushed sea, the cracks and squeals of ice, induced 
a kind of eerie calm, impossibly re-contextualising the heat and ever-present 
traffic of Los Angeles.  Like the MJT, the Panorama is a labour of love, running on 
almost no funds, supported by various side-projects, charging its visitors very 
little.  I bought a book on Arctic panorama painting in Britain, which I’ve flicked 
through but never read.89 
 
“As I ate lunch the following day with the Wilsons’ daughter Danrae, a 
puppeteer and puppet maker, I learned that after founding the MJT, they were 
snubbed by their formerly-wide circle in LA’s contemporary ar t scene.  At the 
time, the husband and wife team had a good income building custom lens 
arrangements for cinematic special effects: tilt-shift devices and the like for 
making model sets appear huge, no longer required in the digital era.  They had 
also built a reputation for exquisite conceptual film.  A description of one piece 
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caught me, though I’ve never seen it: a long zoom-out shot of a tree made 
across a deser t canyon.  Each separate still blown up and recut so that, as the 
shot pulls back, the image remains the same scale in the frame but the tree 
blurs, melting into the environment.90 The image has stayed with me for its 
beauty, and for the technical mastery and absolute dedication to detail it 
represents.  The MJT has been made with this kind of obsessive, highly 
conceptual craft.  The ‘halls’ of the museum, as labelled on the plan, lie in semi-
darkness.  Several exhibits feature hand-made stereoscopes, producing 
hallucinatory effects (lost on researchers born with only one eye).  The MJT is 
an incredibly subtle monument to vanishing museum practices and cinematic 
technology: lenses, lighting effects, and optical illusions are everywhere. 
 
“I write this three years to the day after visiting the MJT, having realised I’d never 
typed up my notes.  The Museum made time for me.  I was warmly welcomed 
behind the scenes to the Airstream trailers where their team of dedicated 
volunteers stayed – mostly young ar tists working anonymously – and the 
workshop where they produce the MJT’s incredibly detailed models, with 
animatronic or projected elements.  In front of one case housing a model of the 
world’s largest waterfall – the Iguazu Falls, on the border of Argentina and Brazil 
– is a viewing device.  Looking through the eyepiece, some elaborate 
nineteenth-century technique involving multiple glass engravings produces a 
three-dimensional mirage of a suspension bridge, hovering impossibly over the 
falls.  The supposedly historical narrative justifying this lavish diorama concerns 
two people who never properly met.  Geoffrey Sonnabend, an experimental 
neurologist whose melancholy theory of memory – or rather, of ‘obliscence’ or 
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forgetting – was inspired by seeing Madalena Delani sing one night at a resor t 
by the Falls.  Delani, an opera singer with amnesia ‘probably derived from 
chemical poisoning at a very young age’, died in a car accident shor tly 
afterwards.91  Decades before, Sonnabend’s father, a structural engineer, 
determined to build a suspension bridge over the Falls.  In 1887, as it neared 
completion, the bridge was destroyed by ‘an unseasonable storm.’  Following the 
calamity, a wealthy benefactor and collector befriended him – later funding 
Geoffrey’s research – because ‘they had much in common, not least of which 
was a love of large, seemingly impossible projects.’92  Both impossible projects 
and theories of forgetting resonate as I write, years later, recalling the dreamlike 
experiences of my visit.93 
 
“Of course, strange resonances are how fictive museums like the MJT operate; 
resisting explication, accompanied by the uncanny sense of synchronicity, 
associations are generated by the material, extending beyond it like roots or 
vines.  As I was visiting, the crew were preparing to go to Russia for filming.  
Working with the ar ts-science collective Kabinet, the MJT has made twelve films 
in their Chain of Flowers series.  I saw one at the museum, an oneiric sepia-
toned journey with delicate, psychedelic focal effects, about which I can 
remember only that it involved a city in the deser t, elaborate structures of 
brickwork, women singing in what sounded like Arabic.  Following an 
unattributed quotation on the website, the Chain of Flowers figure recurs 
throughout the MJT.  The source is Charles Wilson Peale, an eighteenth-century 
soldier, scientist, naturalist, politician and inventor, who established one of the 
first museums in the United States:  ‘The Learner must be led always from 
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familiar objects toward the unfamiliar, guided along, as it were, a chain of flowers 
into the mysteries of life’.94 This oblique reference is one of many cryptic 
allusions in the Museum.  Seemingly fantastic tropes are borrowings from the 
bizarre history of museum practice, from the life of Athanasius Kircher to the 
Tradescants, the pair of gardeners whose collection Elias Ashmole co-opted 
under suspicious circumstances, founding the Ashmolean Museum.  The 
Tradescants’ proto-museum in Vauxhall, the first open to the public in England, 
was known as The Ark.  One of the first exhibits in the MJT is a cutaway model 
of Noah’s Ark according to Biblical instructions; an eminently un-seawor thy 
three-story box divided up into cells like a rectilinear wasp’s nest, rocking gently 
as-if on an invisible ocean.  The nearby label suggests Noah’s Ark as the most 
complete museum of natural history ever known. 
 
“Over the years, the MJT has colonized the adjacent shops, including a coroner’s 
office; one store room smells powerfully of embalming fluid.  It’s difficult to say 
how big the museum is.  On my first visit, convinced I’d seen everything, I missed 
a whole section.  Shadowy halls and spotlights, lens effects and long text panels, 
half-illuminated in the gloom, make for a disorientating experience punctuated 
with moments of striking clarity, like using a microscope.  Upstairs, beside a 
room full of paintings of ‘The Lives of Perfect Creatures’ (canine Cosmonauts),95 
is an exhibit on ‘string figures’.  I’d been making sculptures with cord for many 
years, and was very interested in theses trans-cultural, trans-temporal games––
making moving figures in space, often whilst telling a story or singing.  Later, 
reading Donna Haraway’s recent book on SF – sometimes meaning science 
fiction, sometimes string figures, sometimes speculative fabulation – I realised the 
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exhibit connected with Haraway and her colleague Katie King’s transmedia 
investigation of khipu.96 In a book about string figures I bought in the MJT shop – 
half instruction manual, half ethnological study – is in a sentence I find I’ve 
underlined in yellow, some half-forgotten colour-coding:  ‘One pretty figure I 
invented, as I flattered myself, only to find out later that it is common among the 
natives of the Caroline Islands’.97 My research experience has been similar.  As 
I’m checking this reference, I notice the author’s name is Caroline.  Another 
coincidence.  Another association in an endless chain of flowers, inducing – as 
Ralph Rugoff writes – a kind of ‘minor paranoia’.98” 
  
85 The site is museum piece; some of its code was written in 1996, a relic of dialup Internet 
when low-resolution images and repeated textures were crucial. The website’s three-letter 
domain name – <www.mjt.org> – demonstrates how early it was registered. 
86 Rothstein, 2012. 
87 Sinclair, 2003, 49. 
88 Lawrence Weschler describes the MJT’s ‘Cameroonian Stink Ant’ exhibit. ‘This ant 
becomes infected by a fungus that takes over its brain…fomenting bizarre behavioural 
changes…a spikelike protrusion erupts from…the ant's head…heavily laden with spores, 
which now begin to rain down onto the forest floor for other unsuspecting ants to inhale’ 
(1995, 4–5). Weschler talks to David Wilson, the MJT’s founder, about the ant: ‘“But at 
another level,” David continued, “we were drawn to that particular instance because it 
seemed so metaphorical. That's one of our mottoes here at the museum: Ut Translatio 
Natura––Nature as Metaphor. I mean, there've been times in my own life when I felt exactly 
like that ant––impelled, as if possessed, to do things that defy all common sense.  That ant is 
me.  I couldn't have summed up my own life better if I'd made him up all by myself.”  “But 
David,” I wanted to say (and didn't), “you did make him up all by yourself!”’ (63) Following 
up the story with a biologist, Weschler is unsettled to discover that the MJT’s uncanny B-
movie biohorror about a zombie ant – which Wilson describes as seeming-metaphorical – is 
a fiction at all, but a conflation: all of the unlikely details are taken from fact.  
89 It forms part of my collection on polar exploration and whaling in British colonialism, 
assembled for an unrealised exhibit about the history of Biscoe House: a whaling station on 
Deception Island.  Later used as a military base and research laboratory, John Affey was 
storing his collection at the station before the buildings was destroyed by a volcanic 
mudslide. 
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90 I asked if Mr. Wilson had heard of Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of As-if.  He replied he 
had a copy on his bedside table, but hadn’t made much headway with it.  I admitted I hadn’t 
either. 
91 MJT,  2002, 57. 
92 MJT, 2002, 62. 
93 I was in a fragile state: thrilled to be visiting; destabilised by the failure of my marriage, 
and its unexpected consequence––finally coming out as trans.  My failure to write up the trip 
was not a lack of care, but too much.  Over lunch with Danae, it struck me that the JAM 
acting director Rev. Adam Origen – an elderly man I have only met briefly in person, but had 
many long, rambling phonecalls with – could be represented by a puppet emu.  I’ve never 
made the puppet, nor the videos I had hoped to produce with Origen.  Talking with Danae, I 
could picture the emu clearly: wearing half-moon spectacles, legs protruding from the 
sleeves of a worn tweed blazer, introducing YouTubers to the story behind JAM, with Origen 
providing voiceover in his camp, meticulous way.  Originally from New Zealand but long 
settled in a bedsit above the Royal Vauxhall Tavern, Origen’s voice is an exquisite fake of a 
mid-century English gentleman, continually voicing absurdities in the driest possible tones.  
I never made the puppet or video. In the intervening years Origen distanced himself from 
JAM, unhappy with the ‘consultancy’ direction the new Board are taking.  He has since 
passed away.  As I write, my own impossible project haunts me, the sense that whatever I 
have made is nothing compared to that left un-done.  
94 Museums of the World, 2014. 
95 Canine cosmonauts feature in Pamuk’s Museum of Innocence, particularly Chapter/Case 
34 ‘Like A Dog in Outer Space’. The background is a naïve painting of Laika travelling 
toward the viewer in a tin can spaceship, with a spiral behind.  See A Line Joining 
Moments. 
96 Khipu is a pre-Colombian system of writing from the Andes using knots ~ another 
fascination of mine.  See Looping Topology. 
97 Furness Jayne, 1962, 9. 
98 Rugoff, 1995, 73. 
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A Line Joining Moments 
Revisiting the Museum of Innocence, 2014-2018 
Clair Le Couteur 
“The pamphlet Masymiyet Müzesi, the museum of innocence – given to me when I 
entered Orhan Pamuk’s Museum of Innocence (MOI) – is structured as a series 
of questions:  What is the Museum of Innocence?  What is the novel The 
Museum of Innocence?  What is exhibited in the Museum of Innocence?  One 
seems less straightforward:  
What is the Spiral of Time? 
The ‘Spiral of Time,’ which is found right on the floor at the entrance of the museum, 
can be seen from every floor.  If Aristotle thought of time as a line joining moments 
worth remembering, Orhan Pamuk sees the story as a line joining the objects 
described in the novel.  This is the thought at the hear t of both the museum and the 
novel.  While the spiral represents time and the story itself, the golden dots represent 
moments in time, or the individual objects within the story. 
This spiral echoes the museum’s structure: a residential building, gutted to form 
a series of mezzanines.  Small wooden vitrines line the walls, grouping objects 
with a seemingly naïve, nostalgic ‘dime store surrealism’ aesthetic.99 The cases are 
numbered in sequence, corresponding to chapters in The Museum of Innocence 
(TMOI) novel.100 At the top is a ‘Penthouse’ where Kemal, the museum-novel’s 
Nabokovian narrator, spent his final years, dictating the story to Pamuk.  Besides 
a toy tricycle, bed, and chair – roped off in the style of a house museum – the 
attic space is a reading room, with seating and translations of the novel in 
several languages.  Looking down the stairwell, the spiral of mezzanines merges 
with the design on the ground floor, creating a moment of ver tigo.  The 
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pamphlet’s cover bears the museum’s logo: a stylised butterfly, formed by four 
spirals: a diagram of the lost butterfly earring.  Following this earring through the 
novel-and-museum is a shell game, foregrounding the narrator-collector’s 
continual omissions, misrepresentations and falsehoods.101  Though the museum’s 
stated themes are innocence, love, collecting, and memories, the tropes 
emerging are guilt, obsession, theft, and lies.102 Kemal repeatedly lies to other 
characters, and even to himself, and admits having ‘concealed a few habits’ from 
his visitors.103  
 
“The Spiral of Time’s single narrative thread, curves upon itself, generating a 
form, an emblem.  Objects and events recur, the contents and arrangements of 
cases and chapters reflect each other.  The ‘Aristotelian’ line becomes a network.  
Both this ‘line joining objects’ and the phrase ‘the hear t of…the novel’ echo 
Pamuk’s theory of the novel and its ‘secret centre.’104  For Pamuk, 
correspondences between different characters’ accounts allow readers to model 
a shared, objective time, generating ‘the [novel’s] deep, secret centre, related not 
to history, but to life itself and its structure.’105 Knowledge of this centre is 
intuited from a multi-dimensional fictive space, recalling Dennet’s analogic centre 
of gravity.106 Stripping away the building, the visitors, the city, I envisioned a spiral 
of constellations hanging in darkness: bric-a-brac, household goods, 
adver tisements, documents, postcards, novels, cinema posters.  An assemblage of 
nested assemblages.  Repetitions and symmetries folding one thing to another, 
and out to other books, films, paintings, people, places.  The museum had 
become a tangle of associations: a double helix of flight paths, aerials. 
Innumerable guylines anchored into culture, ‘dynamic lines in space’.107  
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“Following these lines, modelling the Spiral, the loci begin to twist into a 
basketwork, woven about a dark emptiness at the museum’s hear t.108  The 
Museum of Innocence is not a love story, any more than Vladimir Nabokov’s 
Lolita is.109  Though neither Pamuk nor his commentators mention it – somehow 
absent from every critique I have read, or the publicity surrounding the 
European Museum of the Year Award it won in 2014 – the true genre is 
psychological horror.  A wealthy narrator-collector, repeatedly exposed as a 
pathological liar, a kleptomaniac, and worse.  Things repeatedly go missing, are 
stolen and substituted, betraying a compulsive manipulation of the other 
characters.  Betraying that Kemal’s museum-novel was always intended to 
control his legacy by accessioning Füsun’s life: 
But when we reach the point when our lives take on their final shape, as in a novel, we 
can identify our happiest moment.  […] We can bear the pain only by possessing 
something of that instant.  These mementos preserve the… delights as they were more 
faithfully, in fact, than can those who accompanied us through those moments… [I]t 
was at this, the happiest moment of my life, that the earring, whose shape I’d failed to 
notice fell from Füsun’s lovely ear onto the blue sheet. 
  Anyone remotely interested in the politics of civilisation will be aware that 
museums are the repositories of those things from which Western Civilisation derives 
its wealth of knowledge, allowing it to rule the world… [W]hen the true collector, on 
whose effor ts these museums depend, gathers together his first objects, he almost 
never asks himself what will be the ultimate fate of his hoard.  When their first pieces 
passed into their hands, the first true collectors––who would later exhibit, categorise, 
and catalogue their great collections (in the first catalogues, which were the first 
encyclopaedias)––initially never recognised these objects for what they were.110 
The secret centre lies in the gap between these two paragraphs.  This recurring 
scene unites themes of possession, control, memory, pseudo-ethnographic 
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collecting, and the power of the museum.  Inconsistencies in the narration, 
uncomfor table asides and seemingly superfluous details (‘failed to notice’), 
betray that obsessive kleptomania pre-dated Kemal’s ‘love’ for Füsun.  Revisiting 
this passage, I’m convinced Kemal took the earring intentionally; he already 
intended building a museum to himself by appropriating the life of his beautiful, 
younger, poorer relation.111 Kemal first steals Füsun’s belongings, then those of 
her family, before finally – following her violent death – taking possession of 
their entire house, gutting it for his Museum.112 
 
“As Ilya Kabakov – another fictive museum ar tist113 – stated of works that fuse 
ar tworks and commentaries, the texts in the Museum of Innocence form a 
‘unified organism’ with the ar tefacts.  This ‘matrimonial pair’ cannot simply be 
taken at face value, nor in isolation.114  The ‘central point’ is only ever 
approached tangentially.  It can be understood only as a centre of gravity, 
triangulated among a constellation of other reference points.  Even those 
elements that seem to signal the meaning most clearly, resisting paraphrase, fail 
to do so when taken out of context.115 For Bernd Magnus, this characterises 
literature and cer tain philosophical texts, which employ irony, allusion and 
implication: the ‘style…cannot be divorced from the thought it expresses’.116  
 
“The MOI is a monument to Kemal’s ‘happiest moment’––claiming Füsun’s 
virginity.  This preoccupation structures Chapter/Case 23, ‘Silence’.  A ‘specially 
commissioned’ Ottoman-style painting of seagulls references the narrator’s 
unpleasant associations between kissing, and a memory of a gull regurgitating 
food for her chick.  Beneath it, the heel of Füsun’s ‘dir ty white sneaker’ hovers 
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above her ‘childish’ white underwear.117 In Turkey, as in many Arabic cultures, the 
the shoe is highly charged, a grave symbolic insult to anything towards which the 
sole is turned.118  The complexity and specificity of each composition in the 
museum’s display cases generate a kind of para-linguistic thinking, generating 
relevant textual associations, belying its sentimental memento aesthetic. 
 
“The museum’s various voices are marked not only by tensions and 
incompatibilities, but substitutions and slippages: Pamuk as assemblage ar tist; 
Pamuk as metafictional author, who both appears in the story and writes the 
final chapter from the first person;119 Kemal, the fictive narrator, whose first-
person account Pamuk ghost-writes; Kemal’s ‘anthropologist’ accounting of his 
own obsession, and his Europhile attempt to turn it into a cultural ar tefact of 
knowledge and power ; the Kemal hidden from himself and his readers, whose 
lying, thefts, and jealous violence are mentioned off-handedly, blithely explained 
away; and finally Füsun, speaking only through Pamuk-Kemal’s ventriloquism.  The 
novelist, the obsessional collector, the compromised anthropologist, torn 
between his ‘native gir l’ and the attempt to classify, catalogue and control her, 
her society, and those aspects of himself he has dissociated.  These forces pull 
the Spiral in opposing directions, as do hints of the political unrest in Turkey 
during the years narrated; the strains on a national character caught between 
incompatible demands of Ottoman heritage, Islamic society, bitter political 
infighting, and European modernity.   
 
“The fictive space the MOI constructs between its East and West faces – 
emblematised in Pamuk’s double-sided case for his ‘East-West watch’120 – models 
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the social realities of late twentieth century Istanbul, and Pamuk’s critique of 
museums and mastery.  The ‘unpalatable anthropological truth’ that Turkish 
culture – and, implicitly, European colonial knowledge – is violently misogynistic, 
jealous, possessive, and irrational, marked by a gendered obsession with 
‘mastery’.121 Plumwood argues master y lies at the hear t of the violent dualisms 
underwriting colonial modernity.122 Mastery links Kemal’s ‘love’ to tropes of 
collection, possession, and control, and to supposedly-rational structures of 
knowledge and representation inherent to the museum, the institutionalisation 
of the collector’s act.  By writing himself into the hear t of his project, Pamuk 
enables an allusive, unspoken model of both ‘East’ and ‘West’ that does not 
position itself outside its own space of critique, but is radically self-implicating.  
This model is potentially available to all visitors willing to gather together 
sufficient points to trace the Spiral, and locate its centre.123  In the trans-modal 
Museum of Innocence project, Pamuk unifies his theory of the novel as a 
collection of points mapping a space with a sense of the material life of things: 
‘the visual and verbal centres… moving closer to each other…perhaps nested 
one inside the other, and not located on opposite sides of the brain’.124  As 
Maria Fusco states, ‘the processes of reading and looking are irreducible’ and 
‘cannot be accurately compared’, and yet their ‘embodied relations…[in] actually 
experiencing…are compound; you can’t pull them apar t’.125  The fictive museum 
is an associative space in which embodied relations are not ‘accurately 
compared’, but form a centre of comparison that remains empty.” 
 
99 Borrowing from Simic, 2011. 
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100 Several cases are unfinished, covered by red velvet curtains, a fact mentioned in the 
illustrated catalogue: The Innocence of Objects (Pamuk, 2012). 
101 The earring takes centre stage in Case /Chapter 1, where Kemal claims to have taken his 
distant cousin Füsun’s virginity during an affair.  This is the first ‘collection’, described as-if 
this theft – and repeated failure to return the earring – are accidental.  Questions of the 
whereabouts of both earrings occur repeatedly. Shortly before her death in a car accident, 
Füsun is mysteriously wearing one, apparently confusing Kemal (Pamuk, 2010, 487).  
Kemal insists Füsun’s mother stole the earrings after he allegedly returned them, left in the 
family bathroom, (Ch. 49). In this scene, a drunken Kemal stands before a mirror, revealing 
he not only continually steals things – substituting other ‘gifts’ for them, which he later steals 
– but desires possession so complete he can become Füsun.  Kemal claims he can ‘speak 
through her mouth’ (243), a distorted reflection of the act of every novelist.  Earlier passages 
take on new resonance (15). As Kemal is revealed to have invented entire conversations, we 
are left suspecting he substitutes Füsun’s words with what she ‘really meant’, and that many 
episodes with ‘Füsun’ are Kemal talking to a mirror (Ch.11). 
102 See for example 49–55. 
103 Eg. a pattern of abusive silent calls to Füsun’s family home (183). 
104 Pamuk, 2011, 78. 
105 Pamuk, 2011, 82. 
106 Dennett, 1993, 431. See A Theorist’s Fiction. 
107 Deleuze, 1994, 110. 
108 Pamuk, 2010, 512. 
109 Azar Nafisi’s description of Lolita could apply equally to Füsun: she ‘belongs to a 
category of victims who have no defence and are never given a chance to articulate their own 
story… [becoming] a double victim––not only her life but also her life story is taken from 
her’ (Solnit, 2015).  Many academic readers insist any feminist interpretation of Lolita – 
indeed any identification with the character of Lolita at all – is to ‘entirely misunderstand 
Nabokov’.  Annotated versions of Lolita used at American colleges explicitly deny the 
associations they draw are interpretive; Carl Proffer claims he is merely providing ‘keys to 
some of the technical puzzles’ as-if the puzzles are disconnected from the abduction and rape 
of a child.  These claims ignore Nabokov’s own statements that ‘bare facts’ are ‘never really 
quite bare’ and ‘do not exist in a state of nature.’ (Pifer, 2008.) 
110 Pamuk, 2010, 98. Cf. Bal, 1998, 101. 
111 ‘I would dream happily of a museum… where I could tell my story though the things that 
Füsun had left behind, as a lesson to us all. […] I was coming to see myself as…an 
anthropologist who had fallen in love with a native girl while living among the indigenous 
folk…to study and catalogue their habits and rituals.’ (495–6). 
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112 Kemal’s attempts at possession begin with efforts to persuade a 12-year-old Füsun to 
‘sacrifice’ her ‘most valuable thing’ to someone she loved (38–9).  If Kemal not only 
‘collected’ her earring intentionally, but did not in fact ever convince Füsun to give him her 
virginity, the entire surface unravels and something far darker appears.  Kemal’s prurient 
description of Füsun’s corpse is a clue: ‘…the curves of her buttocks; and her soul, which 
had always drawn me to her––remained intact.’ (488–9). Details of the fatal car crash gain 
new significance: ‘I pinned Füsun to the hood of the car… Füsun knew she was about to die, 
and during those two or three seconds she told me with pleading eyes that she didn’t really 
want to, that she would cling to life as long as she could, hoping for me to save her.  But I 
could only smile at my beautiful fiancée…’ (486–8) Did Kemal murder Füsun, faking the 
accident to cover it up? 
113 See Crystals on a Chandelier. 
114 Kabakov, 2000, 257–8. 
115 I am finding it impossible to describe the MOI without becoming possessed by its style: 
repetitive asides, long, complex sentences, extended descriptions of seemingly-irrelevant 
details become inextricable from the unfolding of its looping structures.  I reshuffle 
sentences, paragraphs, footnotes, searching for some order where an constellation of 
associations reads as a linear, coherent argument, relevant detail and cross-references sitting 
comfortably in the notes.  Aware all the while that, like Pamuk – infected with the stylistic 
structures of my subject – I take up the voice of a monster, finding it inseparable from my 
own. 
116 Magnus, 1997, 135. 
117 See Pamuk, 2012, 124–5. 
118 A glass of milky rakı associates the shoe’s insult to Füsun’s white underwear with the 
forbidden consumption of alcohol.  The shoe points toward an invitation card for Kemal’s 
engagement party to Sibel.  Above, sap drips from the tip of a realistic model of a ripe fig: a 
complex symbol in Middle Eastern cultures, symbolising initiation and knowledge, standing 
for the forbidden fruit of Eden, and signifying female sexuality.  The white sap has evident 
sexual connotations.  On shoe symbolism in Islamic cultures, see Gammell, 2008. 
119 ‘“I’m writing the novel in the first person singular,” said Orhan…”’ (Pamuk, 2010, 525). 
120 Pamuk, 2012, 248. 
121 ‘Having raised the question of “mastery,” I would like to return to a matter at the very 
heart of my story…virginity was still regarded as the treasure that young girls should protect 
until the day they married.  […] Clever readers will have sensed that I have placed this 
anthropology lesson here to allow myself a chance to cool off from… [my overpowering] 
jealousy…’ (Pamuk, 2010, 61–4). 
122 See Mappings Between the Pairs. 
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123 ‘[T]he composition of a novel entails the search for an imaginary point from which one 
can see the whole.’ (Pamuk, 2011, 73). 
124 Pamuk, 2011, 94–5. 
125 Fusco, 2014. 
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Making Uncomfortable Parallels 
Cursed Heads and Constellations at Warrington Museum, 2016 
Both in its singularity and its ubiquity within the landscape of the colonizer, the 
ethnographic museum can be understood as a household: a household of foreign 
matter. […] To work with it is to become contaminated: there is no redemption. 
Everything I tell you today will be contaminated… If I want to work in a museum 
where redemption is possible, then I don’t go to an ethnographic museum.126 
A green eye in a net of tensions.  A digital photograph, laser printed onto A5 
card.  Eyelets reinforce each corner ; elastic tags lead to other images, which lead 
to others.  A network of 144 slides: a map~model~portrait of a Britain’s oldest 
municipal museum.127 Each slide bears a four-digit accession number, generated 
by a twelve-sided dice.  They hang in Warrington Museum and Art Gallery 
(WMAG), in a mezzanine void between the World Stories Gallery – formerly 
Slide 131.1:  JAM.RBTT.805;5 ~ Green Eye / The Cursed Gaze 
Warrington Museum and Art Gallery, 2017 
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the Ethnology Hall – and the Fish Gallery above.  Around the mezzanine are six 
viewing stations with pairs of binoculars and wire-bound catalogues.128 A nearby 
label states the installation Roots Between the Tides (2016) was made in 
collaboration with the John Affey Museum.  
 
From the green eye, tags lead to the carved wooden head to which the green 
eye belongs, and to a 1955 Warrington Guardian ar ticle: ’MYSTERY OF THE 
HOODOO129 HEAD/ Mishaps dogged owners––then Museum got it!’130  
Guylines of fluorescent “?AMNESIA?” brand memory-free monofilament connect 
the network of images to iron stanchions, the mezzanine railing, roof beams 
above, and to six 12oz wreck-fishing weights suspended below.  Beneath a 
stanchion connected to the eye, in one of the wooden-framed vitrines lining the 
room, the carving itself is labelled ‘Head of a Lohan.’131  Blobs of paint added to 
the eyes, and a cut to the mouth, lend a buck-toothed, sidelong guise.  According 
to the newspaper, and information supplied to by museum staff, these alterations 
were made to stop the allegedly-cursed carving’s accusatory stare following its 
former owner around the room.  The 1955 ar ticle credits the curse with causing 
a series of ‘car accidents, punctures and trouble with the police’.132 An 
anonymous 2008 ar ticle in Countr y Life online extends the threat to ‘broken legs’ 
and a recent car accident suffered by ‘a new manager at the museum’.133 The 
carving’s label does not mention the curse, but contemporary educational 
worksheets for children produced by the museum refer to it.  The Guardian 
credits the carving to ‘a warlike headhunter’ and the curse to ‘a witch doctor’ in 
‘the primitive jungle of Nor th Borneo’.134 Countr y Life asser ts the curse is written 
on the head in ‘an ancient, indecipherable language’.  One staff member tells us 
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there is no sign of writing anywhere on it, another that the curse is on a scroll 
hidden inside the carving. 
 
The head was kept on top of a filing cabinet in the Museum Director’s office as 
a mascot135 and not included in the museum’s formal displays until recently.  
Today, Warrington Museum holds the double hermeneutic position of both 
collector and teller of this folktale, used to generate public interest in the 
collection.136 Copies of the ar ticles are kept in the object’s documentation file.  
The story is familiar to museum staff, whose professed reluctance to move the 
head during renovations in 2010 was again covered by the Guardian.137 It 
repor ted the figure ‘represents a Buddhist monk’ and that staff were looking for 
‘willing Buddhists’ to help them move it because of a string of accidents:  ‘It 
might be a coincidence but no-one wants to risk it!’138 That disbelief carries risk 
is implied in the children’s worksheet, describing ‘a new manager’ at the museum 
narrowly escaping injury after refusing to believe the curse.  The ar ticles and 
worksheet record an ongoing performative aspect of the museum’s curse tale.  
Staff adopt the stance that the chain of events could be a coincidence, but… 
 
This fictive position is a characteristic of superstition that Colin Campbell labels 
‘half-belief ’; veridicality is explicitly questioned, but actions are still performed as-
if the tale were true.139 Ironically, in earnest, or both, over the last half-century 
repeated speech acts, gestures, and decisions by museum staff and visitors 
(including our researcher) act as-if the carving not only has the power to cause 
accidents, but possesses the capacity to make sense of its surroundings.  An 
associative constellation has formed, a knotting together of multiple elements: 
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the carving’s complex, knowing gaze; the paradoxical status of the museum 
documenting and par ticipating in a paranormal folktale; postcolonial British 
culture’s deeply conflicted relationship to racially charged questions of ‘black 
magic’; and the cognitive mechanisms of superstition.  The fictive curse structure 
flickers between playful make-believe, ironic joke, uncer tain unease, and deep 
paranoia, and their corresponding cultural modes.  Openly scoff, and any 
accident that befalls you will tie you into the tale forever.  Confirmation bias 
quickly reconfigures denial and disbelief into moves within the curse’s narrative 
game, a ver tiginous gravity-well familiar to victims of social persecution: the 
more passionate one’s resistance to the narrative, the more one’s resistance 
empowers it.140 
 
Why did we change the galler y? asks one of the few interpretive texts in the 
renovated World Stories Gallery.  In place throughout the twentieth century, 
previous labels interpreted the collection with the progress narrative of 
scientific racism.141 The new text never explicitly mentions racism, merely stating 
the labels were ‘inappropriate for today’s diverse society’, above a reproduction 
label: The Races of Man and their Cultures.  That the labels were changed because 
they were ‘eye-wateringly’ racist142 – and that racism is wrong not only morally, 
but scientifically and historically – is absent.  Instead, the label implies, we 
changed the gallery because others – the diverse element in society – find it 
inappropriate: race must not be discussed.   
 
The name, labelling and arrangement of the gallery was changed.  According to 
curator Craig Sherwood:  ’We took out the Stone Age, Iron Age, Bronze Age 
 
 
 
65 
from that gallery, because that was making uncomfor table parallels.  And I think 
probably sending out messages that we didn’t want to send’.143 Other cultures 
continued to employ technologies used in Britain in the distant past.  We believe 
more complex technologies demonstrate an evolved, progressive state, and hence 
moral, intellectual, and racial superiority as an ethno-national culture.  As 
Sherwood’s sensitivity to WMAG’s institutional voice demonstrates, 
‘uncomfor table parallels’ continued to generate implicit progress mythology 
even after explicit interpretation has been removed: the associative constellation 
of scientific racism persists in our postcolonial British culture.  Such implicit 
common knowledge is shared by a museum’s community, generating a subject 
position Christopher Whitehead labels the imagined visitor.144 The imagined 
visitor is a fictive entity with real agency, the centre of a cognitive-material 
assemblage: linguistic, material and gestural vocabularies; spatial arrangements 
and juxtapositions; cultural positioning and institutional history; explicit 
statements, and silences.145 Though staff have difficulty with racist comments 
from local visitors – whose complaints prompted the Why did we change…? 
label – they are perhaps less conscious of the responsibility WMAG itself bears 
for local ideologies. 
 
An ar tefact haunted by institutional folktale presents difficulties, even for 
Whitehead’s nuanced model of museum interpretation.  Whitehead distinguishes 
‘two main curatorial registers’ – text production and environmental factors – and ‘a 
third register… the emotional and personal contexts and vicissitudes of the 
visit’.146 WMAG’s propagation of the curse entangles these categories, operating 
in a parallel register of reputation, rumour or hearsay, neither individual nor 
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universal, more amenable to diagrammatic car tography than linear narration.  In 
Whitehead’s view – building on the work of Eilean Hooper-Greenhill147 – the 
museum produces a non-metaphorical cultural car tography.  ‘[T]he map is not 
simply a metaphor… the museum can be understood as a map (it is not ‘like’ a 
map), albeit one with different expressive potentials…notably the augmented 
scope for narrativisation…a spatial means of separating bodies of objects and 
knowledge’.148 WMAG’s postcolonial institutional folktale – a pattern of meaning 
distributed among local newspapers, institutional performance, promotional and 
educational materials, online ar ticles, and the materiality of the ar tefact as both 
subject and object of the narrative – is one of many points of depar ture for 
Roots Between the Tides, JAM’s collaborative research project with WMAG.  
Others include a pigeon’s nest made from Rylands wire scraps, a painted cast of 
a Māori head mistakenly represented by the BBC as a toi moko, a file of magpie 
ephemera from the museum stores… 
 
RBTT functions as a proposal for a new museum car tography: neither object nor 
label, archive nor display, but combining their features.  In contrast to the 
museum’s ‘spatial means of separating’ bodies – grouping by geography, 
chronology or kind into discrete vitrines – JAM’s method knots or nets together.  
RBTT is a diagrammatic model of relations within a collection of slides; 
reframings of WMAG, its collections and context.  The model hangs between 
one gallery and another, between object and label, between exhibit and archive.  
It is a sculptural development of the montage principles of Aby Warburg’s 
Atlas,149 informed by a contemporary network aesthetic but requiring only the 
basic technologies: photographic reproduction; lists and tables; elastic cord and 
eyelets; a ladder and gaff.  RBTT mirrors what Whitehead terms the museum’s 
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‘augmented scope for narrativisation’, modelling interconnection and providing 
an armature upon which narration can be hung.  Our imagined visitor examines 
slides of the green eye, the carving, the newspaper ar ticle, looks up the 
corresponding pages in the printed catalogue, questions museum staff, and 
searches for detail on the internet.  Attempting to re-model the mapping 
operations of museum poetics, RBTT functions as falsework150 for generating 
interpretation, rather than producing explicit narrative itself.  The resulting 
constellation is one of many possible iterations of a set of relations, contingent 
upon the space in which it is installed, the lengths of elastic used, and the 
star ting points selected: one possible round of a game, which could be re-played, 
detaching the modular components from each another and beginning again. 
 
126 Deliss, 2014. 
127 These extra-long tags were donated by Kalsi Tags, Kent. ‘Treasury tags’ have a British 
colonial history. ‘India tags’: string with metal crossbars made by HM Stationery Office for 
the India Office, were later confused with a different type used by HM Treasury.  (Wikipedia 
contributors, 2017). 
128 Below the slide’s accession number, each catalogue page provides two lists: hashtags and 
elastic tags. The catalogues are incomplete, inviting visitors to add other connections, notes, 
sketches, jokes, etc. Some of the first collaborators were groups of local schoolchildren, who 
were encouraged to add to the catalogues and make nets of their own hand-drawn slides 
during a day of workshops. 
129 Hoodoo is a 19th century American word for ‘black magic’, a corruption of Voudoun, 
religious practices of the Afro-Caribbean diaspora, particularly the former slave plantations 
of Haiti.  On the link between Voudoun, race, genre horror and colonialism, see Bishop, 
2008. 
130 Warrington Guardian, 1955, 9. 
131 Lohan are Buddhist saints, often depicted in Chinese and Japanese carvings as temple 
guardians (Perkins, 1998, 298–299). 
132 Warrington Guardian, 1955. 
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133 Country Life, 2008. 
134 Warrington Guardian, 1955. 
135 Mascot – a person or thing kept for good luck – derives from the Provençal mascotto: 
‘little witch’. 
136 One example of the curse as promotional tool is ‘Rotten Luck’, part of Culture24’s 
Museums at Night UK festival: ‘This eerie event, set among display cases featuring a 
mummy, a cursed head, and plenty of scary dolls…’ (Warrington Museum and Art Gallery, 
2016). Coincidentally, an exhibit at the MJT is called ‘Rotten Luck: The Decaying Dice of 
Ricky Jay’, displaying decomposing dice made from celluloid, collected ‘in the attempt to 
acquire empirical knowledge’ (MJT, n.d.). 
137 Warrington Guardian, 2010. 
138 Warrington Guardian, 2010. 
139 Campbell, 1996. 
140 Similar mechanisms unite conspiracy theorising and disciplines like psychoanalysis, see 
Jane & Fleming, 2014, 123–4. 
141 Sherwood & Le Couteur, 2016.  
142 Sherwood & Le Couteur, 2016. 
143 Sherwood & Le Couteur, 2016. 
144 Whitehead, 2012, 47.  Imagined visitor recalls literary theorist Wayne Booth’s implied 
reader, developed in Iser, 1974. 
145 Whitehead, 2012, 47. 
146 Whitehead, 2012, xiv. 
147 Hooper-Greenhill, 2000, 17–18. 
148 Whitehead, 2012, 24. 
149 See This Form That Thinks. 
150 Falsework is a term for scaffolding built to provide temporary support during the 
construction of another permanent structure, such as a bridge. 
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A Minor Paranoia 
Claes Oldenburg’s Mouse Museum (1965-77) was first shown internationally at 
documenta V in 1972, the same event at which Marcel Broodthaers exhibited 
Section Publicité, the final iteration of his Musée de l’Art Moderne (1968-72).  Built 
as an annex to Mouse Museum, Ray Gun Wing (1977) is a collection of around 
300 ‘ray guns’, which includes Oldenburg’s reproductions of mid-twentieth 
century science fiction toys, alongside found, made and altered things in 
materials from knotted rope to chocolate.  The collection is arranged in vitrines 
themselves laid out in ray gun form, revealed by a framed map of the exhibit.  
As Oldenburg describes: ‘Ray gun would become a catch title for all sor ts of 
things.  Looking down on the street, I would find this angle in the shape of a ray 
gun everywhere.  And I would collect the ray guns; they became quite an 
obsession.  If you spell ray gun backwards it’s nug yar, which is very close to New 
York: New York, Nug Yar.’151  Yve-Alain Bois explains that ‘Oldenburg made huge 
numbers of ray guns… but he soon saw that he didn’t even need to make them: 
the world was full of ray guns… Even better he did not even need to collect 
them himself: he could ask friends to bring them to him…’152  Together, Bois and 
Oldenburg’s descriptions sketch out a heuristic method; a curiously targeted, 
collective game of pareidolia, verging on apophenia. 
 
Pareidolia is the ‘man in the moon’ phenomenon: a distinct figure perceived in a 
ground of indeterminate sense-data.  A cloud that looks like a whale; a trash 
heap that looks like a museum.  This perceptual state, where one thing is seen 
as-if another, hovering between sensing and inventing, was famously 
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recommended by Leonardo Da Vinci as a creative method.153 But in Ray Gun 
Wing, a childlike act of make-believe – where any stick with the right angle 
becomes a ray gun for the game – metastasises into something else.  That 
Oldenburg’s fictive museum has stepped from pareidolic play into the world of 
apophenia154 is hinted both in his admission that the game became ‘an obsession’ 
while walking the streets of New York, and in his occult translation of the name 
of the project into Nug Yar.  Regardless that sci-fi ‘ray guns’ don’t really exist, by 
paying them enough attention, making them, projecting them onto the city, 
finding par ts of the city that echoed them back – and then getting his friends, 
and eventually museum visitors to do the same – Oldenburg had conjured ray 
guns into resonant being.  But, like the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, he was no longer 
the ray guns’ master.  Conceptual polarities of real|imaginary and 
creation|discovery were intensified, warped and entangled, and a fictive space 
was generated.  This is what network theorist and ar tist Anna Munster, building 
on the philosophy of William James, describes as the perceptible rather than 
perception or sensation as such; the perceptible ‘arises when perception-action 
has already occurred and is then matched to something already known… a 
pattern seen in data.’155 Ray guns, like the Mar tians, had taken over, and 
Oldenburg couldn’t help seeing them everywhere. 
 
‘Although,’ as Da Vinci says, ‘it may appear trivial and even ludicrous,’156 this 
apophenic gesture of (mis)labelling – stripped back to its most minimal, 
repetitive move in Ray Gun Wing – is key to understanding the fictive museum.  
Some symmetry countermands our vision of the bent wire, the chipped 
concrete, or the knotted rope, co-opting them into the museum’s method, 
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generating a gestalt reading as-if ray gun.  That this exercise in hacking the 
perceptible takes the form of a fictive museum display reveals a potential, 
inherent in the seemingly simple act of arranging sets of things in vitrines, and 
even in the act of labelling – or naming – itself: the potential for institutional 
typology to generate a communicable insanity.157 Categories, classes, types and 
kinds all exhibit what DeLanda describes as ‘double determination’ or double 
causality: wholes require par ts to exist at all (upward causality), but as wholes 
they produce generative effects, influencing the creation of their par ts 
(downward causality).158  The Ray Gun Wing extension of Oldenburg’s Mouse 
Museum is an echo-chamber tuned to specific resonances in the perceptible.  A 
search engine, relentlessly pattern-matching not to a Platonic ideal form – 
existing on some timeless and universal cosmic plane of vir tuality – but to a ‘ray 
gun’ heuristic algorithm, a set of cognitive conditions subtly altered by every 
addition to the assemblage of things, events, performances, and people.  An 
associative constellation is formed between one ‘ray gun’ and the next, between 
that pair and the group surrounding it, and the group in the adjacent case, the 
layout of the cases and their labelling, and the whole assemblage and its para-
textual labelling – title, authorship, commentary – in the context of 
contemporary ar t. 
 
Ray Gun Wing echoes an early museological method or technology of display: 
the typological style, still seen today in the Pitt-Rivers Museum, and once 
common to both natural history and ethnology.159  This is the nineteenth-
century practice parodied by Gustave Flauber t’s ‘loony’160 fictional museologists 
Bouvard and Pécuchet, who create a phallic wing of their amateur museum, 
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where an assor tment of perfectly ordinary things are rendered ‘indecent’ by 
taking them out of context, arranging them in such a way that their form stands 
out.161  The indecency lies in the collectors’ insistence on seeing the objects as-if 
phallic, and in infecting their visitors with this same disciplinary obsession.  What 
the obsessional institutional move that both Flauber t’s inept pair and Claes 
Oldenburg have in common is that they produce a vantage point from which 
everything begins to look like the phallus or the ray gun.  These works expose 
the hidden workings of museum labelling, to borrow the words of William 
Gibson, like ‘discovering a patient whose nervous system is congenitally and fully 
exposed.  It’s just so nakedly obvious’.162  This is the glitch in the typological 
assemblage method that renders it at best an unstable, untrustwor thy science. 
 
In Douglas Crimp’s collection of essays On the Museum’s Ruins (1993) – moving 
from what he describes as a Foucauldian archaeology of the modernist museum 
to a theory of the postmodern163 – Crimp describes this indecent phenomenon 
as a capacity of the ar twork in the museum.  ‘The institution’, Crimp argues, 
‘does not exer t its power only negatively––to remove the work of ar t from the 
praxis of social life––but positively––to produce a specific social relation 
between ar twork and spectator’.164  Discussing the obscenity trial surrounding 
Rober t Mapplethorpe’s work, Crimp observes that ar tworks do not only 
‘represent an object’, but, in doing so, produce ‘a subject effected by, constituted 
in representation through, those structures’.165  For Crimp, the variety of critical 
responses to Mapplethorpe’s work primarily demonstrate how comfor table the 
critic was in occupying the position of a desiring homosexual subject.  This 
observation relates to a key premise shared by psychoanalytic, queer, 
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postcolonial and decolonial theories: in producing the Other, a discourse also 
produces the Self.166  The entire structure of criticality – though ostensibly an 
analysis of the objects on display – therefore becomes suspect: ‘positions are 
occupied in the ensuing controversy as a function of our comfor t in occupying 
[the subject position produced by the ar twork]’.167 
 
What visitors to these museums are experiencing is akin to the Frequency 
Illusion, also called the Baader-Meinhof phenomenon: upon learning a new word, 
for example, we suddenly begin to notice it everywhere.168 The apophenic 
assigns significance to this sudden appearance.  Why have we only begun to notice 
this now? Or for the paranoid Why is this sign suddenly being presented to us, and 
by whom?  Here what Sigmund Freud termed ‘an intellectual function in us which 
demands unity, connection, and intelligibility from any material’ can take over : 
‘unable to establish a true connection, it does not hesitate to fabricate a false 
one’.169 This is the paranoid apophenic style, which posits the most unutterably 
horrifying or fantastical events rather than accept that abhorrent chaos: the 
meaninglessness of sheer contingency.  Emma Jane and Chris Fleming identify 
this as a feature of both sides of contemporary debates around conspiracy 
theories, both the shockingly widespread patterns of paranoid belief, and the 
academic books devoted to debunking them.170 ‘Far from representing a rupture 
with rationalism… conspiracy thinking is actually embarrassingly consistent with 
many ideals of the intellectual tradition that supposedly requires saving from 
conspiracy thinking.’  Jane and Fleming quote Georg W. F. Hegel’s observation 
that one of the founding principles of cer tain kinds of philosophy and theory is 
what we might term absolutist apophenia: ‘the thought that Reason rules the 
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world, and that world history has therefore been rational in its course’.171 In 
Deleuzean terms, this is not Reason per se, but Reason’s Image.  
 
The apophenic subject position produced by Oldenburg’s or Bouvard and 
Pécuchet’s museums is deeply unsettling; the visitor is confronted with their own 
uncer tainty about where the ‘phallic significance’ comes from.  If they don’t want 
to see ray guns, and the ray guns don’t really exist, why are they seeing ray guns 
ever ywhere?  After visiting Ray Gun Wing, investing our attention, we become 
caught up in an infectious knowing that operates – to accession an analogy from 
Ralph Rugoff – like a psychedelic.  Writing on the MJT, Rugoff describes his 
experience of the exhibits having induced a kind of ‘stoned thinking,’ a ‘minor 
paranoia… close to trance,’ in which significance and resemblance seem to 
escape their vitrines, break the quarantine of the exhibit, and seep out into the 
world.172 Once we have entered this wing of Oldenburg’s Mouse Museum, it has 
entered us; now some chance configuration of our senses with the world might 
present us with another ray gun, whether we intend it to or not.  Meaning is 
operating in a way that has no respect for the individual subject.  A self-
assembling, a bootstrapped sympoiesis has co-opted our cognitive pattern 
recognition architecture. 
 
151 Oldenburg, 2013. 
152 Bois & Krauss, 1997, 176. 
153 Da Vinci, 1923, 173. Da Vinci’s method is about pattern perception rather than vision, 
evinced in his example of the sounds of bells. The English nursery rhyme ‘Oranges and 
Lemons,’ which lists what the bells of various London churches ‘sing’, was generated by a 
similar pareidolic method. 
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154 Apophenia is from the German apophänie, coined by psychiatrist Klaus Conrad in 1958 
to describe the ‘unmotivated seeing of connection [accompanied by] a specific feeling of 
abnormal meaningfulness’ experienced in schizophrenic, paranoiac and manic delusion  
(Klaus Conrad, quoted in Hubscher, 2007). Unlike the mere playful resemblances of 
pareidolia, in apophenia the similarities mean something, they are connected, clues to a 
mystery.  A kind of collective apophenia turns the pareidolic resemblance of the Virgin Mary 
on a toasted cheese sandwich, for example, into a cultural icon worth $28,000.  Sandwich is 
matched to Virgin, and so to a cosmic pattern, and to a rationale in which manifestations of 
this kind have great significance.  Acts of belief push this kind of situation past the binary 
boundaries of fact|fiction and into fictive territory; the purchasers of the sacred sandwich 
were not themselves believers, but embedded in a wider culture caught in cognitive 
dissonance between unresolvable polar extremes of scepticism and superstition.  The pop-
cultural icon in question was bought on eBay in 2004 by GoldenPalace.com online casino.  
Its previous owner, Diana Duyser, said ‘I would like all people to know that I do believe that 
this is the Virgin Mary Mother of God’ (Associated Press, 2004). 
155 Munster, 2013, 5. 
156 Da Vinci, 1923, 173.  
157 Farrell, 1998, 44. 
158 DeLanda, 2016, 21. 
159 Today, in institutions such as the British Museum, the typological style is repudiated as 
unscientific, conflated with cabinets of curiosity into a proto-museology, a precursor of real 
museum practice. See Le Couteur, 2015a, 38–40. 
160 Crimp, 1995, 51. 
161 Flaubert, 1881, 103–4. 
162 Gibson, 2011, 168. 
163 Crimp, 1995, 13–19. 
164 Crimp, 1995, 27. 
165 Crimp, 1995, 25. 
166 For Edward Said (1978), drawing on the discourse analysis of Foucault, the discourse of 
Orientalism ‘a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the 
Orient…by which European culture was able to manage––and even produce––the Orient,’ 
and that ‘European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the 
Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self’ (Said, 1979, 3). The Orientalist 
ethnology gallery functions as a kind of negative self-portrait; a representation of everything 
the Occident is not, and hence – borrowing a Jungian term – of the self’s own shadow. 
167 Crimp, 1995, 27. 
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168 Primed to recognise a new type, our cognitive architecture can’t help but identify it. This 
happens at a pre-conscious level, producing the illusion that the type has become more 
frequent than before, or even appeared out of nowhere.  Dubbed the Frequency Illusion by 
Arnold Zwicky in 2006, the experience had already come to be widely known as the Baader-
Meinhof Phenomenon; a user on an internet message board in the mid 1990s linked the 
experience with their sudden awareness of the 1970s terrorist organisation, and the 
description became a meme with has both a Wikipedia entry and a dedicated Facebook page.  
That the label for this phenomenon has a memetic origin seems uncannily fitting (Pacific 
Standard Staff, 2013). 
169 Freud, 2001, 111. 
170 Jane & Fleming, 2014, 132. 
171 Georg W. F. Hegel, quoted in Jane & Fleming, 2014, 123. 
172 Rugoff, 1995, 72–3. 
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A Sudden Change in the Pattern 
Taking fictive museums at their word means becoming complicit in a suspension 
of disbelief, doubtful of reality or ourselves: an analogic as-if mode.  Engaging the 
fictive on its own terms – as a condition of knowledge that refuses the zero-sum 
field of True|False173 – collapses distinctions between literal and figurative 
meaning.  Figures of speech and imagery are taken too literally; coincidental 
details resonate with paranoiac implications, a condition Rugoff labels ‘the 
museum as metaphor’.174  Literal statements collapse, revealed as contingent 
historical assemblages of spatial figuring, overdetermined by allusive psycho-
social associations.  Destabilising the literal|figurative distinction echoes the 
cognitive linguistics of George Lakoff: ‘the power of metaphor to create a reality 
rather than simply give us a way of conceptualising a pre-existing reality’.175 In 
linguistics and philosophy, what constitutes literal meaning, and if it differs from 
the rhetorical or figurative, remains in question.176 Lakoff demonstrates that in its 
presuppositions and its conclusions, abstract reasoning is structured not only by 
metaphoric/metonymic imagery, but by spatial analogies so conventional – 
between, beyond, higher, deeper – we are rarely aware of them.  This is 
par ticular ly true of relations between categories,177 and concepts in dichotomous, 
dualistic, or dialectic opposition.178 
 
Ar tistic research by practice inevitably confronts the paradoxes of disciplinarity, 
institutional conditions of knowledge-production entailing impositions from 
external disciplines that Iser’s heuristic method resists: bureaucratic structures, 
bounded by conventions of writing from Humanities and conventions on 
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practice from Social Sciences.179 These conditions of knowledge-production 
generate significant, widespread anxiety, both externally in institutional culture, 
and internally among practitioners and educators.180 One longstanding 
problematic is the relation of theory, considered in terms of formal language 
(written thesis), and the para-verbal knowledge of practice (body of work). 
Some commentators claim ar tistic knowledge is intuitive, non-linguistic and non-
discursive, and therefore neither rational nor cognitive, a position Henk 
Borgdorff vehemently rejects.181 For Jessica Schwarzenbach and Paul Hackett, 
‘[Friedrich] Schelling’s ideas still influence the discussion concerning verbal 
language as an appropriate explanatory vehicle for works of ar t…[still] fervently 
debated within the ar t community today’.182 Metaphor remains a key term, 
considered in Schelling’s terms as a radical break between the knowledge of 
empirical science, and metaphorical, ar tistic knowledge, offering ‘world 
disclosure, (a way to make things comprehensible…by being par t of the greater 
existential structures of meaning)’.183 However, Clive Cazeaux sees metaphor in 
an expanded, non-dualistic sense, claiming no inherent distinction ‘between 
proper and figurative meaning’, and ‘that while ar t and knowledge are… defined 
in relation to one other, the relation is not always one of opposition’.184 
Cognitive linguists following George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We 
Live By (1980), take the position that metaphorical-analogic relations are 
fundamental to the conditions of knowledge.185 As Lakoff describes: ‘The mind is 
inherently embodied.  Thought is mostly unconscious.  Abstract concepts are 
largely metaphorical.  These are the three major findings of cognitive science.  
More than two millennia of a priori philosophical speculation about these 
aspects of reason are over.’186 Over or not, millennia of language-centred 
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metaphysical philosophy and cultural dualisms structure our contemporary 
image of thought.187 
 
The labels cognition, thinking and knowledge require re-situating.  Cognition is 
approached from the perspective taken, for example, by Edward de Bono188: the 
mind is a complex material system of pattern recognition and association; 
knowledge requires no transcendent element beyond this condition; cognitive 
systems generate significant phenomena in thinking, par ticularly glitches and 
biases.189  In de Bono’s terms, there is no dichotomy or dialectic between 
thinking and feeling.  Mental events, from physical sensation to conceptual 
knowledge, are thinking: ‘the brain is a system in which things happen according 
to the nature of the system.  What happens in the brain is information…the way 
it happens is thinking… Language, notation and mathematics are useful ar tificial 
aids to thinking.  There may be other ar tificial aids which could be invented’.190 
The fictive museum is one such ‘ar tificial aid,’ which Paulo Freire might label a 
‘cognisable object’.191 Contemporary experimental psychology and neuroscience 
have expanded the cognitive beyond something that happens in the brain, 
supplemented by ‘ar tificial’ aids.  Distributed cognition  
is an approach to the study of all cognition… [C]ognitive processes are always 
distributed in some way…across brains, bodies, and a culturally constituted wor ld… An 
individual working alone with material tools is also a distributed cognitive system, as is 
an individual working alone without material tools.  So too is an individual brain 
situated in the body, or the brain without consideration of the body because cognition 
is distributed across the brain.  Even single areas of the brain are studied now as 
systems in which cognitive function is distributed across layers of neurons… 
[D]istributed cognition is not a kind of cognition at all, it is a perspective on cognition.  
(376-377)192 
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Cognitive systems fit Manuel DeLanda’s reworking of Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s concept of the assemblage of assemblages, and its feature of double 
causality.193  This redefining of cognition, which de Bono would term thinking, is 
par t of New Materialism’s emphasis on the fundamentally embodied nature of 
thought.  Thinking and knowing are emergent proper ties of multiple, situated 
bodies, and cannot be abstracted or vivisected from this condition.  Conceptual, 
formal thinking cannot be fully understood – cannot exist – apar t from 
emotional, social, material systems of distributed cognition.  
 
Embodied cognitive perspectives emphasise that so-called ‘higher reasoning 
functions’ appear to use the same modular cognitive systems as spatial 
awareness and movement, and are complexly reliant on emotion and sensation.  
All mental states entail emotional, associative contexts, which can both hinder 
and promote reasoning.194 Emotion and bodily states are only recently being 
seriously investigated as integral to cognition, rather than extrinsic pathologies, 
due to ‘a general sense that emotions are somehow disruptive to “basic” mental 
processes.’195 Seemingly abstract, ‘higher’ cognitive activities – par ticular ly the 
supposedly transcendental, such as semantic reasoning and mathematics – are 
not only reliant on the physical brain, but on those very areas of the brain 
associated with bodily awareness.196 This may be the grand irony of mind/body 
dualism: so-called higher reasoning feels disembodied precisely because it co-opts 
those areas of the brain used for bodily action, like looking for your glasses while 
wearing them. Memory likewise does not correspond with the image of thought; 
cognition does not distinguish categorically between events that happened to 
the self and those experienced through mediation, or between information 
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presented as factual and that presented explicitly as false.  Indeed, false 
memories incorporating distor tions of real experiences, or motivated by 
unconscious biases, are more persistent than genuine ones, and easier to 
recall.197  Both trauma and happiness are associated with distor ted memory, 
while depressed states are statistically more realistic.198  These late twentieth- 
and early twenty-first-century insights from cognitive science re-cut along 
different lines the so-called ‘third narcissistic wound’ to anthropocentrism, which 
Freud ranked alongside the Copernican and Darwinian wounds, and named – 
somewhat narcissistically – after himself.199  Beyond being underwritten (and 
potentially undermined) by The Unconscious, consciousness is revealed as an 
assemblage: multi-stranded processes, contingent upon innumerable modular 
elements of which consciousness is neither in control, nor even aware, and 
which do not correspond to its self-image.200 
 
This is par ticularly true of perception.  The senses are cognitive systems, 
processing visual stimuli long before they reach the brain,201 which itself appears 
to have a maximum frame rate of perception, linked to the subjective passage of 
time.202 Culture-bound spatial metaphors affect our ability to judge 
temporality.203 The findings of experimental physics have suggested for over a 
century that our experiences of space, time, speed and weight as separate 
phenomena bear little if any resemblance to the inherent nature of reality; the 
landscape of ‘spacetime’ can be deformed by sufficient mass-energy-velocity.204 
These findings and those of cognitive science suppor t Jack Halberstam’s 
contestation of the ‘seemingly inevitable, transparent, and neutral rhetorics of 
time and space’.205 Human spatial experience simply does not correspond to the 
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nature of physical reality outside a normative anthropomorphic context, and is 
vulnerable to distor tion effects even within it.  Spatial awareness is modelled by 
multiple cognitive systems; it does not correspond to a ‘map in the head’ 
metaphor.206 Whether through optical illusions or malfunction of any one of the 
necessary modules, it is vulnerable to glitches and uncanny phenomena.207 
Spatiality is an emergent construct of distributed, embodied cognition: space as 
such is a fictive modelling process of associative constellation. 
 
Current embodied-cognitive perspectives relate spatiality in cognition to both 
mathematical and semantic, concept-based thinking.  Spatial representations in 
the brain are activated during the comprehension of language.208  Reading about 
motion through metaphoric description – the road runs through the valley – 
involves ‘mental simulation,’ with measurable effects on task completion.209 
Spatial mechanisms seem to be inherent in the drawing of analogies, that is, in 
the architecture of all knowledge, broadly conceived.210  This suggests a radical 
review of knowledge as inherently, ineluctably spatial and analogous, having first 
redefined the spatial as an emergent cognitive phenomenon, rather a physical 
dimension.  Commonsensical descriptions of cognitive events – including the 
labels natural languages have developed for mental phenomena211 – simply do 
not adequately correspond to what is happening.212  This is par ticular ly true of 
what Val Plumwood describes as the network of dualisms connected by linking 
postulates, which structures our cultural landscape and model of thought.213 
 
Building on these perspectives, we can outline some features of cognition 
relevant for the production of knowledge in the fictive museum: 
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• Cognition is material, taking place in and amongst assemblages of thinking 
things. 
• Cognition is distributed and situated, generated amongst heterogeneous 
modular elements within and without the body, each affecting cognitive 
process.   
• Cognition is associative and analogous, with ‘integral affect.’214 
• Cognition and memory do not feature inherent category distinctions 
between self and other, experience and invention, true and false. 
• Cognition is spatial, co-opting perceptual systems evolved for bodily 
awareness and control in order to model abstract, conceptual domains. 
 
In its structural isomorphisms with these features of cognition, the fictive 
museum approaches the modelling of cognitive space itself, e.g. by the repeated 
use of similar analogical relationships across many domains, media, instances, 
scales.  The simplest and most evident example of this is Oldenburg’s ‘ray gun’ 
move, but the same principle of limitless analogy is operational in what Krauss 
labels as Broodthaers ‘eagle principle’.215 In foregrounding the systemic effects, 
the glitches and instabilities of cognitive space, the fictive museum both 
intervenes in and re-shapes it.  The fictive museum makes those interventions 
available for visitors as opportunities for knowledge and critical awareness, 
working with institutional cognitive space as traditional sculpture does with 
tangible space. 
 
173 On Hegelianism and zero-sum dialectics, see Golding, 2010. 
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Slide 516.2:  The Myth of a Museum 
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The Myth of a Museum 
To begin with a properly museal gesture, we must remember…the museum is a direct 
effect of modernization, rather than somehow standing…outside it. It is not the sense 
of secure traditions that marks the beginnings of the museum, but rather their loss 
combined with a multi-layered desire for (re)construction.  A traditional society 
without a secular teleological concept of history does not need a museum, but 
modernity is unthinkable without its museal project… No matter how much the 
museum, consciously or unconsciously, produces and affirms the symbolic order, there 
is always a surplus of meaning that exceeds set ideological boundaries, opening spaces 
for reflection and counter-hegemonic memory.216 
As Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon was for Foucault, for W. V. O. Quine the 
museum is a paradigmatic structure, representative of representation itself: ‘the 
architectural figure of this composition’.217 Proposing a materialist, behaviourist 
replacement for transcendent myths of language, Quine identified uncritical 
semantics and copy theories of representation as the ‘myth of a museum’.218 
Quine’s mythical museum is located in the mind of a ‘native’ being analysed to 
determine what his language means.  Quine’s figures – the mythical museum 
institution, the native, and the ‘we’ who ‘observe his behaviour’ – allude to 
ethnology, structuralism’s bir thplace.  Quine models a naïve copy theory of 
representation, a museum~signified on the one hand and a set of label~signifiers 
on the other.  The mythic museum uncomplicatedly assigns names to pre-existing 
exhibits, a traditional, commonsensical view: a one-to-one mapping without 
transformation between a collection of specimens and set of labels.  ‘Translation’, 
for this folk-semiotics, is simply a matter of swapping one set of labels for 
another, leaving the exhibits otherwise unchanged.219  There are objects over 
here, and their labels over there: two completely different orders of being.  
Something might be mislabelled – in which case the label would be false, rather 
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than true – but this is merely a correctable error, not a problematic.  That the 
cases and labels might affect the form of the collection is conspicuously absent.  
This is the myth of the museum. 
 
Discussing Gustav Flauber t’s fictional museologists Bouvard and Pécuchet, the 
deconstructionist Eugenio Donato concludes ‘it is thus through the Museum that 
questions of origin, causality, representation, and symbolisation are most clear ly 
stated’.220 Like Foucault and Giorgio Agamben – though without their faith in 
archaeological methods – Donato associates muséal knowledge with the ‘fiction’ 
that a ‘repeated metonymic displacement of fragment for totality, object to label, 
series of objects to series of labels, can still produce a representation which is 
somehow adequate to a nonlinguistic universe.’  Museums rely on the legibility 
and generalisability of ‘the spatial juxtaposition of fragments’.221 Flauber t’s ironic 
museum here comes to stand for the institutional knowledge production: stable 
categories are assigned labels, and discursive critique can communicate 
knowledge of those things, and lead to new knowledge.  Donato stresses that 
‘metonymic’ displacements of par t for whole – synecdoche – have a spurious 
rationality: a collection of ar tefacts and a matching set of labels is an inadequate 
model of ‘a nonlinguistic universe.’222 Borrowing a philosophical expression for 
the cæsura between body and mind, there is an explanator y gap between label 
and ar tefact. 
 
In his associative drift through science fiction and social theory – inspired by the 
media theorist Manuel Castells’ notion of ‘the network society’223 – a different 
Steven Shaviro proposes Seattle’s Experience Music Project224 as the twenty-
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first-century equivalent of the Panopticon.225 In this millennial museum, opened 
in 2000 by Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, visitors were given prototype smar t 
guides: ‘a heavy handheld-computer-cum-audio-device’.226 Browsing in mutual 
isolation, wearing earphones and prodding touchscreens, visitors queue to see 
famous rock’n’roll relics in a space ‘simultaneously public and private’, which 
‘seamlessly conflates the space of an educational museum with…vir tual reality 
enter tainment.’227 Some fifteen years later, smar tphones have replaced the need 
for custom museum devices; in today’s network society, everybody buys their 
own museum guide.228 Many display and labelling techniques have changed 
almost unrecognisably in this ‘second “golden age” of museum building’.229 Yet, 
whether by way of a clay cylinder, printed card or an AR app, the explanatory 
gap between the collected object and the meta-object of its label – the 
structural binary myth of the museum – remains in place. 
 
The label|ar tefact dyad structures what Viv Golding labels ‘museum poetics,’ 
building on Gaston Bachelard’s ‘poetics of space.’230 Rather than ‘notions of 
purity, fixity and authority that echo in the traditional museum’s masculine 
framing of knowledge in glass showcases’, Golding argues for a creolised, 
affective, feminist museum practice; an ‘ongoingness’ that is explicitly fragmentary, 
par tial and polyphonic, invested in the ‘concrete poetry’ of objects and bodies in 
relation.231 For Castells, however, the fragmentary, par tial and polyphonic have a 
very different resonance.  In his keynote for the International Council of 
Museums, Castells lays out a programme for ar t in the museum.  Borrowing the 
computing term communication protocol to describe ‘the system’s capacity to 
translate from one code to another,’ Castells claims 
 
 
 
92 
we live in a society structurally destined to an ever increasing individualisation of 
communication…the fragmentation of communication systems and…codes of cultural 
communication…the fragmentation of sense and the potential lack of codes…  [P]aradoxically, 
the multiplicity of cultural expressions in reality decreases the capacity to share sense, and 
hence, to communicate’ [our emphasis].232   
Castells states we need a cultural communication protocol for ‘the system’ to 
resist this destined fragmentation.  Ar t – specifically ar t in museums – bears 
responsibility, ‘a tool for building bridges…restoring the unity of human 
experience beyond oppression, differences and conflicts…’233 
 
Castells rhetorically recognises this claim is ‘paradoxical,’ and asser t ‘reality’ not 
once but twice.234  Multiplicity becomes, if not a lack, then a ‘potential lack’: a 
prior universal whole has been broken into Donato’s ‘heap of 
meaningless…fragments.’235 Castells describes a ‘world of broken mirrors’; 
mirrors being, of course, the emblematic metonym of representation par 
excellence for the worldview of colonial Modernity.236 Like Fredric Jameson’s call 
for ‘cognitive mapping’237 between experience and structure, there is a totalising 
sense to Castells’ globalist museum.238 Castells proposes museum-ar tworks 
replace the breakdown of a master code: the universal mythic museum prior to 
multicultural Babel.  Implicit here is the image of a prior unity, a set of ‘common 
references of society,’ a time before ‘the Internet’ enabled ‘every 
subject…individual or collective…[to] construct their own hyper text’.239  
Castells invokes an inescapably Eurocentric, colonial frame; its coherence relies 
on what Brian O’Doher ty called the ‘little mythic motors’ of ideology,240 the 
equally colonial metaphors of fragmentation and ruin, of multiplicity, polyphony 
and dissent. 241 Castells acknowledges this in passing: ‘the same old problem in a 
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new technological context…throughout history and even today, it is through 
shared experience that we…translate our different systems of communication 
[our emphasis].’242 This is translation, as Vásquez argues, as colonial erasure. 
 
Castells’s historical exceptionalism – which O’Doher ty takes issue with in 
Modernism, and Patricia Waugh addresses in postmodernism – is an explanatory 
gap between a traditional ‘throughout history’ on the one hand, and the radically 
progressive ‘even today’ on the other.  Far from being a contested and unstable 
archive of contingency and rupture, with multiple competing narratives and 
absences, marked by colonialism, slavery, warfare, and oppression, the past is 
presented as a site of uncontested representational wholeness, innocence and 
naturalness.  A centred ‘traditional history’ is the stable ground against which the 
universal figuring of rational progress is represented.  But like label|ar tefact 
dualism, inevitable progress is a Modernist colonial myth: the ‘secular teleological 
concept of history’ Huyssen describes as foundational for museum building.  
‘Myths’, Mary Midgley reminds us, ‘are not lies.  Nor are they detached stories.  
They are imaginative patterns, networks of powerful symbols that suggest 
par ticular ways of interpreting the world.  They shape its meaning.’243   
 
But myths – par ticular ly teleological progress and its older twin, the myth of 
decline and ruin – forcibly reshape the ragged complexity of life into a thinkable 
figure, and Image of thought244 passing for rational knowledge.245  As Midgley 
explains, mythic networks are not mere falsehoods or fictions, though they may 
encompass many of each.  Instead, these are cognitive patterns of meaning that 
include both the embodied mind and the cognitive prosthetic structures of the 
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world: the signs, symbols, traditions, texts, images, gestures and so on, which 
Georges Didi-Huberman labels ‘forms that think’.246 The paradigmatic structure 
of the traditional museum – with ar tefacts on the one hand, and labels on the 
other – is a constitutive symbol,247 a model continually re-asser ting a mythic 
pattern: the colonial ideology of neutral, rational, universal representation. 
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Slide 170.5:  A Consensual Hallucination 
 
 
 
97 
A Consensual Hallucination 
Synonymous with the internet and vir tual reality experiments during the 1980s 
and 1990s, cyberspace – like the ray gun – has a dated, retro-futurist feel 
today.248 Though associated with a post-internet condition, author and theorist 
Bruce Ster ling explains cyberspace as where a telephone conversation happens: 
‘the place between the phones…though there is still no substance… nothing 
you can handle, it has a strange kind of physicality now’.249 If cyberspace can be 
backdated to the pre-Internet between of the telephone, why not the telegraph, 
or the letter?  Correspondence takes place in the emergent between of a 
distributed technological system (we often forget writing is a technology), which 
cannot be located in its components.  From an embodied~cognitive perspective, 
this insight applies to the space of counting on an abacus, or even one’s fingers.  
Consciousness itself is a cyberspace, emerging amongst distributed, modular 
assemblages of heterogeneous material systems.  When electronics are involved, 
such spaces are usually labelled virtual or digital.  Using the sign systems of 
mathematics or philosophy, they are labelled abstract.  In ar t and literature, such 
spaces are fictional or imaginar y.  All are fictive spaces generated by associative 
constellation. 
 
Cyberspace has become ubiquitous: digital events cause widespread tangible 
effects.  Writing on Gibson’s cyberspace in the context of internet ar t, Ingrid 
Schar lau’s description applies equally to global internet culture: 250 an ‘apparently 
simple visible facade’ conceals a nested complexity of masks, ‘a myriad disparate 
par ts’ of which no one is ‘its author or subject’ and no one has ‘an overview’.251  
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For ar tists including LaFarge, Hill, King, and Maria Miranda, the internet is the 
location par excellence of fictive ar t.252  In the responsive, situated information 
environment of Web 2.0, traditional boundaries between academic disciplines, 
creative industries, ideological propaganda, journalism and enter tainment are 
exploded, reconfigured, suffering an unrecognisable sea-change.253 So-called 
Augmented Reality (AR) technologies are becoming mainstream. Ubiquitous 
GPS data and real-time pattern recognition make applications like ‘Pokémon Go’ 
not only possible, but liable to generate wildly unpredictable effects.254 
Transnational corporate platforms like Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr and Twitter 
blur distinctions between individuals, celebrities and institutions.  From the 
transgender teenager to the President of the United States, the retired 
watercolourist to Frieze Ar t Fairs, the most amateur collector to the British 
Museum, Twitter is a cyberspace forum juxtaposing entities of the most 
disparate levels of social, economic and political agency.255 Likes, Followers, and 
Comments function as real-time metrics of attentional power ; a thriving grey-
market economy of automated bot accounts falsify attention metrics to 
generate real economic and political influence.256 Here and in the sphere of viral 
fake news, distinctions between documentary and fiction, vir tual and actual are 
not so much indeterminate as functionally irrelevant.  
 
Schar lau’s ‘visible facade’ of cyberspace identity – branding, hyperlinks, Google 
rankings, accessible metadata – restructures the poetics of knowledge 
production and institutional authority.  Due to its dialogic feedback effects and 
transmedia potential – an eagle principle radically flattening phenomena into 
‘content’ – blogging has been claimed by several practice-based researchers in 
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the ar ts as transformative research method.  For Lucas Ihlein, ‘blogging had 
begun to intervene in the very processes [of research]… documented and 
instrumentalised through the public sphere created by the blog itself… a new 
way of doing art’.257 Though Ihlein’s method joins the widespread contemporary 
revival of Situationism and Psychogeography with an explicitly dialogic or 
relational aesthetics, his observations have wider relevance for the affordances 
of the blog.  Unlike the corporate website, blogging is not a ‘fictionalised online 
image…where everything seems to lock into place in a seamless way’, but rather 
a ‘framework which allows the qualities of experience…to exist on their own 
terms.  The expansive container… [does not] require closure or fixity’.258 Ihlein 
concludes the ar t-research blog enables what Michel de Certeau terms ‘spatial 
stories’,259 ‘able to radically transform the researcher’s relationship with the 
surrounding world’.260 As an ar tistic research form, blogs aggregate together 
disparate media, materialities, processes, events, and entities into a single fictive 
location in cyberspace. which ar tists including King have discovered as 
containers capable of modelling ‘transmedia, transcontextual tangles’.261 
 
In the paradoxically de-centred context of fictive ar t, what Ihlein calls the ‘centre 
of the process of enquiry’ is generated by the enquiry itself.  The capability of 
the ar t-research blog to gain the agency to ‘transform relationships’ becomes a 
far more destabilising, unsettling proposition.  Ihlein subscribes to a re-centring, 
neo-Kierkegaardian ‘correct relation’ with our ‘par ticular heredity, history, or 
locality’; the questionable postcolonial position of ‘becoming indigenous’ or 
‘becoming native’, however much this is acknowledged as something we must 
‘create for ourselves’.  In contrast, the fictive heuristic perspective forces re-
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cognition of the unstable, unpredictable agency of things and their mislabelling.  
An agency transforming not only ‘the researcher’s relationship with the 
surrounding world’, but the very dialectic identities of world and researcher––a 
paranoid, apophenic method for which truth is a contradiction in terms.  
Locating the blog in an expanded definition of cyberspace – fictive space 
emerging amongst distributed things, regardless of category, discipline or location 
– the blog becomes an associative constellation with the potential to 
reconfigure its elements, including the researcher.  A tensile strength, among a 
constellation of heterogeneous elements orbiting a fictive centre of gravity, 
which – given sufficient attentional influence – could transform cognitive-
material conditions in chains of nonlinear contingency.  Here the agency of the 
author function is not denied or diminished, but ramified, extended to every 
modular and sub-modular element of every assemblage.  Without restriction, 
irrespective of temporal or geographic origin, with the sole proviso that no 
element has agency in isolation, least of all the humanist model of a conscious, 
rational, researcher exercising their free will as an individual master identity. 
 
David Joselit identifies in contemporary ar t a ‘lingua franca’ of ‘global 
conceptualism’: an ‘international style’ with various ‘dialects’, of which the ‘most 
pervasive…of the present moment…proceed from…the aggregator’.262 Joselit 
identifies two ‘syntactic structures’ that recur across the various instances of 
aggregators he observes: asynchrony, ‘a figure of uneven development, both 
literally and metaphorically’; and the common, ‘where semi-autonomous elements 
come together’ but are not integrated into a coherent structure.  In the common 
– associated with Bruno Latour’s ‘assembling the social’ – Joselit argues 
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aggregators resist identification with either montage or archive.263 Montage 
‘subsumes’ its constituent elements ‘within an overall compositional logic’ that 
does not maintain ‘the disarming quality of independence characteristic of an 
aggregate, which seems always in danger of falling apar t’.  Likewise, the archival 
possesses a ‘principle of selection,’ which ‘serves to collect, preserve, and even 
constitute evidence as a pillar of epistemological stability.  Aggregates, on the 
other hand, proceed from an obscure principle of selection, typically staging 
confrontations among an array of objects that embody entirely different values 
or epistemologies’.  Joselit’s observation intersects with Benjamin Buchloh’s 
writing a decade before on the very different ‘Atlas’ works of Aby Warburg, 
André Malraux, Eduardo Paolozzi, and Gerhard Richter.  Buchloh argues these 
‘accumulations of photographic images’ do not fit comfor tably within traditional 
conceptions of photomontage, or collage, but function as ‘anomic archives’, 
which through their structuring ‘diametrically oppose the avant-garde objectives 
of immediacy, shock and fragmentation, even if these records are merely 
imaginary structures’.264 The trans-disciplinary, trans-temporal, trans-media 
assemblage projects of Aby Warburg and Walther Benjamin – subjects of intense 
contemporary interest – could be described as precursors of the aggregator.   
 
Operating by proto-algorithmic methods, the assemblage-aggregator ’not only 
undermines the falsely unifying tone of the speaker and the alleged omniscience 
of the author, but also enables various practices, positions and perspectives to 
be juxtaposed…[and thus] not only denounce[s] naively subjective conceptions, 
but…redefines the object of writing history…as an agglomeration of numerous 
inter linked…structures’.265  For both contemporary aggregators and for the 
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unfinished projects of Warburg and Benjamin, authorial agency is generated 
among constituents – including visitors – generating correlative meanings in 
association, rather than homogenising and unifying a central or conclusive 
principle or message through authorial interpretation or translation.  Joselit 
identifies ‘the aggregator’s impulse to furnish a platform where unlike things may 
occupy a common space’.266 Blogging and the fictive occupation of corporate 
social media offer transformative potential via cyberspace’s capacity to offer a 
common platform, hosting radically heterogeneous constituencies.  Crucially, 
however, the aggregator is not simply a tabula rasa upon which all readings may 
be projected with equal veridicality; structures of meaning emerge through 
material-cognitive agency.  And while these conditions of knowledge production 
intensify in the post-internet era, Ster ling's description of cyberspace 
demonstrates this is a potential of the fictive space of associative constellation. 
 
248 Cyberspace is clear instance of the fictive, emerging from science fiction into experiential 
reality.  William Gibson (1982) based cyberspace on cybernetics, coined in 1948 by Norbert 
Weiner from the Greek kybernētēs: ‘helmsman’ or ‘pilot’. Gibson (1981) had previously 
written another short story on ‘Raygun Gothic’, the retro-futurism of the early twentieth 
century. 
249 Sterling, 1998, xii. 
250 Two decades on, the internet has expanded exponentially: an unthinkable, unchartable 
global force, interleaving social interactions, advertising, global financial markets, political 
propaganda, religious evangelism, scientific research, the entertainment industries, data 
mining, journalism, pornography, popular music, espionage, education, legal processes, 
archiving, and innumerable other fields of human endeavour into one vast, fractured 
rhizome, in which – potentially at least – events in one domain can gain viral traction on the 
global attention economy, generating nonlinear, contingent ramifications in many others, 
regardless of our assumed boundaries of relevance or rational causality.  See Shaw & 
Reeves-Evison, 2017. 
251 Scharlau, 1998, 109. 
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252 Turner et al., 2008, 5. 
253 Nolin, 2011. 
254 Pokémon Go is an AR smartphone app. Players explore their surroundings looking 
through the phone camera, which occasionally reveals cartoon creatures to collect, 
depending on the GPS location. This has led to – amongst other things – the discovery of 
dead bodies by children, complaints by the Holocaust Museum, new road traffic blackspots, 
improved interest in entomology, and increased sales at local businesses that mark 
themselves as PokéStops (Peterson, 2016). 
255 Hanna, Rohm, & Crittenden, 2011. 
256 Michael, 2017. 
257 Ihlein, 2014, 38–49. 
258 Ihlein, 2014, 42. 
259 de Certeau, 2001, 72. 
260 Ihlein, 2014, 47. 
261 King, 2017. 
262 Joselit, 2013, 12. 
263 Joselit, 2013, 12 (Note 16). 
264 Buchloh, 1998, 50–60. 
265 Buchloh, 1998, 55–6. 
266 Joselit, 2013, 17. 
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Crystals on a Chandelier 
Reviewing Ilya Kabakov’s fictive museum installation Incident at the Museum, or 
Water Music (1992), Rober ta Smith seems caught up in the cinematic set-
dressing of what Kabakov labels Total Installation––entering a 1990s New York 
gallery to find oneself in a dishevelled museum of Soviet Realist paintings, water 
dripping from the ceiling into buckets.  Smith observes the paintings ‘are the 
handiwork of one S. Y. Kochelev and belong to the Barnaul Ar t Museum.  Of 
course, paintings, painter and institution alike are fictive creations of Mr. 
Kabakov’.267 Kabakov exceeds the ar tist-as-curator role he appeared to be 
occupying, unmasked as painter, decorator, script writer, and critic all at once.268 
Perhaps precisely because the uniqueness of her opinions is a professional 
requirement, Smith does not recognise Kabakov’s fictive manipulation of the 
‘suite of opinions’ as par t of the ar twork, with gallery texts (and her own 
review) forming what Kabakov labels an ‘unified organism’ with the ar twork.269   
 
Though she recognises Kabakov as a ‘conceptualist’, Smith does not read Incident 
at the Museum’s ‘dematerialised’ effects in the tradition of Conceptual Ar t, seeing 
the texts and their concepts as key to the work.  Smith complains its ‘weakness 
is the fact that it is almost more interesting to read the ar tist's synopsis of the 
piece and its intended effect in the accompanying brochure than to experience 
it firsthand’.  Smith’s critique only gains traction if these texts and ‘the piece’ are 
separate things, rather than evidence of a fictive, distributed practice, rooting out 
beyond temporary physical installation into cultural discourse.270 Smith remarks 
on Kabakov’s ‘oddly formalist interpretation’, which draws attention to the water 
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music, ‘declaring that the leaky museum becomes a concer t hall for those with 
sensitive ears’.  Far from being separable from ‘the work’, this situated text is 
intended to be read in the space, altering the visitor’s experience.  Declaring the 
drips in a leaking museum to be a concer t, composed by Russian animator 
Vladimir Tarasov, is the kind of gesture familiar from late-twentieth-century 
Conceptual Ar t.  To construct the museum beforehand, to paint all the paintings 
in it under an assumed name, and then to declare that the dripping water makes 
it a conceptual ar t concer t hall is something else entirely.   
 
What Smith recognises as the ‘odd’ tone of Kabakov’s gallery text subver ts the 
supposedly anti-sublime, anti-æsthetic creed of New York Conceptualism: 
[T]he music "speaks" only to those who have the internal ear with which to hear it.  It 
is these select few who can see beyond the chaos to sense the music’s evocation of 
other works of art – "conversations of drops" in marble chalices in Arabic palaces, the 
splash of fountains in French parks, even Handel’s Water Music .  Only in the sublime 
setting of a "temple" of ar t could the entire phenomenon occur.271 
Do we trust that this is the gallery’s interpretation?  Or even Kabakov’s 
interpretation?  Doesn’t it sound more like the pronouncement of one of 
Kabakov’s unreliable narrators, ironic Nabokovian allusions teeming below the 
surface?  Surely this, like the cod-Soviet Realist paintings, is a kind of double 
pastiche?  Like Ralph Rugoff ’s friend staring at an unusual object in the MJT’s 
ticket office, we are struck by a sense verging on paranoia as we read Kabakov’s 
press release, wondering if this too is par t of the exhibit.272 Perhaps it is no 
wonder that Smith refused to recognise this possibility––how does one write 
about an ar twork that writes about itself, pre-empting our analysis? 
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Claire Bishop, writing about Danh Vo’s epic double-bill for the 56th Venice 
Biennale – mothertongue and Slip of the Tongue (2015) – makes a similar refusal 
of recognition.  In Bishop’s damning critique, Vo’s work is ‘intensely subjective’, 
with a ‘hermetic quality at odds with the very idea of intersubjective 
communication… the task of history’.273 The result is merely ‘the idea of 
research and the lure of history’, an unprincipled collection based on a personal 
luxury æsthetic Bishop likens to baubles on a necklace, ‘or, better, crystals on a 
chandelier’.274 It is not only the ‘seductive sculptures’, the ‘ornamentation’, the 
‘subjective’ intimacy, and ‘almost Beuysian levels of myth’ that trouble Bishop.  
She decries ‘meandering trajectories between cultural signs’; the ‘cut-and-paste 
accumulation of details… rather than interpretation’, indulged in for ‘ornamental 
and aesthetic ends’.275 Signaling the ‘academic cliché to invoke Walter Benjamin’ 
while enacting it, Bishop insists Benjamin’s call for ‘a tiger’s leap into the past’ is 
‘increasingly needed’.  For Bishop, the ‘semionautic’ trajectories – borrowing 
Nicholas Bourriaud’s term – within Vo’s structure are absolutely counter to the 
‘constellation’ of Walter Benjamin’s dialectic image.  Bishop reminds us ’the 
Benjaminian model of history is fundamentally curatorial, revolving around the 
novel juxtaposition of pre-existing objects that jolt the viewer’.  What Bishop 
finds ‘painfully ironic’ is ‘that at some point around the millennium, the ar tist-
curated show morphed into a creature that forsakes interpretation (historical or 
otherwise) for the shor t-term seductions of captioned sensibility’.276  
 
It is precisely this matter of a supposedly anti-Benjaminian lack of ‘interpretation’ 
that Bishop latches onto as a weakness in the ‘ar tist-curated show’.  Yet this is 
somehow the very quality in Benjamin that Storrie foregrounds in The Delirious 
 
 
 
108 
Museum.  Bishop laments ‘[o]ne of the biggest trends in contemporary ar t… 
“the ar tist as historian”… research-based practices’ that are ‘content to present 
vitrines full of texts, and slide shows of appropriated images’.  We can sense 
Bishop’s discontent, her resistance to investing time and energy to this method, 
slogging through endless texts and slideshows––just get to the point!  Bishop 
signals her impatience with the ‘reluctance to synthesise and organise… leav[ing] 
it up to the viewer to do the work of drawing the strands together’.  And in Vo’s 
work there were many such strands, mapped and numbered, supported by a 
catalogue Bishop calls a ‘thick brochure with yet more lengthy captions’. 277 For 
Bishop, such ar t fails to honour its commitments to the visitor, leaving ‘the work’ 
undone.  The time for uncer tainty and diffusion – once an acceptable tactic – 
has passed, and Bishop demands shows ‘that offer–however provisionally–a stab 
at interpretation’.  Digressive captions, ‘meandering…literary performance of 
free association… oneiric mélange of data points’ cannot provide synthesis.  
Bishop can only conclude the catalogue is ‘as arbitrary as all the other details.  
What does any of this have to do with why… [our emphasis]’.278 Bishop’s 
impatience, her insistence on distillation, recalls Georg Lúkacs’s infamous 
assessment of montage: a ‘one-dimensional technique’ that can ‘never be more 
than dir ty water’.279 
 
Writing on Hito Steyer l’s work in documenta 12, Daniel Birnbaum claims the 
associative ‘urge to compare anything and everything’, an ar tist-curatorial trope 
Birnbaum dubs string theor y, ‘makes any kind of specificity – political or ar tistic – 
impossible’.280  Birnbaum complains that Roger Buergel's migration of form 
curatorial strategy – which recalls for Birnbaum the work of Aby Warburg – 
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amounts only to a flattening, a pervasive lack of par ticularity.  Rather than a 
radical détourning championed by Storrie, for Birnbaum this kind of associative 
constellation instead becomes a bracketing-away of singularity.  Discussing Luis 
Jacob’s collages, Birnbaum notes a slippage of ‘bubbles, globes, balls, and spheres; 
heads appear attached to bodies and cut off ’.  Things are literally excised from 
their context and re-assembled to serve another function.  Anything with the 
right form becomes another bubble… or perhaps another ray gun.  But 
ultimately it is not this aspect of appropriation – this accessioning, vivisection 
from the environment and translated for the institutional purposes of a foreign 
power – that disturbs Birnbaum.  Indeed, he appears unworried by the same 
tendency in Warburg towards ‘universalism’.  Instead, the disturbing factor seems 
to be that he and his un-named companions cannot grasp the curatorial 
associations, concluding they ‘signify nothing’.  Birnbaum’s group – presumably all 
professionals at the game contemporary ar t Snap – lose too many rounds to 
enjoy themselves:  ’How brilliant, if only it had worked!  Or even just become 
legible’281––a critique that does not extend to the contingencies of legibility.282 
 
Birnbaum acknowledges the curatorial strategy he critiques is explicitly ‘post-
colonial’; Buergel’s ‘contribution’ to an ongoing ‘conversation’ Birnbaum links to 
the work of Okwui Enwezor in documenta 11.  This refusal to group ar tworks 
by the typologies of geographical style or historical period often comes with 
reference to Michel Foucault, who, according to Agamben, liberated 
historiography from ‘the apparent seriousness of metonymic contexts, like the 
chronological and geographical, [that] have no epistemological basis at all’.283  
And like Storrie’s discussion of Benjamin’s intention ‘merely to show,’ Birnbaum 
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positions Buergel’s associative method as non-interpretive, refraining from 
adding more ‘critical theory’.  It seems significant that the sole example 
Birnbaum gives of an unintelligible, illegible curatorial association explicitly 
concerns race: por traits of the ‘disaffected black youth’ of Kerry James Marshall’s 
The Lost Boys (1993), juxtaposed with a seventeenth-century Dutch painting 
about the ‘legend’ of a ‘dark-hued’ couple giving bir th to a ‘white-hued’ 
daughter.284 Birnbaum’s telling example reveals the opposite of apophenia: a 
refusal to see connections.  In this decolonial constellation, another unmissable 
association is Rolando Vásquez’s double erasure, the process by which colonial 
modernity – a condition Vásquez views as ongoing – first erases something, and 
then erases that erasure, refusing to recognise anything has been ignored.285 
Analysing Birnbaum’s analysis in this way, however, we run the risk that our own 
interpretation makes something else legible, a kind of queered position halfway 
between lay psychoanalysis and decolonial theory.  We risk a meta-
interpretation, requiring we locate Birnbaum’s narrative in a wider context, 
which we claim more awareness of than he has himself.  As with Kabakov’s 
water music ringing in a distributed ‘temple of ar t’, the visitor’s interpretation 
becomes vulnerable.  The constellation being assembled in the fictive museum 
requires the visitor to make the right associations, returning the work to an 
aesthetics of connoisseurship.  This game of allusions, of in-jokes and getting the 
references, is precisely the weakness that both Bishop and Birnbaum identify in 
the ar tist-as-curator associative constellations they are critiquing: an 
exclusionary, complicit literacy required of the imagined visitor.
267 Smith, 1992. 
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268 Like Wilson and Pamuk, Kabakov published a book to accompany his fictive museum 
installation. See Kabakov, Tarasov, & Chicago, 1993. 
269 Kabakov, 2000, 257. 
270 For a more detailed discussion, see Le Couteur, 2012, 28–45. 
271 Robert Feldman Gallery, 1992. 
272 Rugoff, 1995, 73–74.  Cf. Nabakov, 2010, 322–3. 
273 Bishop, 2015, 329. 
274 Bishop, 2015, 329. 
275 The ornamental and the aesthetic being dreadful vices, akin to the illustrative, the 
seductive, or the self-indulgent. 
276 Bishop, 2015, 329. 
277 Bishop, 2015, 329. 
278 Although claiming to be on the side of Benjamin, it is difficult to picture Bishop reading 
the Arcades Project with much enjoyment at this point. 
279 Lúkacs, 1977, 43. 
280 Birnbaum, 2007, 408. 
281 Birnbaum, 2007, 408–9. 
282 See Lefebvre, 2000, 143. 
283 Agamben, 2002. 
284 Marshall’s work explicitly engages historical figure painting, the question of the 
representation of the black body in museums and galleries, and questions of racial heritage 
and legend, by making history paintings––in this case one that features a tree with ‘Life’ on a 
scroll around its trunk. For visitors familiar with this, or even slightly versed in some Black 
diaspora thematics – colonial history, shadeism / colourism, legend and stereotype, 
reclaiming lost heritage, passing on Black culture in a racist society, representation and 
erasure – the affinities here are clear. When we add the fact that Marshall is depicting Black 
children, referencing pictorial conventions from the seventeenth century, including 
allegorical figures such as chessboard floors and trees of life, the associations seem frankly 
unmissable. 
285 Vásquez, 2011, 30–32. 
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This Form That Thinks 
In The Delirious Museum, Calum Storrie discusses Walter Benjamin’s well-known 
intention in his unfinished ‘literary montage’ Passagenwerk286 to ‘merely show’ his 
collection of things; that ‘by making use of them’ he ‘needn’t say anything’.287 
Storrie concludes that ‘it is as if Benjamin is here proposing a museum without 
labels and without explanation; a museum in which the role of the curator is 
returned to being the custodian rather than the interpreter.’288 Sidestepping the 
issue of whether or not Storrie’s return to a supposedly-prior state of being 
applies to Benjamin’s project, there is clearly a significant problem with applying 
it to Oldenburg’s Ray Gun Wing, for all that the project lacks explicit narrative 
interpretation.  Here, the perceptible is generated relationally, by association.  
Like Walter Benjamin’s dialectic image, this is a pattern or figure formed in a 
‘constellation saturated with tensions,’ which cannot be conflated into a unified 
whole without a collapse of what Benjamin identifies as a gap or break, a ‘cæsura 
in the movement of thought’.289 One such axis of tension in Ray Gun Wing, 
perhaps its most intense, is presence|absence, linked to true|false.  Are the 
collected objects ray guns, or aren’t they?  The collection generates the question 
and suspends it, forming a constellation of contradictions, a freeze-frame 
flickering back and for th as though paused on a VCR.  What is clear in the 
exposed wiring of Ray Gun Wing – and subsequently discernible in other fictive 
museums, and potentially all other museums – is how the collected thing 
becomes a point in an argument, par t of a pattern that builds a representation 
of the world.  
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Benjamin describes this act of collecting as a ‘magic circle’, where the collected 
object is ‘detached from all origins’ and ‘turns to stone’, becoming ‘an 
encyclopaedia of all knowledge’.290 The thinking, the searching, the shuddering 
that is taking place cannot comfor tably be located in either the ar tist’s intention, 
the visitor’s interpretation, or some negotiation between the two.  There is a 
process at work beyond any neutral custodianship.  It is as-if the collection itself 
generates a field of resonance through the very gesture of collection and display: 
a fictive voice by which things are identified, called into being.  Here the found, 
the altered, the made, and their methods of institutional framing cannot be 
disentangled; creation, curation, interpretation, and reception are wired up 
together into a feedback loop.  Instead, a kind of placement as language291 begins 
to operate, where selection, adjacency and relation generate associative 
significance.  And, as Ray Gun Wing demonstrates so powerfully, this associative 
significance, while highly contingent, is far from an individualistic, arbitrary free 
play of signs, equally open to any and all interpretations.  Like the model of the 
Ark at the entrance to the MJT, the fictive museum object is both produced by 
the museum, and inextricable from a meshwork of pre-existing relations and 
associations, hovering between history and mythology.  Museum models and 
reproductions occupy a strange zone between object and label, par ticularly 
when they are sold in the museum shop as ‘authentic museum reproductions’.292 
The meaning of the object, even the thing itself, is produced in a montage of 
contextual relations. 
 
In his recent work, Georges Didi-Huberman champions montage as ‘the ar t 
producing this form that thinks’.293 This is an open-ended montage, in seeming 
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contrast to works like Ray Gun Wing, where the potential of things to generate 
sympoietic montage effects is radically shor t-circuited.  Though Ray Gun Wing is, 
in effect, the kind of Eisensteinian montage Didi-Huberman describes, it is a 
form that only thinks one thing; a colonising, totalising force that discovers-
assembles only a model of itself, like a virus.  True heterogeneity and difference 
are suppressed, or, as DeLanda might term it, territorialised.  By contrast, Didi-
Huberman seems to be celebrating precisely the experience that perplexes 
Claire Bishop and Daniel Birnbaum in their reviews of ar tist-curation.294 Instead 
of a ‘lack of interpretation', Didi-Huberman finds instead a field of potential 
‘legibility’.295 Alongside Benjamin’s Passagenwerk, the cultural project Didi-
Huberman chooses as the paradigmatic example of the radical potential of 
montage is Aby Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas (1927-1929).  Didi-Huberman 
claims Warburg’s montage-diagram of ar t historical reproductions ‘deconstructs, 
with its very exuberance, the ideals of uniqueness, of specificity, of purity, of 
logical exhaustion.  It is a tool… for the inexhaustible opening up to possibilities 
that are not yet given’.296 Didi-Huberman is focussing on the Atlas as a vast 
collaborative game of association to be played with an unfathomably large deck 
of cards.  The possibilities for legibility are not yet given before the cards have 
been played, laid out on Warburg’s black baize-covered boards like a tarot 
reading, but more fluid, liable to be endlessly reshuffled.  Didi-Huberman is most 
moved not by any specific round of this card game so much as by the game 
itself, the spatial reconfigurations, redistributions, and displacements of its 
operations.297  
 
Though Warburg intended the Atlas to become a large book, with over seventy 
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thematically arranged panels that would then be re-photographed, the project 
was unfinished at his death, and perhaps unfinishable, though several such books 
have since been published.  The panels appear to have found their perfect 
medium on the internet, with Cornell University having produced a dedicated 
website that studies ten panels in detail and places them in context.  Multiple 
explanatory passages or tours from ar t historians can be sampled, and the 
panels can be navigated in detail, zooming in and out of the individual images in 
a way that would only be possible in a printed book on the scale of a vast 
library atlas.298 In the reproductions of Warburg’s Atlas, and in the physical 
reproduced images of the Atlas itself, countless forms, styles and media are 
rendered equivalent through their flattening into black and white.299 As André 
Malraux pointed out in his Musée Imaginaire or ‘Museum Without Walls’ project, 
museums ‘have tended to estrange the works they bring together from their 
original function’.300 Two decades after Warburg, Malraux was engaged in 
assembling hundreds of images for his own expansive ar t historical project, 
though not quite on the scale of Warburg’s two thousand selections from his 
library of ten times that number.  Alongside this estrangement through re-
contextualisation, Malraux notes ‘the mere act of grouping together many works 
of the same style creates its masterpieces and forces us to grasp its project’.301  
 
But is this the ‘project’ of the style, or of the grouping?  The act of grouping in 
the museum is heightened by framing and lighting, by photography that ‘impar ts 
a family likeness to objects that have actually but slight affinity’.302 This, Malraux 
reminds us – as we read his museum-book of photographic reproductions – ‘has 
created what might be called “fictitious” ar ts, by systematically falsifying the scale 
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of objects’, at once producing and revealing ‘great styles which… “might have 
been”… the persisting life of cer tain forms, emerging ever and again like 
spectres from the past. In the realm of…the fictitious ar ts, the fragment is 
king’.303 Rather than resolve this impossible conflict between binary questions of 
what is truly in the material, and what is created or exaggerated through its 
framing, Malraux’s project celebrates the power of re-contextualising montage: 
‘by the angle at which it is displayed, and with appropriate lighting, a fragment or 
detail can tell out significantly, and become, in reproduction, a not unwor thy 
denizen of our Museum without Walls’.304 Just as in Oldenburg’s Ray Gun Wing, 
or our own circular argument in A Constellation Saturated with Tensions, 
Malraux’s montage of photographic reproductions in his Museum Without Walls 
uses a diagrammatic method, operating on Broodthaers’ cognitive eagle principle 
to generate isomorphic resonances, homogenising the most diverse materials, 
whilst foregrounding the method by which this is achieved.  Malraux’s is 
therefore a fictive museum, operating beyond a truth|fiction binary with the 
signal self-awareness that it is doing so.  Malraux’s emphasis on the framing, 
positioning, rescaling, and re-contextualisation of photographic reproductions 
changing the nature and associations of the things reproduced shifts Benjamin’s 
intention to ‘merely show’ rather than tell beyond Storrie’s account of it.  Here, 
montage assemblage and collection are not so much accompanied by 
interpretations, as a mechanism for generating thinking and interpretation itself. 
 
The recurring, reanimated ‘spectres from the past’ Malraux discusses were 
precisely Warburg’s area of interest.  Warburg spent decades theorising a kind of 
psychoanalysis of cultural patterns formed in response to trauma, which he 
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called pathosformeln: pathos-formulas.  In the last years of his life, using the vast 
resources of his idiosyncratically arranged library, Warburg mapped the ‘gestures’ 
symptomatic of the pathosformeln thematically across medium, style and period 
using a never-ending typological montage of photographs, pinned to large 
mobile boards: the Mnemosyne Atlas.  Like Malraux’s use of photographic 
reproductions, Warburg’s images were not valued for their own material 
embodiment as photographs, or newspaper clippings, but ‘merely as 
reproductions’, placeholders to be looked through in the manner of lecture 
slides.  But Didi-Huberman is correct in emphasising how this very aspect 
‘deconstructs’ ideals of purity and uniqueness.  The images themselves gain 
agency beyond questions of reproduction or representation.305 As Chari Larsson 
observes, rather than reconstruct the specific trajectories of Warburg’s 
arguments – which slides could be linked to which, and the theoretical 
interpretation that generates – Didi-Huberman is ‘instead accentuating the non-
axiomatic openness of the images and their ability to be constantly 
rearranged…  The montage effect does not illustrate pre-existing ideas and 
concepts, but generates new relationships between the constellations of 
images… ask[ing] the spectator to proceed heuristically.’306 According to Larsson, 
Didi-Huberman is responding to Gilles Deleuze’s notion of the image of thought.  
If we also ascribe to montage – the ‘form that thinks’ – Benjamin’s figure of the 
constellation of tensions, a por tmanteau term is generated: a dialectic image of 
thought, a label instantly freighted with an extensive and contradictory body of 
secondary literature.  In this depiction, associative montage assemblages become 
not thoughts themselves, but a cognitive space of thinking; generating fictive 
tension between fact and fiction.  This tension is present from the outset of 
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Deleuze’s critique of ‘the traditional image of thought’ as inevitably entailing the 
notion of a ‘common sense’ and the conflation of the true|false binary with 
good|evil and accuracy|error.307  
 
The collection of quotations, images and concepts itself generates an unresolved 
– indeed, unresolvable – tension.  On the one hand, there is Didi-Huberman’s 
utopian model of montage as an open-ended form that thinks, a field of ‘infinite’ 
potential legibility.  On the other, there are the specific instances of montage, 
where context-bound assemblages conspire with our interpretive machinery 
and the ar tist-curator’s gesture in very specific patterns of meaning.  The 
collection generates involuntary resonances and trajectories between the things 
and their framing.  Between one thing and another, knots of resemblance are 
formed, which alter our sense of the perceptible.  Once we see the ray gun, we 
cannot un-see it; once we are lured into stoned thinking at its consequent minor 
paranoias, we have knowledge of the conspiracy theory.  Things, their 
representations, and our interpretations of their patterns become shifted, subtly 
but irrevocably, by way of a space at once formed by and forming their 
associations.  This is a space that, to borrow Gaston Bachelard’s labelling, has a 
poetics, requiring a kind of ‘topoanalysis’ to discern its generative effects on 
stoned thinking, the charged process of associative constellation.308 
 
286 This is usually translated into English as ‘The Arcades Project’, but this translation 
obscures Benjamin’s punning on the polysemic word passages, simultaneously balancing the 
architectural, the textual, and the navigational. 
287 Benjamin, 1999, 460. 
288 Storrie, 2006, 25. 
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 Slide 201.7:  Looping Topology 
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Looping Topology 
Between one thing and another, in associations among the data set, in 
association, the perceptible is assembled.  That the arrangement of the cases, the 
room, and the diagram of Ray Gun Wing’s layout all take the form of the ray gun 
is surely no coincidence: as Calum Storrie reminds us, ‘the diagram of the 
labyrinth is also a labyrinth.’309  ‘Resemblance’, Anna Munster argues, ‘should here 
be considered as a resonating relation, rather than a hierarchy (a form) that 
arranges a signifier and signified within a sign. [For Gregory Bateson] this was 
difference itself… The point of overlay between map and territory, then, is a 
fuzzy set of resonating, subtractive, differentiating resemblance relations––the 
island-map force field.’310  Here Munster is discussing C. S. Peirce’s thought 
experiment of placing a map onto the island it represents, and hence generating 
a point where the map corresponds precisely to the section of territory it 
touches.311  Munster concludes that ‘[t]he place on the map and the place on the 
island recursively relate (to) each other, creating a looping topology that 
describes not simply the nature of the island but generates the “event” of 
relationality in and through which map and land constitute a field’.312  Form and 
matter, map and island, are caught in a loop of redefinition, a circular argument.  
This point of overlay between map and island generates a new space, a field 
beyond questions of representation or veridicality: a similarity centre.  Ray Gun 
Wing generates a similar recursive, looping topology, through a performative, 
reiterative typology, beyond any isolated act of diagramming or montage.  This is 
a map that has the power – as architectural drawings do – to cut up and 
rearrange the territory.  However minimal, Oldenburg’s gesture of looping 
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topology – creating the object of its research, seeking only to find – requires 
repetition and elaboration to function; the infection, like the eagle principle, or 
homogenising effect of capital, must spread.  This is the horror of the fictive 
museum: that it colonises outwards, relentlessly de-and-re-contextualising.  
 
DeLanda describes assemblages as having a double causality, from par ts to 
whole and from whole to par ts.  In a similarly recursive move to Oldenburg’s 
ray gun collection in the shape of a ray gun, DeLanda takes Deleuze and 
Guattari’s description of assemblages one stage fur ther.  Each assemblage itself is 
composed of micro-assemblages and composes macro-assemblages, a 
concatenated structure of unthinkable complexity: tur tles all the way down.313  
Ray Gun Wing is an astonishingly clear example of this recursive, emergent 
double causality.  The collected and arranged things and their minimal labels take 
on an eerie agency not only in relation each other, but to our own involuntary, 
impersonal cognitive processes of pattern recognition and categorisation.  In 
fictive museum works like Ray Gun Wing and the Museum of Jurassic Technology 
– and arguably in all museums – the labels and other ostensibly interpretive 
texts are themselves things in the assemblage, knotted up together.  Par ts that 
generate the meaning of the whole, just as the whole does the par ts––a 
hermeneutic circle.314 To truly operate in the fictive, to actively suspend the 
dualist true|false relation to things (and so escape what W. V. O. Quine calls the 
mythical museum), this hermeneutic circle must encompass materiality as 
agential, not a matter of given relations.315 Knots of transmedia mattering must 
form a looping topology, par ticipate in the generation of meaning, and have a 
hand in the associative assembly of the collection itself.  The collection, once it 
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has achieved a bootstrapped momentum as-if of its own accord, begins to 
stabilise itself like a gyroscope, generating emergent principles.  We label this a 
fictive heuristic: something that is seeking out and assembling its own associates, 
its own conditions, its own cognitive space.  Our task is merely to become par t 
of the system, the method of its emergence. 
 
In fictive museums, with their mobile, looping trajectories, all surrounding 
commentary is drawn into the constellation, and the distinction between the 
work and its interpretation dissolves.  This is one of the functions of the fictive 
institutional frame; by generating its own contextual field, the collection 
paradoxically escapes the quarantine in which ar ts and fictions are usually held 
apar t from other knowledge worlds.  The collection, its fictive status as-if 
museum, and its labelling as ‘ray gun’ function in tandem, all generating and 
sustaining resonances and tensions, fields of association, around the similarity 
centre.  This aspect of the operation of the label in the fictive museum is 
especially clear in two of the most celebrated fictive museum works of the mid-
twentieth century, Marcel Broodthaers’ Musée de L’Art Moderne (1968-72) and 
Marcel Duchamp’s series of 300 ‘por table museums’, the Boîte-en-valise (c.1935-
68).316  In both of these examples, the collections’ status as ar tworks was at 
once asser ted and undermined.  For Broodthaers, this was effected with a set of 
engraved black plastic labels positioned next to figures of eagles, material 
cultural ar tefacts from a wide variety of contexts.  These (mis)labels 
simultaneously proclaimed the objects in the collection were not works of ar t, 
and precisely in so doing appropriated them as ar tworks.  Likewise, the fact that 
Duchamp included labels with each of the painstaking miniature ‘reproductions’, 
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giving details of the original work, meant that the series was for a long time 
dismissed by curators and collectors.  That Duchamp had included (or perhaps 
occluded) an ‘original’ with each valise was only discovered after his death.  
Duchamp produced the sets using the incredibly labour-intensive colour 
reproduction method of hand-stencilled collotype.  Had Duchamp made the 
claim – and were it not for the labels defining the miniatures as ‘reproductions’ – 
these works could well have been described (and priced) at least as editioned 
prints, or more accurately unique ar tworks in themselves.317 
 
In the fictive museum, a thing and its label form what Ilya Kabakov calls a 
matrimonial pair, where the work and its commentary ‘form an ar tistic whole, a 
“unified organism.” ‘318 Knowing that both the thing and its label have been 
influenced by the fictive process, but not to what extent, we begin to question 
the institutional meta-language of labelling, interpretation and display; the 
exhibits and their supplements fuse into an interpretive assemblage.  Like 
Kabakov’s visitor, we find ourselves involved in an ‘infinite suite of opinions’ 
which could include our own, destabilising the interpretive boundary not only 
between institution and exhibit, but between self and other.  In Ray Gun Wing, 
Kabakov’s suite of opinions is fused: there is seemingly no discursive, narrative 
interpretation, only the ray gun.  Ray Gun Wing demonstrates the potential of a 
(fictive) museum structure to generate a categorical, colonial, relational, 
representational machine.  A machine with genuine apophenic agency to 
intervene – beyond narrative, beyond humanist questions of conscious 
interpretation or intention – directly in the event of the perceptible for both its 
creators and visitors: a cognitive automaton.  In Kabakov’s Incident at the 
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Museum… these opinions become entangled with the ar t-historical progress 
mythology of styles and movements, building tension between an apparently 
formal interpretation on the press release and established ideas about ‘naïve’ 
Soviet Realism and ‘dematerialised’ Conceptual Ar t.  In the Museum of Jurassic 
Technology and the Museum of Innocence, the suites of opinions include 
statements about the very nature of what a museum is, and what it is for.  The 
mythical museum of representation, with its dualism of passive, material signified 
and active, immaterial signifier becomes a dynamic field of tensions and 
resonances.  A looping topology where labels are revealed as material things and 
things as tangles of contextual networks, map-island fields of relation exhibiting a 
double causality: associative constellations in fictive space. 
 
Both Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas and Oldenburg’s Ray Gun Wing appear at first 
to conform to what Gilber t Simondon named the hylomorphic model: a 
traditional philosophical binary ontology, in which form (morphe) is imposed by 
outside agency onto passive matter (hyle).319  Seemingly, the traditional hierarchy 
between form and material is preserved, even intensified: materials are swept up 
together in a relentless, para-rational, formalist pursuit of form: a Platonic ray 
gun.  But something else is suggested by the uncanny powers of Ray Gun Wing to 
affect our pattern recognition, and by Didi-Huberman’s emphasis on the fluid 
rearrangements of Warburg’s Atlas generating thought forms.  Like the point of 
conjunction between C. S. Peirce’s map-island assemblage, neither side takes 
priority; form and material are joined by a cognitive space in which they are 
mapped together, transposed around a similarity centre.  In Ray Gun Wing or 
Warburg’s Atlas, agency might be re-located in material things, but only in the 
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sense proposed by Munster : things as fields of resonance, events of relationality.  
This is the approach Bill Brown describes as thing theor y: ‘objects asser ting 
themselves as things… a par ticular subject-object relation’.320 In place of the 
hylomorphic model, Tim Ingold proposes instead a meshwork of trajectories, in 
which things are knotted relation and association.321 Rather than associations 
taking place as relations between pre-existing objects, things are rootballs, 
laceworks of dynamic forces, ‘a par liament of lines’. 
  
Brown’s subject-object and Ingold’s knots suggest it is not that a traditional 
directive agency has shifted from the creator to the creation – the perspective 
in Deleuze’s introductory description of the image of thought322 – but that a ‘ray 
gun’ cognitive assemblage of ~Oldenburg~collection~label~vitrine~visitor~ is 
formed.  Each labelled element itself an unthinkably complex trans-material 
assemblage in the sense that Manuel DeLanda theorises.323 Such assemblages are 
patterns of meaning occurring across materialities and disciplinary contexts, 
which ar tist and theorist Katie King describes as ‘transmedia transcontextual 
tangles’.324  King uses the Andean knot writing system khipu as paradigmatic of 
this process of thinking both about and with things. Khipu encode information, 
Frank Salomon argues, in a way that is more like an infographic than linguistic 
transcription, that is, diagrammatically.  This is a ‘writing without words’, in which 
knots ‘have a sor t of agency we usually reserve for only one side of that gap we 
think we jump across to create a “representation” or to engage in “making”… 
mapping themselves together with other objects and features of the world 
without words, indeed some never verbalized.’325  King cites Donna Haraway’s 
perspective on how these entangled knots of mattering cannot be translated 
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without being transcoded, and cannot be refigured into solely linguistic language 
without radical alteration.326  In focusing on the knot, recent thinkers like Ingold, 
King and Haraway step beyond hylomorphic form|matter dualism and begin to 
approach what is known in mathematical terms as topology: the study of how 
space is structured, folded, bent, or knotted.  This New Materialist emphasis on 
the highly contextual and contingent matterings that structure meaning also 
helps an form an understanding of the ineluctably transmedia modality of the 
fictive museum.  Kabakov’s conceptual ‘water music’ can be heard only with the 
full assemblage of fictive space, genre-bound pictorial representation, ambient 
space, institutional and narrative framing, and material embodied experience. 
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310 Munster, 2013, 24–5. 
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Mappings Between the Pairs 
Both in its tendency to accession sections of other texts, at its structures of 
irony, mimicry and pastiche, the fictive museum is an inter textual form.  
Underwriting Julia Kristeva’s discussion of intertextuality and the work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin is an explicitly spatial model of language, where ‘[t]he word is 
spatialized…it functions in three dimensions…’327  This is not merely a 
metaphor ; Kristeva describes a site ‘at the intersection of language (the true 
practice of thought) with space (the volume within which signification, through a 
joining of differences, ar ticulates itself)’.328  Gilles Deleuze also identifies 
spatialisation with ‘the structuralist project, based upon a distribution of 
differential characters within a space of coexistence’.329  Although this may be 
what Deleuze calls an Image of thought330 rather than thought itself, he takes up 
a modified version in calling for a space of difference without opposition:  ‘The 
task of life is to make all these repetitions coexist in a space in which difference 
is distributed.’331  Deleuze describes the Image of thought as an implicit, dogmatic, 
commonsensical structure in which Truth, Goodness and Thought – each a 
‘relation which includes the opposite within it‘332 – become aligned: 
In this sense, conceptual philosophical thought has as its implicit presupposition a pre-
philosophical and natural Image of thought, borrowed from the pure element of 
common sense.  According to this image, thought has an affinity with the true; it 
formally possesses the true and materially wants the true.  It is in terms of this image 
that everybody knows and is presumed to know what it means to think… We may call 
this image of thought a dogmatic, orthodox or moral image.  It cer tainly has variant 
forms… In the realm of the implicit, it nevertheless holds fast… For this reason, we do 
not speak of this or that image of thought, variable according to the philosophy in 
question, but of a single Image in general which constitutes the subjective 
presupposition of philosophy as a whole.333 
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Mirroring Deleuze’s single ‘subjective presupposition as a whole’, Cordelia Fine 
describes an implicit network of associations – a kind of cognitive, empirical 
version of Jung’s collective unconscious – that is both extremely powerful, 
influencing perception and intuitive judgement, but also highly adaptable, 
changing over time.334  Given the cognitive perspective developed ear lier, it is 
evident that this network of associations is not exclusively – or even primarily – 
linguistic.  This ‘highly organised network’ shares the scale of Kristeva’s intertext in 
connecting not only every ‘representation’ in the mind, but cultural structures 
beyond it (texts, images, institutional decision making, etc.).  Fine goes on to 
describe experimental research that the priming of stereotypes, even if the 
context is one of critique, affects self-perception and alters memory.335  Besides 
being somewhat terrifying, these findings demonstrate the incredible power of 
nature-cultures336 both to encode and produce contexts of associative 
significance, and to alter our perceptions, including self-perception and 
behaviours. 
 
In discussions of implicit – or for psychoanalysts, unconscious – networks of 
association and the rationales they give rise to, psychologists building on the 
work of Seymour Epstein have proposed a dual process model for the mind.  In 
brief, these theories argue that there are two mental systems, one involuntary 
and intuitive, the other conscious and rational.337  The authors of the above 
description propose that it is because the mind has two kinds of thinking – two 
kinds of ‘cognitive architecture’ – that there are ‘dualistic patterns of thought,’ 
and that this ‘plays a key role in the psychology underlying explanatory gap 
intuitions and folk dualism.’338  That is, as Paul Bloom argues, there is a ‘universal’ 
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human tendency towards ‘folk dualism’: an intuitive dualistic thinking, founded on 
a rift between the material body and the immaterial mind.  Between these two 
domains is an ‘explanatory gap’.  Dual process theorists are arguing, hence, that 
not only are there distinct ‘high’ and ‘low’ kinds of mental process,339 but that this 
dual process model explains the existence of naturalised ‘naïve’ mind|body folk 
dualisms from ‘world cultures’.  Astonishingly, their model maps with surpassing 
neatness onto that very mind|body ‘folk dualism’, with the ‘low road’ of bodily, 
automatic, emotional-intuitive ‘gut feeling’340 contrasted with the ‘high road’ of 
conscious, logical, theoretical, techno-scientific rationality.  While Fiala et al 
par tially acknowledge that mental processes might not divide into such a neat 
binary as their model suggests,341 they seem unaware of this ironic paradox at 
the very crux of their procedure: their ‘high road’ theory is re-inscribing within its 
own labelling precisely the ‘low road’ mind|body folk dualism they are attempting 
to explain, entangling itself in a fictive looping structure. 
 
The work of Australian feminist Val Plumwood directly addresses the difficulty in 
trying to think our way out of this condition, remarking on dualism’s ‘mazes and 
chasms’.342  Developing Hegel’s dialectic of the master and the slave, Plumwood 
identifies this very mind|body dualism as lying at the hear t of kyriarchal culture.  
Our common-sense, our philosophy, and our ongoing history of environmental 
destruction, misogyny, racism and colonial atrocity, are ramifications of the 
master binary reason|nature.  In the context of museum poetics, described by 
Quine as the mythic model of representation, this maps onto what Ilya Kabakov 
dubs the ‘matrimonial pair’ of word and object or label|ar tefact.  Kabakov's turn 
of phrase demonstrates how readily we can map a heteronormative gendered 
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pairing onto any dyadic structure.  In Plumwood’s thoroughgoing critique of 
Western rationality, sets of mutually-reinforcing dualisms are connected by 
‘linking postulates… assumptions normally made or implicit in the cultural 
background which create equivalences or mappings between the pairs’ and ‘form 
a web or network.  One passes easily over into the other, linked to it by well-
travelled pathways’.343 This is the mechanism by which the Good, the True, and 
the Rational become aligned in Deleuze’s Image.  Together, these construct an 
ineluctably gendered and racialised master identity, ‘who claims for himself both 
full humanity and reason’.  Again, it is vital we see this as a spatial condition of 
cognitive knowledge, rather than a merely linguistic phenomenon:  ’The set of 
interrelated and mutually reinforcing dualisms which permeate western culture 
forms a fault-line which runs through its entire conceptual system.’344  Plumwood 
follows similar historical materialist principles to Manuel DeLanda, and we can 
continue this commitment to immanence by stating that this network of 
dualisms exists in and structures cognitive space: a macro-assemblage of 
heterogeneous things relating together as sympoietic patterns across material 
culture, bodies, languages, memories, exhibiting double causality from par t to 
whole and whole to par t.  We propose this network assemblage of stereotypical 
associations – structured through linking postulates, mappings from one dualism 
to the next – as a collective cognitive sculpture on a vast scale: a trans-cultural 
worldview.  Adapting Deleuze’s expression to foreground its spatiality, we label 
this the Model of thought. 
 
In her model of thought, Plumwood demonstrates how the seemingly irrational, 
emotional or coincidental abuse of others is ‘a cer tain kind of logical structure’ 
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echoing the Deleuzean Image: a supposedly disinterested and objective reason, 
founded on universal purity and truth.  Seemingly abstract and eminently 
reasonable dualisms of true|false, fact|fiction and label|ar tefact are inextricable 
from a kyriarchal cage of linking postulates.  However, Plumwood sees limited 
value in deconstructing the master category to reveal its reliance on 
subordinated identities, a strategy she describes as reversal, which remains 
within the terms of the dualism as given.345  For Plumwood, reversing or even 
deconstructing dualisms cannot provide escape from what she calls the ‘maze of 
mirrors’ in which thinking is trapped in our condition of late colonial modernity.  
Instead, Plumwood is interested in the structural principles of the network, 
which links dualisms into a mutually reinforcing worldview.  This spatial network 
– which we label the Model of thought – continually presents us with endless 
false dichotomies into which choice is structured, depicting any resistance to 
those dichotomies as paradoxical, incoherent, or nonsensical.  Plumwood’s work 
on the network of dualisms and Fine’s description of stereotypes and likewise 
have far-reaching implications.  Stereotypes are potent fictive entities, with the 
power to influence the course of events without regard for our conscious 
opinions of their veridicality.  A key contribution of the fictive as a term becomes 
relevant here: fictive spatiality becomes relevant not only in terms of the fictive 
museum, but as a condition of knowledge as such.  
 
Joining Plumwood in arguing ‘all forms of hierarchy have always been based 
ultimately on gender hierarchy’,346  Fredric Jameson claimed there is ‘a growing 
contradiction between lived experience and structure’, a widening ‘gap between 
phenomenological perception and a reality that transcends all individual thinking 
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or experience’.347  Jameson not only takes an explicitly dualistic, totalising 
position, but argues that ‘our dissatisfaction with the concept of totality is not a 
thought in its own right but rather a significant, a symptom’.348  Adopting the 
label from Kevin Lynch’s The Image of the City,349 Jameson called for an ‘aesthetic 
of cognitive mapping’ between material, observable things (superstructure) and 
the total structure of global colonial capitalism (base) that move them. In doing 
so, Jameson implicitly contradicts Lynch’s asser tion that ‘[m]eaning is also a 
relation, but quite a different one from spatial or pattern relation’.  This 
contradiction – the refusal of given distinctions between meaning, spatiality and 
pattern recognition – is the point of depar ture for our understanding of fictive 
space.  Jameson gave a hint of the kind of project this might entail in the figure 
of the conspiracy theory, that stereotypically irrational paranoiac connecting of 
everything with everything else, a totalising apophenia.350  In calling a cognitive 
mapping, Jameson is clear that this is an ar tistic project concerned with the 
realization of a kind of space of possibility, ‘a matter of form’.   
 
In this context, a pair of linked possibilities open up for fictive museum works.  
As arrangements of associated things-and-their-labels, fictive museum works 
have the potential both to char t this space and to reconfigure it.  The fictive 
museum, as a modelling of the Model of thought, foregrounding the intersection 
of this network of dualisms with embodied cultural spaces, may be capable of 
direct, sculptural interventions in the cognitive fabric.  However, as Fine's 
warning about the priming of stereotypes even in the context of critique makes 
clear, even the ironic reproduction of existing label|ar tefact structures carries 
risks.  If the Model’s stereotypical networks are primed merely by thinking about 
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it – influencing our memories, perceptions and actions whether or not we 
consciously agree – then even ironic play or critical analysis can inadver tently 
become a Ray Gun Wing, co-opting our cognitive assemblages into the Model. 
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Slide 22E.1:  An Unbridgeable Chasm 
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An Unbridgeable Chasm 
The Model of thought, a network of inter linked dualisms, at once spatial and 
linguistic, personal and cultural.  There is a symmetry in each of these figures, in 
the shape of the ‘explanatory gap’, which Benjamin calls the cæsura.  In all these 
discussions of dialectics, dualisms, binaries, and the structures they form, 
oppositional concepts are arranged spatially, whether or not this is imagined as a 
purely metaphorical space, or there is some kind of vir tual, cognitive, or even 
neural reality ascribed to it.  In the terms of Manuel DeLanda’s Assemblage 
Theory, borrowed from topology, each of these dualisms would be described as 
a dimension.  Truth and falsehood, in this sense, is literally a one-dimensional 
account of reality.  In Giorgio Agamben’s work on the paradigm – itself a model 
of thinking or dialectical image of thought – he also describes a gap, a cæsura.  
Agamben replaces what he describes as the impassable gap in thinking, an 
intermediate zone in which precisely nothing can be situated, with a field of 
tensions, a ‘zone of undecidability which neutralises every rigid opposition’.351  
This ‘zone of undecidability’ acts as a kind of neutralisation, a grey area in-
between space.  Although Agamben describes this spatial concept of ‘the 
paradigm analogy’ in novel terms, it resembles some ideas from Walter Benjamin 
– not to mention many other thinkers – and indeed Agamben refers to 
Benjamin repeatedly in his discussion.  This Model of thought, in which conceptual 
opposites form a kind of multidimensional dimensional space, a field or 
spectrum in which everything can be located, is common to many philosophical 
discussions from a wide range of disciplines.   
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Bar t Ehrman, a New Testament scholar who published a history of the 
conceptual progression of Jesus from man to God, notes a significant shift 
between the conceptual framework of today and that of two millennia ago, 
arguing that a Divine|Human binary with an ‘unbridgeable gap’ in between was 
not shared by ancient thinkers, who considered the two as overlapping 
continua.352  From this perspective, Agamben’s field of tensions is more a return 
to an older image of thought than a contemporary development.  But as 
Plumwood confides, the attempt to think outside of the network of dualisms is a 
labyrinth of contradictions:  ‘the escape routes are mazes containing mirrors, 
sidetracks, looped trails and knots’.353  A dualistic model of linear progress 
between ancient and contemporary thinking must surely count as one such 
looped trail.  In order to navigate this maze successfully, to char t it, it would not 
only be necessary to break ‘the well-travelled pathways of conventional and 
philosophical assumption’, or to critique dualistic divisions, but to work in 
association with the thinking things of the fictive museum, to assemble a 
sculptural, cognitive field model.  This requires we consider our labels and our 
ar tefacts as equally material things.  The terms of a dualism are just as embodied 
and distributed as our cognition, a trans-modal assemblage, a patterning among 
signs, sounds, texts, images… 
 
The Museum of Jurassic Technology’s ‘Sonnabend-Delani Hall’ presents us with a 
series of things.  Recordings of operatic singing, a melancholy voice that 
reproduces German lieder music of love and loss.  Labels containing fragments of 
biographical narrative and references to distant places, obscure psychological 
theories, forgotten events.  Maps and models of those places, and illusionary 
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structures that were never built there.  Other models, abstract wooden forms of 
cones and planes, claiming to explain theories of memory and forgetting.  Beside 
Sonnabend’s pseudo-rational geometries is a model of – we are told – Proust’s 
theory: a little model madeleine cake on a plate, and a button that releases its 
scent when pressed.  A shifting structure can be assembled between these 
elements, a kind of institutional meditation on love, loss, memory, theory, poetry, 
place, ambition, time…  In the MJT’s darkened rooms, labels seem to float in the 
careful half-light.  The highly polished cases reflect images and objects into a 
mirror-maze of endless deferrals and associative resonances, in which 
photographs and projections seem as physical as a pair of opera glasses, and a 
white glove seems to glow with an inner light, insubstantial as a butterfly.  As 
Claire Bishop wrote of Danh Vo’s Venice Biennale work, this is meaning as 
ambience, as mood, easily dismissed as precisely the kind of nostalgic 
accumulation of evocative fragments Bishop chastised in an illustrated lecture 
she toured in the same year, ‘Déjà Vu: Contemporary Art and the Ghosts of 
Modernism’.354  But in the fictive museum, these nostalgic fragments are not 
what they seem; on the basis of all available evidence, we’re forced to enter tain 
the possibility that Madalena Delani, Geoffrey Sonnabend, and his ‘theories of 
obliscence’ are all fabrications.  Rather than locating the work in a supposedly 
stable, objective ground of history and research, with cultural references 
appropriated as anchor points into larger networks of pre-existing meaning, the 
associations serve to destabilise the reference points we think ourselves sure of.  
We have perhaps heard of the Iguazu Falls.  Have we visited it?  Perhaps we 
should look it up on the internet to check?  How reliable are our memories, our 
madeleines, our Madalenas? 
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As the Museum of Jurassic Technology’s digressions reveal – its slippages from 
pseudo-historical minor opera singers with amnesia to unbuilt bridges to 
wooden models supposedly illustrating outmoded theories of memory – the 
fictive museum proceeds into this labyrinthine territory obliquely.  The MJT 
situates itself on an unbuilt suspension bridge, an optical illusion, in the 
unbridgeable chasm between truth and fiction.  Does this then mean we join 
Ralph Rugoff in his analysis of the MJT as ‘metaphor’?  We construct a reading of 
the MJT where the model of the Iguazu Falls and its impossible suspension 
bridge is a metaphor, perhaps for the space between truth and fiction?  Or 
between perception and reality?  Rugoff ’s essay ‘Beyond Belief: Museum as 
Metaphor’ does not read the MJT in this way, explicitly reducing the exhibits to 
specific allegorical metaphors, though he does insist that metaphor is the right 
way to read them,355  translating the MJT’s Latin motto Ut Translatio Natura as 
‘Nature as metaphor’.356 
 
Yet metaphor is very close to its Latin root metaphora, as close as translatio is to 
the word translate.  If we follow the rhetorical and linguistic understanding of 
metaphor as ‘one thing for another’, a mapping from one domain of experience 
onto another, a replacement, then Rugoff ’s choice of metaphor here is too direct.  
Rugoff instead is describing metaphor in the abstract: a general analogic sense 
rather than a one-to-one exchange.  The exhibits in the MJT function as allusion, 
the kind of endless deferral and associative punning which Danny Nobus and 
Malcolm Quinn identify with the work of Jacques Lacan and Alfred Jarry’s 
‘pataphysics’.357  To map the MJT’s model of Iguazu Falls onto any one specific 
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metaphorical structure would be to close down the fictive space being 
generated, to vivisect it in the same way that explaining a joke excises any 
possibility of humour.  Poetry and jokes function as knowledge, rather than 
information.  It is the space they generate between component par ts that 
produces knowledge, a knowledge that ‘direct explanation’ forecloses. 
 
Within the institutional frame of the fictive museum display, a collection of 
component things can begin to generate knowledge not as an identifiable set of 
defined meanings, but as a space of thinking.  Unlike what Benjamin describes as 
the ‘magic circle’ of the traditional collection, where objects become turned to 
stone and are representative of universals, in the fictive museum, the collection 
begins to model this very aspect of museum collections.  Foregrounding and 
destabilising the very dualisms that traditional collections are founded upon and 
keep behind the scenes, such as subject|object, reason|nature, truth|fiction, and 
label|ar tefact, the fictive space of thinking established by the MJT exposes the 
myth of the museum.  The set of Kabakovian ‘matrimonial pairs’ begin to 
establish their own field of relations, associative mappings from one to another 
from which things cannot be isolated.  To describe why the MJT has a rocking 
model of Noah’s Ark labelled as the first natural history museum would lead us 
astray into a branching series of digressions into Biblical scholarship, the history 
of museums, the symbolism of seafaring, and quasi-theological discussions of 
doubt and faith well beyond the scope of this thesis, or indeed any other.  
Instead of a kernel of truth, a central point that can be described in a nutshell, 
the MJT proceeds like Joseph Conrad’s description of Marlow in Heart of 
Darkness: rather than ‘a direct simplicity, the whole meaning of which lies within 
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the shell of a cracked nut’, we have instead ‘meaning…enveloping the tale which 
brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze, in the likeness of one of these 
misty halos that sometimes are made visible by the spectral illuminations of 
moonshine’.358  Yet these tropes of hazy vagueness, like Agamben’s greyed-out 
figure of undecidability, are not apt analogies.  The nested assemblages of the 
fictive museum are intensely specific, local, a concrete poetry of things 
overdetermined with material resonances. 
 
Into this basketwork of interwoven associations – among which ear ly twentieth 
century nostalgia becomes entangled with memory, loss, effor ts to map and 
build upon the world’s shifting structures – the institutional framing devices of 
the museum itself are drawn.  The self-effacing materiality of the institution, its 
poetics of pragmatic neutrality, begins to sing out; its specific hinges and locks, its 
cer tain shades and weights of felt, or melamine, or buckram, its carpeting and 
coving.  Each chip and scratch become par t of a legible texture.  As one of the 
ear liest exhibits in the MJT, the ‘Sonnabend-Delani’ halls have been exhibited in 
more-or-less the same fashion since the ear ly 1990s, longer than many displays 
in other museums, and cer tainly longer than most contemporary ar t 
installations.  Since their installation, the model of the Falls has been upgraded, 
re-fashioned.  This fact is not recorded explicitly; as with the majority of 
museums, the MJT appears unchanging – a permanent display – but is under 
constant development and renovation.  Only our memories and a comparison of 
archival materials reveal that this ‘magic circle’ of history is itself in flux, more 
shifting sands than stable ground.  Like a melancholy song heard one evening, or 
a theory of the mind invented in a fever-dream, the notes and words seem to 
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hang in the air, giving us a sense of the singer’s voice, and the structure behind 
the song, but dissolving in our memories, leaving us with a collection of loosely 
associated things, surrounding a model of an unbridgeable chasm.  Whether 
figured as an unbridgeable chasm, a cæsura, or a zone of undecidability, this 
explanatory gap is itself par t of the Model, the unlabelled institutional space 
amidst one thing and another, the similarity-centre that brings them into 
association, and is itself generated by that act.  The explanatory gap is a fictive 
space with tonal, textural characteristics; this is the field of operation of the 
fictive museum. 
  
351 Agamben, 2002. 
352 Ehrman, 2014, 3–4. 
353 Plumwood, 2003, 60. 
354 Bishop, 2014–2015. 
355 Rugoff, 1995, 72–3. 
356 David Wilson himself makes this metaphorical claim. (Weschler, 1995.) 
357 Nobus & Quinn, 2005, 78. There are two fictive museums dedicated to pataphysics: the 
Pataphysical Museum and Archive in London and the Musée Pataméchanique in Bristol, 
Rhode Island. 
358 Conrad, 1990, 3. 
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Slide 2355.5:  Pentagonal Loop 
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A Constellation Saturated with Tensions 
Museums, like maps, construct relationships, propose hierarchies, define territories, and present 
a view. Through those things that are made visible and those things that are left invisible, views 
and values are created.359 
The Museum is a diagrammatic form, a mapping of one thing to another.  Among 
such assemblages, implication and allusion are generated in potentia.  This spatial 
move is the key to museum poetics: a looping topology, generating relational 
associations, contingent on context.  As The Museum maps natures, cultures, 
histories – accessioning things, re-staging and labelling them – what are its 
accessioning principles?  What gets included in the assemblage, what is made 
explicit and visible?  And what is subject to a ‘politics of absence’,360 whether by 
being left to implication, actively excluded, or left off the map entirely, repressed 
as double-erasure?361  We arbitrate, assigning things to proper territories, 
categories, to established, sense-making rationales.  We vivisect, carving up 
networks of situated associations into quarantined domains, shorn of context.  
Just how realistic is the knowledge we produce, if realism is a kind of 
isomorphism between map and territory? 
 
To institute ourselves, we proceed as-if a museum, collecting, arranging, 
interpreting, putting labels next to things.  Of course, labels are themselves 
things; the ar tefact labels the label as much as the other way around.  We collect 
quotations, placing them in endnotes as-if in display cases, joined to statements 
with the diagrammatic convention of a superscript number.  But when we 
accession texts into this writing, which is the label?  By assembling inter textual 
points of reference – foregrounding associations between them, relations of 
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similarity or analogy – it is possible to create a kind of a circular argument or 
looping topology.362  
 
To begin generating our fictive museum space of mislabelling, let’s assemble a 
display case, a collection of five cultural reference points: 
 
A In his much-quoted fragment on the dialectical image, Walter Benjamin 
produces a written model of a spatial thought structure.  Benjamin describes a 
‘constellation saturated with tensions’, located ‘where the tension between 
dialectical opposites is greatest’.363  Benjamin’s language is at once conceptual 
and spatial; metaphoric physical forces describe a constellation of collected 
ideas, hanging at a ‘standstill’ under tension.  Elsewhere in the Passagenwerk, 
Benjamin discusses the space of a collection as a ‘magic circle’ in which things 
are also at a ‘standstill’, in the process of being ‘turned to stone.’  This collection 
space is equated with the topos hyperourainos, Plato’s vir tual domain of 
‘unchangeable archetypes’, or ideal, universal forms.364  
~ 
B In Plato’s own discussion of forms, geometries and universal structures in 
Timaeus, regular geometric forms – the so-called ‘Platonic solids’ – are mapped 
onto the four Classical elements.  At the end of this section, a fifth and final solid 
is mentioned in passing: the dodecahedron, which Plato claims forms the shape 
of the universe, its signs and constellations.365  In Plato’s Phaedo, rather than the 
shape of the universe, the dodecahedron is claimed by Socrates as the shape of 
the ‘upper ear th’: the ‘true ear th… pure and situated in the pure heaven,’ 
compared to which the world we inhabit is like the bottom of the sea; a hollow 
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filled with endless mud, where everything is spoiled, corroded by brine.  This 
heavenly world of purity – echoing Plato’s topos hyperourainos – is said by 
Socrates to be the shape of ‘a twelve-patched ball’ made of leather.366 
~ 
C Two millennia ago, balls made from a dozen pentagons of leather were 
clearly common enough things for Socrates to use one as a metaphor.  
Dodecahedra were in use as leather balls367 before they were ‘discovered’ by 
philosopher mathematicians.  This demonstrates a key principle uniting ‘thing 
theory’ and current approaches to cognition in psychology, linguistics, 
archaeology, etc.  Thinking is embodied and distributed, happening only through 
and with things.  Examining the evidence provided by concrete analogies like 
Socrates’ leather ball, Thing Theorists like Tim Ingold aim to ‘over throw’ what 
Gilber t Simondon termed the hylomorphic model,368 replacing dualistic 
conceptions of form and matter (subject and object, active and passive…), with 
a meshwork of entangled flows and intensities.369 
~ 
D For cognitive archaeologist Colin Renfrew, things precede conceptual 
understanding, or more often, coincide inextricably with it.  Renfrew, like Ingold, 
refers to this process as entanglement.  Renfrew argues that symbols are 
abstractions from material things, events, arrangements, describing in detail how 
things exer t their own agential pressures on a society.  Conceptual and material 
culture are so entangled, they cannot be considered separately.  Renfrew refers 
to these material-symbolic things as constitutive symbols, acknowledging in the 
process that this perspective requires thinking beyond mind|body or 
form|substance dualities, dualities that have been entrenched in Western 
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philosophical discussion since before Plato.  For Renfrew, escaping these 
mind|matter dualities involves a hypostatic approach; thinking in ways reminiscent 
of medieval theologies of the Holy Trinity.370 
~ 
E Val Plumwood’s extended feminist analysis of reason|nature dualism links 
Benjamin’s notion of a space of tensions, Renfrew’s opposition to what he calls 
the ‘mind/matter’ dualism, and the philosophical tradition of dualism since 
Plato.371  In Plumwood’s account, a ‘master category’ of disembodied, male-coded 
human reason is formed in opposition to its exclusions.  Each dualism has the 
same structure, described in spatial terms; a privileged, central identity (e.g. 
reason) and a de-valued, exterior other (e.g. nature).  Through their mappings 
onto other cultural dualisms, one term is equated with another, e.g. human~man, 
forming what Plumwood calls a ‘network’ of polar tensions.  This network of 
linked dualisms – a constellation saturated with tensions between dialectical 
opposites – generates a transpersonal, transmedia cognitive space. 
~ 
A In his much-quoted fragment on the dialectical image, Walter Benjamin 
produces a written model of a spatial thought structure… 
 
This looping structure of concepts and references generates a kind of spatial 
symmetry.  In this case, the structure is pentagonal, and can be drawn in simple 
geometric372 style.  This rational-seeming diagram presents us with an apparently 
absurd proper ty, however.  Because of their identical visual treatment, 
philosophers with vastly different canonical ranking appear to be accorded equal 
status, and so, implicitly, do their signature philosophies, their contributions to 
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knowledge.373  The smooth whiteness of the A4 thesis page is revealed not as a 
lack of context, but an active agent in the production of knowledge, used as-if a 
blank and neutral dimension.374  A fictive space – a new associative context – is 
generated between, or rather amongst material: the writing above, the reference 
points in culture, the diagram, and our processes of reading, attention, memory, 
and comparison.  And like The Museum, this fictive space never empty, neutral, or 
abstract, although often carefully styled to appear so.375 
 
Fictive spaces are generated amongst different material elements in association, 
without what Manuel DeLanda labels a ‘global embedding space’:376 an empty, 
featureless conceptual entity within which the elements are situated, and with 
reference to which they are understood, but with which they never interact.  
DeLanda describes philosophies with embedding spaces as n+1 theories, 
requiring an additional transcendent domain outside existence to contain, 
structure or explain it.377  Unlike n+1 theories, fictive space is emergent, not pre-
existing.  It does not contain within, it associates amongst.  Elements associated by 
fictive space touch, leaving mutual traces, however fleeting.  Fictive space does 
not therefore exist within the mind – although many key processes do take place 
inside the skull’s elaborately structured and delicately maintained context – but 
rather out in the wild, amongst things: a matter of context.378 
 
359 Hooper-Greenhill, 2000, 18. 643.0. 
360 See Tali, 2014, 201. 182.0. 
361 Rolando Vásquez, quoted in Osipian, 2017, 1. 580.2. 
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Double erasure describes the tendency of colonial power structures towards a kind of 
epistemic violence that first erases a thing, and then erases the memory or record of the 
erasure, denying erasure has taken place (Zein-Elabdin, 2004, 28). 43E.0. 
362 See Looping Topology. 
363 Benjamin, 1999, 475. E52.0. 
364 Benjamin, 1999, 204–5. 968.3. 
365 Archer-Hind, 1888, 190–7. 6E0.0. 
366 Plato’s Phaedo 110B, quoted in Archer-Hind, 1888, 197. 
367 Dodecahedra were also known to many ancient civilisations in the form of rock crystal or 
iron pyrite beads, or carved for dice games.  One particular example is an Etruscan 
dodecahedron carved from soapstone, with figures incised onto the faces, discovered in 1885 
by Stefano De’ Stefani at Monte Loffa, and thought to date from before 500 BCE. See 
Sparavigna, n.d. 
368 DeLanda, 2016, 142–43. 4E3.0. 
369 Ingold, 2010, 2–3. 774.0. 
370 Renfrew, 2012, 128–30. 303.0. 
371 Plumwood, 2003, 2–6. E28.0. 
372 Geo-metry or the measurement of the earth has in fact little to do with straight lines and 
regular polygons, so perhaps the style of this kind of drawing ought instead to be called 
‘Euclidean’. 
373 This distressing status equality produced by similar visual treatment likely one motivation 
behind the decision of mediaeval painters, for example, to depict holy personages as many 
times larger than the rest of us ordinary sinners. 
374 The page is an industrial technology only unremarkable to us because of its ubiquity.  Our 
tendency, of course, is to consistently ignore both the embodiment of knowledge and our 
reliance on abstracted models of bodily space to represent concepts.  According to Lakoff, 
unless we take intentional steps away from it, our ideas – particularly our understanding of 
abstract categories – tend to revert to the model of table-top-scale physical vessels (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2008, 10–24). 
375 Between the objects, labels and visitors in the traditional museum is seemingly empty 
space.  Space made for its poetics – for the purpose of giving things space – is painstakingly 
manufactured, occupying valuable urban real estate. The ‘neutral temperature’ of the 
museum requires engineering and maintenance.  Likewise, the ‘background’ on which label 
texts are printed are considered, constructed surfaces.  Large panes of glass are the product 
of a material culture sufficiently technically advanced that these feats of engineering are both 
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ubiquitous and invisible.  This A4 page, with its specific affordances and entanglements, its 
imperial histories and implication in global, neoliberal commerce and production, is 
similarly emblematic of the duplicitousness of neutral, featureless spaces. 
376  DeLanda, 2010, 125–127. 880.0. 
377 DeLanda, 2016, 116. 223.4. 
378 Things themselves generate associations, given the right kinds of apophenic pattern-
recognition algorithms and memory-storage architectures to work amongst.  This condition 
of what could be labelled as fictive space's sympoiesis or bootstrapping is particularly 
evident in contemporary conditions of post-internet knowledge production, but was being 
explored by Ramón Llull’s ‘thinking machine’ in the thirteenth century.  See Borges, 2000. 
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The Fictive as an Operational Mode 
In ethnographic and legal discourses, fictive kinship labels non-kin treated as-if 
kin: the ‘auntie’ unrelated by blood or marriage to the children she raises; the 
‘sisters’ of a religious or ethnic community.379  Established in anthropological 
studies of kinship outside Western norms, fictive is now being applied to the 
systems underwriting those norms.  For Catherine Lee, ‘the boundaries between 
social and supposedly biological relationships’ such as family, nation, and race are 
fictive.380 Culture establishes itself through fictive boundaries, naturalising 
arbitrary choices and contingent historical developments.  The fictive is a 
performative as-if relation of communal self-definition, meaning and knowledge. 
 
In literary usage, fictive describes something produced by or productive of 
fictions; an author’s fictive method is the method they use to produce fiction.   
Iser’s ‘heuristics for human self-interpretation through literature’ develops the 
fictive ‘as operational mode of consciousness that makes inroads into existing 
versions of the world’.381 Resisting ‘the old fiction/reality dichotomy’, Iser’s 
heuristic gives an account of literature distinct from fictions in other discourses, 
such as philosophy.382 Literature is the unification of a triad: the fictive, the real 
(‘elements taken from referential reality’), and the somewhat ineffable ‘third 
element’ of ‘the imaginary…a form that allows us to conceive what it is toward 
which the sign points’.383  Iser’s imaginar y shares features of broader 
philosophical concerns with contesting finitude, the boundaries of experience, 
and the limits of thought.384  But while Iser elaborates the fictive as active in the 
world – including lies and hoaxes – he does not distinguish it from the fictional 
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per se, arguing the fictive is ‘the medium for [the imaginary’s] manifestation’.385 In 
‘replacing the customary antithesis’ of real|fictional with the triad 
real~fictive~imaginary, Iser uses the long-established metaphysical gambit of 
replacing dualism with a trinity, a spatial structure we do not wish to 
reproduce.386  
 
In cognitive science,387 fictive and factive are used to discuss veridicality: the 
perceived validity of an interpretation of sense data.  This ‘assessment produced 
by a cognitive system, with no appeal to some notion of absolute or external 
reality’388 avoids the tendency of terms like subjective to isolate and individualise.  
Veridicality is a par ticularly useful concept when discussing fictive ar t.  As ‘an 
inferential ar t form rather than a denotative ar t form’, fictive ar t creates an 
‘inferential gap’ between audiences and ar twork, unsettling its own truth 
conditions, and fracturing audiences into sub-communities of belief and make-
believe.389 Drawing on Iser’s work, ar tist and educator Antoinette LaFarge 
coined fictive art to describe 
a particular form of aesthetic production that doesn't belong to any one field.  Other 
terms for related kinds of work include superfiction and parafiction.  Fictive artworks 
have clearly fictional elements but extend outside the realm of the textual in various 
ways, principally through the creation of realia.  A working definition of the term might 
be: plausible fictions created through production of real-world objects, events, and 
entities.390 
LaFarge explores ar tworks that use fictional elements to generate real-world 
objects and events that visitors may not actually recognise as ar t.  Plausibility 
begs the question of veridicality: does an ar twork need to fool some or all 
audiences in order to be considered fictive, or only have that potential?  Carrie 
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Lamber t-Beatty labels this plausible, interventionist approach parafiction, as para-
medics operate outside of institutionally controlled settings.391 Fictive ar t 
operates outside institutional boundaries, often appropriating institutional props 
– uniforms, signs, brochures, logos, etc.  LaFarge sees these ‘institutional façades’ 
or masks as ‘both a revelatory and a concealing device,’ a paradoxically double 
gesture of ‘outing the self without outing the self… [that is] an operational 
aspect of fictive ar t’.392  
 
For Iser the fictive generates a doubling of meaning, a paradoxical interplay of 
revealing by hiding, which ‘emblematises the fictive as the coexistence of that 
which is mutually exclusive’.393 This recalls Mary Ann Doane’s ‘double mimesis,’ 
where exaggerated, ironic performance foregrounds the constructed nature of 
gender roles through a ‘divergence between voice and body’.394 While Doane 
saw drag and transgender performance as re-inscribing dualism, queer theorists 
including Butler and Jack Halberstam have taken up ‘double mimesis’ for 
masquerade, and the façade more generally.  Queer performativity decenters 
the naturalisation of gender and sex boundaries, implying identity itself is fictive, 
impossible to account for with a rigid fact|fiction model.  That Butler’s work on 
performativity has been misconstrued to mean that gender is therefore an 
unreal or voluntary performance is testament to the pervasive, tenacious nature 
of dualism.395 For Halberstam, this counter-cultural critique of ‘the processes of 
heteronormativity, racism, and sexism’ entails a double project, a trans*396 
critique of normative realism extends even to the ‘seemingly inevitable, 
transparent, and neutral rhetorics of time and space’.397  
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Theorising the fictive as an area of enquiry and cultural production is associated 
inescapably with spatiality,398 doubling, and the performative: a radical rethinking 
of the ‘commonsensical’ norms through which reality is conceived as thinkable, 
which Deleuze labels the Image of thought.  The MJT and MOI site themselves in 
just such a trans* space of between, foregrounding culture, class, gender, trans-
temporal and trans-spatial themes.  These ar tworks in museum drag feature 
consistent themes: speculations on the nature of memory, language and 
representation; confusion between historical and fictional characters and 
situations; deliberate, self-conscious (mis)labelling, and physical structures such as 
bridges, boats, models, labels and frames that embody spatial states of between-
ness, implicating the museum form itself. 
 
We take up the fictive as a non-definitional, non-technical label, an associative 
constellation assembling and extending all of the above uses.  The fictive is a 
‘catch title’399 for all those par ts of our worlds that do not fall neatly into ‘clear 
and distinct’400 categories of true|false, fact|fiction, or ar tefact|label.  Fictive 
phenomena are confusing or misleading to think about using such pairs of terms, 
whether considered as dichotomies, dualisms, or dialectics.  Rather than a hard-
edged definitive category, the fictive is an operative mood, or mode, 
foregrounding the roles that inventions, implications, jokes, lies, mistakes, myths, 
misunderstandings, perceptual glitches, performativity, contingency and 
coincidence all play in the networks of causality.  The fictive labels the turbulent 
boundaries of the actual ~ negotiated territories where make-believe, as-if 
arrangements, fictions, and falsehoods generate real-world consequences.  Iser 
emphasised that treating something as-if something else is not ‘an empty game 
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of ideas but a practical purpose through which the comparison may lead to 
consequences’.401 We extend this with Deleuze’s emphasis on ‘involuntary 
forces’, practical purposes we may pursue entirely unawares.  Paradigmatic 
examples of the fictive include: massive real world consequences of fictional 
events;402 speculation and insider trading both caused by and causing market 
instability; self-fulfilling beliefs of the kind Nick Land terms hyperstition;403 
psychosomatic illness, where the patient’s involuntary cer tainty causes total 
voluntary function loss;404 and gross injustices which, because they lack public 
veridicality, have few consequences.405  
 
This counters the strong relativism stereotypically associated with 
postmodernism: everything is a matter of discourse, and we have no access to 
‘the real’ ~ a condition Quentin Meillassoux terms ‘the “argument from the 
circle” of correlationsim’.406 Instead, the fictive is a cognitive materialist approach: 
everything is a discourse of matter with real, agential existence, giving special 
attention to the powerful, unpredictable effects of imaginary things.  In the most 
intensely fictive situations, distinctions between truth and falsehood collapse 
entirely, not as an epistemic condition of uncer tainty, but as an ontological 
condition: abstract binary categories such as real and unreal cease to have 
meaning beyond a spatial relation.  Rather than join Iser in creating a third term, 
thereby stabilising a fact|fiction binary, we label this binary relation itself as fictive 
space. 
 
379 On the importance of ethnicity to fictive kinship structures, see Taylor et al., 2013. 
380 Lee, 2013, 6. 
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381 Iser, 1993, xv. 
382 There is a rich tradition of philosophical thinking about fiction as an operational mode, 
reliant on contextual clues that are obscured by considering fiction as a solely written 
phenomenon.  See Gale, 1971, 324–340. 
383 Iser, 1993, 2. 
384 See Priest, 2002. 
385 Iser, 1993, xviii. 
386 Rather than resolve a dualism, a trinity risks stabilising and cementing it.  (Cf. 
Richardson, 1958, 55. 419.0) As Cai Zong-qi argues, this is a consistent feature of ‘onto-
theology,’ and one that is disassembled by radical ‘(anti)philosophical’ approaches like 
Derridean deconstruction and Buddhism’ (Zong-qui,1993, 183–195). 
387 See A Sudden Change in the Pattern. 
388 Bloom, 1996, 212. 
389 LaFarge & Le Couteur, 2017. 
390 LaFarge, 2007. 
391 Lambert-Beatty, 2009. 
392 LaFarge & Le Couteur, 2017. 
393 Iser, 1993, xv. Cf. Lefebvre, 2000, 143. 
394 Mary Ann Doane, quoted in Tonkovich, 2010, 84. 
395 There is a wealth of writing on this topic.  See for example Butler, 1993, 17–32. 
396 Halberstam’s use of trans* is part of an inclusive cultural movement which arose from 
internet discussion groups on non-normative genders in the 2000s. In many computer search 
engines, particularly in libraries and archives, an asterisk is commonly used as a wildcard 
symbol: trans* therefore produces results for transgender, transsexual, transnational, 
translation, transportation… Recent identitarian trans activism has rejected the use of the 
asterisk, on charges ranging from ‘unnecessary’ or ‘inaccessible,’ to ‘inherently problematic’, 
‘transmisogynistic’ and – somewhat incomprehensibly – ‘binary’ (Trans Student Educational 
Resources, n.d.). 
397 Halberstam, 2005, 9. 
398 Spatiality is used in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological description of 
experience to distinguish body-centred conception of spatial relations from non-human 
physical space (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, Ch. 3).  Despite Merleau-Ponty’s insistence that the 
gestural, translational meaningfulness of spatiality is not a ‘cognitive’ operation’ (185), his 
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thinking has been widely adopted by cognitive approaches.  We take Merleau-Ponty’s 
‘system of equivalents not founded on the recognition of some law, but on the experience of 
a bodily presence’ to define the embodied~cognitive in general, and the associative 
constellation of fictive space in particular. 
399 This expression is used by Claes Oldenburg for his ‘ray gun’ works, see A Minor 
Paranoia. 
400 ‘The “clear and distinct” itself is inseparable from the model of recognition which serves 
as the instrument of every orthodoxy, even when it is rational.  Clarity and distinctness form 
the logic of recognition, just as innateness is the theology of common sense…’ (Deleuze, 
1994, 146). 
401 Hans Vaihinger, quoted in Iser, 1996, 14. 
402 For example, the 1989 Velvet Revolution, which toppled Communist rule in 
Czechoslovakia, was in part provoked by the fictive murder of Martin Šmid (Sebestyen, 
2010). 
403 ‘Hyperstition is a positive feedback circuit including culture as a component. It can be 
defined as the experimental (techno-)science of self-fulfilling prophecies. Superstitions are 
merely false beliefs, but hyperstitions – by their very existence as ideas – function causally 
to bring about their own reality. Capitalist economics is extremely sensitive to hyperstition, 
where confidence acts as an effective tonic, and inversely. The (fictional) idea of Cyberspace 
contributed to the influx of investment that rapidly converted it into a technosocial reality.’ 
(Carstens & Land, 2009).  [Land’s work cannot be cited without mentioning his disturbing 
entanglements with far-right politics, reframing his entire oeuvre.] 
404 Somatoform disorders confound any binary relation between voluntary and involuntary, 
or between body and mind (O’Sullivan, 2015). 
405 Examples of this include institutional corruption such as the endemic sexual abuse of 
children within Catholic institutions. 
406 Meillassoux, 2014, 11. 
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A Theorist’s Fiction 
Things think.  Just as we have them neatly arranged in a cabinet, or pinned down 
in a drawer, some chance juxtaposition reveals a glitch in our system.  A 
widening crack, magnetizing attention until the entire classificatory apparatus 
twists, wrenching itself into new spaces, leaving whole library shelves obsolete, 
adrift.  This is the wonder and horror of museums––the agency of labelled 
collections to alter thinking.  The eerie affordances407 of relics to warp reality, 
assembling communities of veneration and interpretation, building cathedrals 
around themselves.  Things echo and resonate across time and distance and kind, 
connections unlimited by any one mind or medium.  Invisible, intangible perhaps, 
but nonetheless material, the patterns persist––associative constellations, at 
once generating and generated408 by thinking.  Associations constellate in 
processes neither arbitrary nor necessary, but as matters contingent upon any 
and every flavour of causality.  Associations ramify regardless of hierarchy or 
class, border or boundary, regardless of any rationale or narrative they are 
influenced by, or influence in turn.  Patterns of knowledge production institute 
themselves, and the resulting constellations – like the progress mythology of 
scientific racism in the Modernist ethnographic museum409 – have consequences, 
far beyond their allegedly abstract, objective or disinterested guise. 
Traditional museum poetics are characterised by a double structure: a 
performative staging of the ar tefact and its label.  With ‘no intrinsic or necessary 
link between them’, some theorists argue an absolutist position: all links between 
things and narratives are arbitrary.410 Associations in museum assemblages are 
neither arbitrary nor necessary; they are contingent and agential, generating 
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apophenic ‘forms that think’.  In the fictive museum, the implicit, associative, 
agglutinative nature of museum knowledge becomes its key problematic.  This is 
the underlying conceptual drive for our work.  Combined with the fictive 
museum’s destabilisation of given categories, disciplines and hierarchies, each 
detail or reference point potentially shifts the meaning of the constellation.  
Queering established ideals of reliability, validity, or factuality – exchanging them 
for the shifting, contingent problem of veridicality, of passing as real411 – we 
navigate the unstable, paradoxical fields of the fictive.  In place of given identities, 
origins and cer tainties, we encounter only the as-if: self-suppor ting systems of 
collusion and connivances, complicities, conditionals, and contingencies.  
Disciplinary boundaries between ar t and theory, fiction and philosophy, writing 
and sculpture, history and folklore, mythology and museology, humour and 
seriousness are unmoored.412 In place of the traditionally distinct domains of 
ontology (being), epistemology (knowing), ethics (acting) or æsthetics 
(perceiving), only non-binary non-division remains: a resonant, diffractive 
condition of onto-epistemic-ethico-æsthetics, shifting flows and fields, 
assemblages of assemblages, radically contingent, cognitive, mutually-constitutive, 
multiply-mattering things. 
 
Taking up this agglutinative mode, a connotative marking in addition, our 
approach is necessarily incomplete, multi-faceted, tangential, digressive. It is 
repeatedly re-introductory, accessioning a mass of cross-references, alluding 
towards the fictive centre of an associative space.  A Line Joining Moments 
discusses this fictive centre in relation to the Museum of Innocence project, and 
what Pamuk terms the secret centre413 of a novel, generated among multiple 
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points.  As an analogy for consciousness and the narrative self, philosopher 
Daniel Dennett employs the ‘theorist’s fiction’ of the centre of gravity: ‘a sor t of 
abstraction, something whose existence was not in the slightest impugned by its 
invisibility.’414  While discussing Hans Vaihinger’s version of Immanuel Kant’s as-if, 
Iser explores the related notion of the similarity-centre: 
To understand by means of feigning something is… a pragmatic necessity that aims not 
at insight but at production. For this process, the “intermediary” and “similarity-centre” 
are indispensable types of fiction. The “intermediary” is devised in order to reduce “the 
gap between the mass of apperception and that which is to be apperceived”… The 
As-if modifies comparison and analogy in equal measure, and so the “intermediaries” 
present themselves as models that cannot, however, offer information about what they 
are modelling… [A] precondition for acts of comprehension… [which] cannot explain 
what is to be comprehended… It is as “transit-points” that they come closest to their 
nature as mere projected supplements. Their contents are minimalized, and this brings 
out their elemental functionality, which is fulfilled by their catalytic effect. These 
different forms of the As-if reveal the unmistakable features of a structural model. The 
As-if is in fact the structure of the structures that vary according to prevailing 
pragmatic contexts…415 
This spatial model produces knowledge (rather than information) by generating 
intermediar y transit-points among the things being modelled.  In the performative 
act of proceeding, for example, as-if this project were a museum, something is 
generated between these two entities, which Vaihinger labels a similarity-centre.  
Following Lakoff, cognitive linguistics might describe this in terms of topological 
mappings between domains, while Deleuze might discuss it in the context of 
‘theatrical space’, where ‘repetition is woven from one distinctive point to 
another, including the differences within itself […] dynamic lines in space’.416 
 
Associating Iser’s reading of Vaihinger’s as-if with the fictive museum generates 
an alternative conception of the fictive.  To engage the fictive museum on its own 
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terms, to accession it as a research method, is to take seriously the possibility of 
fictive museum poetics producing knowledge.  However, as Iser points out, this 
‘model-building is only a precondition for acts of comprehension’, which cannot 
‘offer information about what they are modelling’.  To generate a fictive museum 
in order to see what it can do, in effect we attempt a reflexive modelling of this 
modelling process, or, as Iser terms it, ‘the structure of the structures that vary 
according to prevailing pragmatic contexts’.  We speculate that knowledge arises 
through elaboration and association, foregrounding spatial relations between 
ideas, reference points, descriptions.  In place of a single dialectic or analogic line 
between two entities, we assemble a collection of such lines, a meshwork of 
intermingled processes, where a similarity centre emerges.  Instead of a linear 
argument, we generate a constellation, a space to think with.  The fictive central 
point of the thesis is approached tangentially, sculpturally in the round. 
 
In our commitments to embodied~cognitive approaches, introduced in A 
Sudden Change in the Pattern, we take the agency of matter seriously.  We 
propose: certain aspects of (fictive) museum poetics structure the kinds of knowing 
generated by these forms of thought.  One such structural condition is the 
label|ar tefact convention: a binary division between objects and meta-objects.  
Our response is one of doubtful praxis.  Doubtful that fictive space can be 
adequately char ted by echoing existing museum structures, however ironically, 
JAM explores alternatives.417  Spatialising the associative links among its 
collections, as described in Making Uncomfor table Parallels, JAM generates 
assemblages of slides, hybrid museum collection~display~archive~models.  
Things label one-another in association, without hierarchical distinction between 
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ar tefact and label, found and made.  This scaffolds our contribution to 
knowledge: rethinking the fictive museum as cognitive sculpture, and thereby re-
envisioning knowledge production as the emergence of fictive space. 
 
Labelling is a key problematic.  The performative act of (mis)labelling is capable 
of both cultural appropriation and epistemic violence:418 the overwriting of 
knowledge structures – of worldviews – devaluing their claims to truth, their 
legitimacy, their right to self-definition.  As demonstrated in Blum’s careful 
answer ‘she’s real to me’, the act of questioning itself shares this capacity for 
violence, par ticularly when it re-configures life into either/or categories, 
enforced by the word really.419 In our kyriarchal, interrogative culture, 
responsibility lies with the par ty put to question – usually in the minority – to 
adequately explain themselves.420 Drawing from Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed (1970), we adopt a different position: meaning and knowledge are 
only generated in dialogue, only in association, and thus must be continually re-
addressed.421 The vocation of human knowledge is a reciprocal awareness of the 
self-and-world, leading to a revolutionary, liberatory re-labelling of existence, 
performed in contradiction to kyriarchal stereotypes.  Unless education is playful 
and mutual, Freire maintains, it is not education.422 Taking an non-binary, trans-
identified position – itself vulnerable to epistemic violence – the We of this 
project ally ourselves with Stefano Harney and Fred Moten’s ‘Undercommons’.  
Building on the work of Gayatri Spivak and Franz Fanon, Harney and Moten 
emphasise ‘fugitivity’ and ‘refusal’ as legitimate responses to the inescapably 
colonial, kyriarchal condition of knowledge-producing institutions today.423  We 
make no ‘clear and distinct’ division between research and ar twork, between 
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written thesis and creative practice.  Another refusal is of the false choice 
between the so-called virtual space of the Internet, the physical space of objects 
and installation, the conceptual space of academic writing, and the bodily or 
temporal spaces of performance.  JAM is instituted among these manifestations; 
no field us primary, or exists in isolation.   
 
Our museum operates according to an emergent fictive heuristic principle of 
accessioning: the similarity centre is determined only by resonances, echoes, and 
symmetries.  The hear t of an embodied~cognitive space that forms for visitors, 
be they human or algorithmic pseudo-intelligences, through associative 
constellation.  Each accession re-situates the museum, altering its fundamentals, 
changing its nature.  Every new point in the network shifts its locus in fictive 
space.  The research’s centre of gravity, a ‘theorist’s fiction’, a point with no 
characteristics, has no existence apar t from its location-in-relation to the 
assemblage. 
 
Museum as por tal.  An in-between space, saturated with institutional tensions, 
the armatures of ideology, kyriarchal control structures.  A space you may enter 
– like Nabokov’s narrator in A Visit to the Museum – to question the ownership 
of a painting, and emerge to find yourself in a different city, exiled.424 
407 James Gibson (1966) coined affordance to describe potentials for interaction between 
agents and their environments; it has been widely taken up by philosophers and cognitive 
scientists. 
408 Generate is used throughout in preference to produce, make, construct, etc. to describe 
processes of coming-into-being that are not created by top-down, external authorship, but 
result from sympoiesis: ‘complex, self-organizing but collectively producing, boundaryless 
systems.’ (Dempster, 2000, 1). 
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409 See Making Uncomfortable Parallels. 
410 Shelton, 2001, 19–20. 
411 In trans communities, passing describes the highly contingent state of being recognised as 
a member of the gender you identify with, e.g. after being on testosterone for six months, I 
began to pass as male. 
412 Fuck propriety ; } 
413 Pamuk, 2011, 153–178. 
414 Dennett, 1993, 431. 
415 Iser, 1993, 147–9. 
416 Deleuze, 1994, 10. 
417 An unanticipated by-product or ‘output’ of this aspect of the research is a propositional-
critical praxis of museum activism online, in print, and in person. 
418 Nayar, 2015, 65. 
419  You’re adopted, so who are your parents really? 
 Ok, you’re transgender, but are you really male or female? 
 Are you really Irish or British? 
420 Labels are no more than contingent accumulations of meaning, conditioned by material, 
circumstantial genealogies.  Established distinctions merely mark how regularly questions 
have been rehearsed by discourse.  The unresolvable, paradoxical anxieties we feel in 
labelling a thing are generated in part by how violently the act of established naming 
bifurcates our world.  Our answer to re-inscriptions of division can only be a simple 
negative: Is this academic writing or art writing? No.  See Halberstam’s discussion of 
‘refusal’. 
421 Freire, 1996, 68–70. 
422 Freire, 1996, 53. 
423 Harney & Moten, 2013. 
424 Nabokov, 2010. 
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The John Affey Museum 
When Europe’s great colonial museums were founded, the lamps illuminating 
their surroundings burned with the pale fire of spermaceti: oil extracted from 
the head cavities of sperm whales.  Soon after, the South Kensington museums 
began lighting their interiors with gaslight, then with electric lamps linked to coal 
and gas power stations; a situation which continues today.  But in the late 1950s, 
an amateur ethnographer and Antarctic whaler called John Henry Affey (1905-
1969) proposed not only that the 165-metre British-Norwegian whaling factory 
vessel he worked aboard be conver ted into a floating ‘Transnational Whaling 
Museum’ (TWM), but that its ‘cases be illuminated with parmacetti.’425 To 
understand this bizarre, anachronistic insistence, we must form some impression 
of Affey’s complex relationship to whales and whaling, his views on museum 
making, and an esoteric, materialist philosophy of language, seemingly more 
suited to a theosophist or conceptual ar tist than to a would-be museum 
director.  
  
In one of the many paradoxes of his little-known career, Affey was both a whaler 
– working for many years as a laboratory technician on a whaling factory ship – 
and a campaigner against the whaling industry.  Affey believed passionately that 
commercial whaling should cease, but that the Southern Venturer, or its sister 
ship the Harvester, should continue to operate as a living museum.  Whaling 
traditions from every known culture were to be not only collected and 
displayed, but practised commemoratively from the vessel.  Every scrap of the 
whales they caught was to be made use of.  Key to this project was that visitors, 
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whether day-trippers or those bound on longer voyages, take par t in the hunt, 
or at least be made to sample what he called ‘the black flesh’ of whale meat.  
This was the ethnographic principle of par ticipatory observation – inspired by 
Affey’s reading of Bronislaw Malinowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922) 
– raised to the level of a communion rite.  Staff and visitors would join in public 
acknowledgement of our shared complicity in and historical reliance on whaling.  
A perpetual process of confession, mourning, thanksgiving and atonement to 
whales and whalers alike. 
 
In the event, the TWM was never founded.  With whale stocks declining rapidly 
and less profit to be made, the Venturer was sold to a Japanese company in 
1962; Nippon Suisan KK426 bought the vessel solely for the British whaling quota 
attached.  Some four teen thousand tonnes of blood-soaked steel changing 
hands for the piece of paper that came with it.  Vast complexes of rusted steel, 
washed again and again by iron-rich whale blood, until – Affey insisted – the 
very fabric of the vessel was infused with it.  The Venturer was laid up in Mihara, 
before being butchered for scrap some years later.  In the half-century since, 
recycled steel from the Venturer – plus an equal quantity from the Harvester, 
Affey’s second choice – might have ended up anywhere, the taint proliferating 
from scrap yard to foundry to scrap yard.  A homeopathy of cetacean 
hæmoglobin; a matter of distribution.  Some may still be sat rusting in breakers 
yards in Mihara, or Santander.  Most will have ended up as par t of the fabric of 
shipping containers, railway girders, steel plate… even of contemporary whaling 
ships.427 Some might have found its way into the spoon that stirs your coffee, or 
into the steel and bronze powder used for 3D printing.  If so, traces could be 
 
 
  
174 
present in the steel dice we use to generate our semi-random JAM accessioning 
numbers.  This is, of course, a vanishingly small chance: we proceed as-if it is the 
case.   
 
Steel dice form the link between Affey’s two unrealised museum projects: the 
TWM, and the John Affey Museum (JAM).  Affey kept a memento from the 
Venturer that he referred to as a knucklebone: a complex steel pipe coupling 
from the laboratory, which he gradually filed into a rough dodecahedral form.  
This memento became the focus for his second museum effor t, a ‘distributed, 
dozenal museum’ that would collect things without removing them from their 
native environments.  These ‘JAM Accessions’ accrued as lists, first in notebooks, 
and later on index cards, kept in steel military surplus Veteran file drawers.  Each 
accession was assigned a semi-random duodecimal428 number ; Affey’s unevenly 
weighted knucklebone favoured cer tain throws over others.  But far from being 
a source of error, this was – Affey argued – the only rational means of 
proceeding.  Numbering by thematic classification such as Melvil Dewey’s 
decimal system imposes arbitrary self-fulfilling categories from the outset.  All 
sequential numbering systems introduce a misleading sense of priority, besides 
which date-based numbering is ‘foundered [sic] in demonstrably false religious 
claptrap’.429  Yet pure randomness is as much an idealised absolute as perfect 
systemic order : neither are attainable.  For Affey, only the sheer contingency of 
semi-random numbering is true to material reality.  In consequence, our 
contemporary JAM dice are constructed on this principle.  Uneven weighting 
will gradually introduce a shoaling or flocking effect to the numbers rolled: 
clusters that generate associative constellations and emergent meanings.  
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Affey’s voyages began at his home in the Shetlands near the Arctic Circle, 
boarding the Venturer at Leith harbour, Edinburgh, bound for the whaling station 
of Leith Harbour, South Georgia, par t of the South Shetland Islands claimed as 
British Antarctic Territory.  Once there, Affey would take any oppor tunity to visit 
the former Hektor station on Deception Island, then used as a base by the 
British Antarctic Survey, from which it issued postmarks on behalf of the 
Colonial Office to asser t their territorial claims against Argentina.  Affey was 
convinced he had discovered on Deception archaeological evidence of a lost 
indigenous culture of the Antarctic, a people he called the Whale Riders.  For 
both the TWM and JAM, Deception played a key role.  In many respects, it was 
the ideal location for Affey’s museum archive following the loss of the Venturer: 
the desiccated freezing air was a good preservative, the inexplicable, perfectly 
straight Costa Recta and unusual omega-shaped harbour had always been 
popular with tourists, and the site’s overlapping whaling, scientific and colonial 
histories resonated with Affey’s concerns.  However, Deception’s unusual shape 
was due to its being the caldera of a submerged volcano: 
From the late 1940s, Affey had begun to store his cases of indexed reference cards 
and dozens of original artefacts in the former Hektor whaling station… In 1968, 
disaster struck Deception in the form of violent geological upheaval, causing lahars of 
boiling mud and ash to engulf the site… The huts used as Base B of the BAS were 
badly damaged and abandoned, and, along with them, Affey’s improvised museum 
store. Despite increasingly desperate letters to anyone Affey thought may have been 
able to gain access to Deception Island and see what could be salvaged of his life’s 
work, all was to no avail, and the following year he suffered the first in a series of 
ultimately fatal strokes.430 
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The event marked a crisis for Affey’s museum project; with no collection, no 
funds, and par tly as an act of despair, he founded JAM that same year.  
Presumably, the twenty steel Veteran card index drawers containing whatever 
remains of Affey’s notes and references are still buried beneath the black sand 
and ash of Whaler’s bay; twenty points, forming the ver tices of a dodecahedron, 
projected onto some complex, folded surface.  Nearby, a label plaque affixed to 
the ruin of Biscoe House by the Deception Island Management Group identifies 
the area as a Historic Site.431 
 
To date, two essays from 2015 are among the few published mentions of John 
Henry Affey and his museum proposals: the first is an introduction to fictive 
museum poetics in Performance Research, and the second is an analysis of 
selkie432 folktales in Gender Forum.433  2018 marks the quinquagenary of that first 
founding – or perhaps first foundering – and sees the launch of JAM as a floating 
institution, not on the oceans of the world as Affey had intended, but navigating 
via satellite the ever-shifting shoals and currents of the Internet.  Fifty years on, 
in the contemporary moment, shor tly before its public relaunch as a heritage 
and collections consultancy business, JAM is primarily an online institution, 
represented alongside the major museums of the world via public engagement 
profiles hosted by corporate social media platforms: Tumblr, Twitter, Facebook 
and Instagram. 
 
Today, the main site of JAM is a Tumblr blog, containing hyperlinks, documents, 
spreadsheets, images, audio recordings, 3D models, vector diagrams.  The 
contents of this blog are not contained within anything; it is a fictive space, 
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distributed across server farms, web browsers, and the sensoria of its visitors.  A 
collection encoded with carefully structured magnetic fields.  Maintained in 
unknown locations, accessible from anywhere with wireless internet, or a 
satellite connection, and the Universal Resource Locator address.  The digital 
images, slides edited in Photoshop, are the visible light projections of things-in-
context, diffracted through a fixed 35mm lens onto a digital sensor array.  Some 
things in the world are easily projected through a single lens.  Other things are 
more distributed; invisible, though equally material.  Patterns, tides, networks, 
lines, which can be diagrammed or modelled into a scale and mode more 
suitable to the human sensorium, as Gaia’s magnetic fields can be figured with a 
series of dashed arcs, and some red and blue arrows. 
 
In this paragraph, printed across the recto and verso of this white A4 sheet, the 
global standard of institutional administration, are twenty tilde signs ~  Twenty 
points, bounding fictive labels ~ Connected in a cer tain way, with vir tual lines, 
this set of points can form a topological diagram of a dodecahedron ~ This 
paragraph can therefore model the John Affey Museum ~ A museum is a space 
where information is mapped onto things ~ Every museum is a set of vir tual 
points and lines ~ Lines between ar tefacts and their accession numbers, 
between collections of things, and constellations of information ~ Each line is a 
dimension, and so each museum is a hyper-dimensional surface ~ As institutions 
linking things and information clusters, museums are cognitive spaces that 
generate meaning ~ Museums draw lines of association between different 
cognitive modes: visuospatial, auditory, kinaesthetic, proprioceptive, linguistic, 
iconic ~ Assemblages of matter map onto assemblages of encoded information 
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and performance~assemblages of knowledge ~ Museums are trans-coding, 
trans-modal assemblages of assemblages ~ The hyper-dimensional surface of the 
museum is a field of resonances ~ Reflexive symmetries echo between things, 
encoded descriptions, external references, and models of thought ~ In 
producing cognitive models of these symmetries, visitors associate them with 
their own experiences, feelings, and memories ~ In doing so visitors generate 
different knowledges ~ Museums, then, are sculptural: spaces with an affective 
cultural poetics ~ Both in their external reference points and their spatial 
arrangements, museums foreground cer tain resonances, symmetries, and 
associative lines ~ It matters how things are lit, how much space they are 
accorded, and how they are positioned ~ It matters what information and what 
things are juxtaposed, clustered, assembled into associative constellations ~ 
 
425 Affey, 2017, 81. 
426 This corporation, founded in 1911, is currently known as Nissui, and is one of the largest 
fishing concerns in the world. In an email to our researcher, however, they claimed no 
knowledge of owning the ‘Southern Venturer Maru’. 
427 Though Affey imagined he was experiencing the last years of commercial whaling – to be 
a man located at the End of History – the pattern has continued replicating regardless, woven 
deeply into national economic identity. Today, Affey’s proposal that whaling continue only 
as a living museum, operating a sustainable ‘re-enactment whaling’ carried out for what we 
would now call knowledge production and the continuation of intangible cultural heritages, 
remains a vision for the future. 
428 Affey felt likewise about ‘decimation’ ~ the progressive decline of more practical dozenal 
counting methods in favour of the decimal system. Dozenal, or duo-decimal counting 
systems are widespread across human cultures, with the benefit of being easily divisible by 
2, 3, 4, 6 and 12. Using the right thumb to count the right dactyls or finger bones, and 
keeping track of dozens using the left thumb, it is possible to count to 144 using only the 
hands. The historical accident of the French Revolution is partly to blame for the loss of 
dozenal systems, although their attempts to change to a decimal clock and calendar remain 
unsuccessful. See Zirkel, 11X3. 3X8.1. 
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429 Affey, 2017. 
430 Le Couteur, 2015, 38. 
431 Deception Island Management Group, 2005. 
432 Selkies, silkies, or selch are transcultural mythological beings, part seal and part person, 
appearing in coastal folklore from Ireland, the British Isles, Shetland, the Faroe Isles, 
Iceland, and Scandinavia. 
433 ‘Fictive Museums and the Poetics of Mislabelling’, Performance Research 20.1 (2015), 
36–47; and ‘Slipping Off the Sealskin: Gender, Species, and Fictive Kinship in Selkie 
Folktales’, Gender Forum 55 (2015), 55–82. 
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Slide 27X9.3:  The Museum is the Performance 
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The Museum is the Performance 
It is the difference between having the score of Mozar t and playing it. The museum is 
the performance of the stuff in your collection, not the collection per se. 434 
During the 1920s, British celebrity archæologist Sir Leonard Woolley claimed to 
have discovered the oldest known museum while excavating the sixth-century-
BCE Babylonian palace of Ur.435  Ennigaldi-Nanna, daughter of King Nabondius, 
kept a collection of antiquarian ar tefacts ‘complete with clay tablet labels’ in the 
form of cylinders with texts in three languages.436  One of these cylinders – a re-
inscription of the text on a clay brick from c.2000 BCE, found while digging 
foundation trenches for a new building in c.650 BCE – is now on permanent 
display at the British Museum (BM).437  This narrative of ancient archaeology 
motivates its inclusion in the ‘Building Babylon’ display:438 a group of ancient 
inscriptions that reference – and in some cases wilfully misrepresent – even 
more ancient authorities.  While the BM online catalogue gives the metadata of 
the cylinder’s discovery and a par tial translation of the cuneiform inscription, the 
fact that the cylinder labelled par t of a collection, and that Woolley claimed it as 
a museum label, are absent.  The exhibit itself does not include the inscription, 
nor mention Woolley at all.  Without knowing it beforehand, this narrative is 
impossible to extrapolate from the twenty-word label.439  The value of this 
unique ar tefact for the history of museum studies – and the BM’s rationale for 
displaying it, rather than the thousands of similar accessions in storage – remains 
obscure to even the most assiduous visitor. 
 
 
 
  
182 
Whether by a brief name or title of provenance – great-grandmother’s basket – 
or by an elaborate ritualised song-and-dance, collections of heir looms are always 
hitched to narrative: prompts or prosthetics for performance.  From this pre-
historic pairing stems the dyad of thing and name, ar tefact and label, accession 
and metadata, which continues to constitute the molecular structure of the 
museum today: extensive, labelled collections, arranged for display by an 
institution.  In the Musaeum Ashmoleanum, which opened in 1682,440 ‘an inferior 
officer alwaies attends to show the curiosities to strangers.’441 Performance is 
bound into this structure: a thing and its tale, told together on an institutional 
stage. It is no coincidence that the theatrical expression front of house is often 
used by museum staff.  ‘Although we may be reluctant to admit it,’ Elaine 
Heumann Gurian writes, a museum exhibition ‘is more akin to the production of 
a theatre piece than any other form’.442  In the British Museum’s ‘Building 
Babylon’ display, this theatre piece is a nascent production – a set stage of props 
and cues awaiting a performance, which the Museum itself may not provide.   
 
As museum curators Spencer Crew and James Sims write, ‘[t]he problem with 
things is they are dumb.  They are not eloquent, as some thinkers in ar t 
museums claim.  They are dumb.  And if by some ventriloquism they seem to 
speak, they lie.’443  And, as Woolley’s clay cylinder reminds us, labels are things 
too, props tied to performative acts.  Performance writer and curator André 
Lepecki described a current turn towards ‘the body as archive’.444  Describing his 
Musée de la danse (2015) project for Tate, dancer and performance ar tist Boris 
Charmatz states ‘we dance as a mental space, not only as a physical practice’.445  
The project re-envisaged Tate with a speculative, fictive museum proposal: What 
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if Tate Modern was Musée de la danse?  Charmatz installed 90 dancers in the 
gallery, who would lecture, teach, and most crucially perform gestural sequences 
from different eras and styles of dance: ‘as if their bodies are the museum 
spaces’.446 Charmatz at once re-imagining the mental space of the skilled 
performing body as-if it were a fictive, living museum, and reveals embodied 
performance as the missing piece in the ar tefact~label pairing. 
 
There is more than one way to enter a museum.  Some visitors pop in to see 
something specific, some just to browse.  Some devote the whole day, trying to 
see as much as they can.  Some visitors accept the museum’s interpretations 
unquestioningly; some scrutinise every juxtaposition and oddity of phrasing for 
slips or hidden agendas.  Some proceed case by case, cross-referencing each 
little number,447 reading every label.  Some choose to ignore the labels entirely.  
Our museum should be open to all these approaches and more; museums make 
meaning reciprocally, each visitor co-producing their own performance.448 
 
Before beginning, we have to stamp this museum catalogue as fictive.  Not only 
generated by and generative of fictions – fictions inextricably entangled with and 
treated as-if factual – but re-assembling and re-arranging the facts themselves.  
Resituating facts as-if fictive, exposing them to reconsideration as symbolism, 
metaphor, metonymy, allusion, irony.  We do this, perversely,449 in the service of 
realism.  A radically embodied~cognitive realism aligned with New 
Materialism,450 researching not how things should work (or would, if only we 
could get them in order, define our terms, vivisect true from false, fact from 
fiction, literal from figurative, reality from illusion, base from superstructure…), 
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but how things can and do happen. An as-if mode, collecting life’s messy, 
contingent, par tial, improper, intersubjective, reciprocal, and above all associative 
matterings,451 in order to ‘understand by means of feigning’.452 
 
As a precondition to putting together a fictive museum, we have to claim a kind 
of freedom of association.  The right to proceed associatively, to make montages 
or constellations, to gather together or disband communities.453 The right to 
accession things into our research assemblage, irrespective of their genealogies, 
their provenance or media, their citizenship status in this or that disciplinary 
field.  Irrespective of their station in the kyriarchy.  Irrespective of their veracity 
or veridicality.454 
 
We lay claim to a dubious method of blasphemy, or passionate irony.455  To an 
exemplary fictive museology: to academic, ar tistic, and museological worst 
practices.  A non-binary method, inescapably trans-temporal, trans-cultural, trans-
disciplinary, and trans-gendered, if only because of our contrarian456 impulse to 
respect no given bounds.  A method desiring only one kind of validity (that 
impressive term born from the Latin for bodily strength):457 we seek validity as 
intensity of interconnectivity, a tensile strength amongst things held in 
association.458  Knowledge459 not as an immaterial abstraction, but as a patterned, 
spatial polyphony of bodies and things, a song known only in the singing of it.460 
 
The ‘we’ who do this are the John Affey Museum.  We both generates and co-
opts identity,461 an authorial, institutional, intersubjective in-common.462  
Museums always speak by fictive means: a performative, institutional We.463  The 
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museum may be an institution producing knowledge, even an institution 
producing knowers, but it is first and foremost an institution producing itself.  
Civilising the Public; Educating the Masses; safeguarding cultural capital;464 being ‘a 
laboratory of comparative cultural investigation’…465  Speaking as one, we doubt, 
on principle, all self-justifications or mission statements from The Museum: ‘the 
motive-hunting of motiveless Malignity’.466  And so we address ourselves not to 
any visitors or interest groups in whom we might wish to produce impacts or 
outcomes, but to this reified kind, of which we form a minor example ~ to The 
Museum itself.  We address the muséal467 gaze, that reciprocal performance of 
being museum-like. 
434  James Bradburne quoted in Holledge, 2018. 
435 JAM follows ‘Common Era’ (BCE/CE) dating conventions, originating in nineteenth-
century Jewish scholarship, rather than the ‘Anno Domini’ method still employed by many 
institutions, including the British Museum, based on the fictive birth date of Jesus of 
Nazareth. 
436 Fowler, 2003,12. 
437 Excavation number U.2757, British Museum number 119014, Registration number 
1927,1003.9. Location G55/dc5. 
438 Other object titles include: ‘Using the authority of the past’; ‘A seal with a history’; 
‘Secret numbers’; ‘Reading old records’; ‘Venerating an ancient king’; and ‘Lacking 
transparency’. 
439 The British Museum label text reads: 
 ‘Digging up the past 
A clay cylinder recording brick inscriptions of Amar-Sin (2046-2038 BC), which emerged 
during the digging of the remains of an ancient building. 
 About 675-655 BC 
 From Ur 
 ME 119014’. 
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440 Elias Ashmole having taken legal possession of the famous collection of the Tradescants’ 
Ark, allegedly by deception, and secured funding to house it in Oxford. 
441 Anthony Wood, quoted in Genoways & Andrei, 2016, 34. 
442 Heumann Gurian, 2006, 160. 
443 Crew & Sims, 1991, 159. 
444 Lepecki, 2010.. 
445 Tate, 2015. 
446 Tate, 2015. 
447 218.1. 
448 8E0.0. 
449 441.0. 
450 Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, 48. 153.0. 
451 Barad, 2015, 401. 459.0. 
452 Iser, 1993, 147–9. 01X.1. 
453 As claimed for example in Article 20 of the United Nations ‘Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights’. 
454 Drawing on its use in linguistics and the social sciences, veridicality is used here to mean 
the assessment of truthfulness or likelihood: not the veracity of something per se, but the 
contingent conditions of seeming factual to a given interpretive community. For the use of 
this term in computational linguistics, see for example de Marneffe, Manning & Potts, 2012. 
455 Haraway, 1991, 291. 390.0. 
456  ‘I will say that I’m a contrarian at heart, I’ve noticed this since I was very little. When I 
hear things, dogmas, I tend to go to the opposite pole. One of the first things I was interested 
in was forgery for that reason, the last taboo. And so I’m very interested in the many ways in 
which fictive art serves a contrarian impulse within the art world. It’s not just one thing; it’s 
so many ways.’ (LaFarge & Le Couteur, 2017). 
457 Lather, 1993, 674–5. 15X.0. 
458 For more on the idea of validity reconsidered as a kind of tensile strength, explored in the 
context of JAM’s Roots Between the Tides project, see Le Couteur, 2017. 
459 Data structured in relation generates information; information structured in relation to 
human contexts produces knowledge.  This context incorporates both the ways in which we 
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record, communicate and use information, and our pre-experiential cognitive conceptual 
maps, whether intuitive or systematic, that structure its associative significance.  Knowledge, 
in this sense, is a context-bound translation amongst information structures: a mapping of 
maps.  This broad definition of knowledge follows Zins, 2007. 
460 Landes, 2013, 92–3. 901.0. 
461 Haraway, 1991, 296. E70.0. 
462 Derrida, 1998,  41–2. E6E.0. 
463 ‘Should I say “we” instead of “I”?  Am I pretending the museum is actually speaking?  
What would it say?  How would it say it?  Can I make jokes?’  (Dornan,  2017). 13E.0 
464 Throsby, 2011, 166–68. 712.0. 
465 The British Museum, 2017. 
466  Samuel Taylor Coleridge on Shakespeare’s Iago, quoted in Mahoney, 2009, 500. 
467 913.0. Cf. Theodore Adorno’s gloss on museal, quoted in Crimp, 1995, 44. 9E5.0.  
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Drawing Conclusions 
Fictive museums are associative constellations – transmedia assemblages of 
things~images~texts~events~performances~sites – which label themselves 
Museum.468  Fictive museums under take a reframing of the ostensibly neutral, 
pragmatic conditions of institutional knowledge production ~ re-modelling the 
Model of thought.  They are far from the only cultural phenomena with this 
potential.  But by dealing directly with museum poetics – a mythic structure, a 
representative figure for representation – they are uniquely positioned to 
foreground its glitches, contradictions, paradoxes, and absurdities.  Re-producing 
museum poetics in an as-if mode, fictive museums unsettle our expectations of 
how museums should behave, highlighting how museums do behave.  By 
accessioning the aesthetics and poetics of knowledge-producing institutions – 
whether by performing the double-mimesis of museum drag, or even entering a 
trans* space of passing as-if museum – fictive museums queer representation, 
classification, categorisation, and the interactions of research and creation, 
exposing and destabilising dualism. 
 
In the fictive museum – to say nothing of other knowledge-producing 
institutions – labelling and explanation never quite function as adver tised.  
Fictive museums use complex textual and sculptural devices to destabilise and 
disconcer t the poetics and performances of the museum.  The conventional act 
of labelling something with its name, date, and context quickly enters reflexive 
modes of irony, hoaxing, and absurdity, dismantling the veridical boundary 
between literal and figurative.  Though what Kabakov terms the ‘matrimonial pair’ 
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of object and label remains largely secure, this distinction is made more complex 
by the use of elaborate reproductions, models and framing devices.  In the John 
Affey Museum, par ticularly in the Roots Between the Tides project, a polyphonic 
alternative to this dialogue between the non-textual object and the textual label 
is proposed: an associative constellation model of hashtagged slides re-labels and 
re-contextualises itself and its surroundings, generated by hand from a modular 
kit of things and a database of connections. 
 
Fictive museums operate in an as-if mode, where questions of veridicality and 
relevance are unsettled in favour of a fictive heuristic.  An eagle principle, which 
gathers anything and everything into its own orbit, turning about a centre of 
gravity, a theorist’s fiction, generated amongst the materials accessioned.  This 
similarity-centre exhibits a looping topology, both producing and produced by a 
kind of apophenic ray gun effect, re-contextualising each modular element into 
an assemblage form that thinks.  In doing so, fictive museums foreground the 
unstable associative context of knowledge production, the implicit and intensely 
contingent background conditions, its glitchy Model of thought: complex and 
paradoxical models of knowledge’s unspoken, unlabelled conditions.  Implicit 
meanings generated amongst matters in association constitute the ground 
against which figures of linear continuity are perceived.469 As Rachel Haidu 
observes of Broodthaers’ work, this opens to investigation the premises of 
critique and perception.  Fictive museums can develop what Paulo Freire 
described as ‘the power to perceive critically,’ re-modelling the very institutions 
of perceiving and critique.470  In this sense, the project argues for mis-labelling as 
resistance, for what Hal Foster describes as a reflexive approach to meaning.471 
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The Fictive Museum proposes ways to re-model knowledge in terms of cognitive 
assemblages: fictive spaces of association.  The minor mode of this method applies 
primarily to a genre of ar tistic production – the fictive museum – which the 
project approaches simultaneously as object and method of study.  Fictive space 
is proposed as a pragmatic, generative way of thinking about and producing 
knowledge in ar tistic research.  In following the emergent rationale – the fictive 
heuristic – of the John Affey Museum on its own terms, The Fictive Museum has 
generated unplanned outputs relevant to mainstream museum practice.  One is 
a proposal, or provocation: a model for ordinar y museum to become aware of 
and take responsibility for its own inevitably fictive aspects.472  Thinking through 
the dualistic label|ar tefact relation in the museum has generated a second 
output; an associative constellation method of grouping things in fictive space.  
Whether objects, images, texts, or others, things are assembled in terms of one-
another, rather than abstract, pre-established categories.  Labelling is not 
considered as separate and immaterial description, but rather a performative, 
contingent, and consequential act.  Labelling matters, and takes place reflexively.  
In consequence, the fictive museum not only extends beyond its own 
boundaries, intervening in the praxis of the ordinary museum, but implies a 
major mode of re-envisioning the fictive as method.   
 
This major form draws far broader conclusions.  We propose fictive spatiality 
not only as an approach to the ordinary museum – i.e. to all museums – but 
speculate that fictive space is an inherent feature of human knowing as such.  
Fictive spaces of analogical association not only operate beyond commonsensical 
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divisions of meaning into literal|figurative, but are required by the ver y spatial 
terms in which such dualisms are conceived.  The explanatory gap is a fictive space.  
To the extent that knowledge-producing institutions are structured by 
inter linked dualisms – networks of seemingly common-sense distinctions 
between label|ar tefact, literal|figurative, reason|nature, mind|body, and true|false 
– they presuppose an inherently kyriarchal Model of thought.  Our consideration 
of fictive museums exposes this Model as a spatial, fictive assemblage in itself.  
We believe that by revealing fictive space as an ineluctable modality of knowing, 
fictive museums can help mitigate against epistemic violence.  In doing so, fictive 
museums implicitly address broader questions of knowing, thinking and meaning, 
many of which are longstanding philosophical paradoxes.473   
 
Making no attempt either to resolve these philosophical issues, nor to produce 
any authoritative account of them, the contribution of this performative, 
practice-based research is instead to take up fictive museum poetics as method, 
accessioning and assembling our collection and (mis)labeling it as a genre: the 
fictive museum.  Museum poetics are better suited to making introductions than 
drawing conclusions.  Taking (mis)labelling as its model, at the hear t of this 
project are the twin acts of accessioning and association: lines of thought drawn 
between fictive museum research ar tefacts.474  Rather than analytic, critical or 
definitive, our approach in both thesis and praxis has been exploratory, 
associative, and par tial ~ accessioning quotations, labels, slides, performances, 
references, notes, and songs ~ trans-media models and diagrams.  A point cloud, 
sketch-mapping how different aspects of the fictive museum might interact.  This 
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diagrammatic, spatial fictive heuristic method works in parallel with the John 
Affey Museum’s collections online.   
 
Gathered together, these collections form a locus, a fictive space of assembly.  
The thesis-and-praxis makes a sculptural lacework ~ a constellation of things ~ 
knotted in association ~ among the materials submitted and beyond ~ gesturing 
outwards to other works ~ events ~ structures ~ into other spaces ~ trans-
media ~ trans-disciplinary ~ trans-cultural ~ trans-temporal.  Instead of 
constituting a stable or complete museum in itself, we assemble a par tial set of 
processes, a fictive heuristic capable of generating fur ther work and thought.  
Our intention is that this generative institutional space allows visitors to become 
acquainted with the fictive museum as a valuable and coherent cultural genre, 
and to gain a sense of some of the things it might make possible.   
 
The Fictive Museum accessions labels, models, problematics and points of 
reference – rather than rationales or structures of legitimation – from 
established discourses of knowledge.  We join Iser in stressing the need for a 
heuristic method that is not imposed-from-without, nor labelled on the terms of 
other disciplines.  Given the increasing bureaucratisation of The Academe on 
ostensibly neutral rationales impor ted from corporate culture, a fictive heuristic 
approach to (mis)labelling becomes a methodical imperative. The unthinkably 
vast proliferation of information both in print and online only intensifies this 
condition.  We proceed by doubtful praxis, via self-confessed contingency, 
superstitious bibliomancy, synchronicitous decision-making,  contrarian refusals, 
associative assemblage, reflexive (mis)labelling in place of developed terminology, 
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ruling nothing out, and reigning nothing in.  This method is not only cognitively 
realistic – and hence germane to our exploration of the fictive – but perhaps 
the only way to go on.475  A passionate commitment to fictive spatiality, and 
par ticular ly to the queered institutional façade of the fictive museum, is in par t 
an implicit proposal for how future fine ar t research might proceed: a method 
for knowing.  In this respect, The Fictive Museum is closest to the model given by 
post-conceptual, post-internet ar t: ‘the opening up of dada found-object 
aesthetics into critical appropriation’.476   
 
Situating the fictive museum assemblage online in retro-futuristic cyberspace at 
once amplifies Debord’s warning of a life shifted from action to contemplation, 
and utter ly de-centres its terms of distinction.  Sarat Maharaj  – acutely aware of 
the dangers of labelling477 – labels this ‘an emerging overall condition of living… 
the “grey-matter” environs’.478  Opposing a Beckettian unnameable to ‘the 
“institutional drive” – one that can easily repeat itself in the ar t research world’, 
Maharaj takes up the unnameable and Foster’s label of unknowing to counter a 
drift toward 
what we might call the “corticalization of creativity” - tending towards the pole of 
dexterous, “ether-real” permutations in the algorithmic mode.  The tendency marks the 
rendering of creativity increasingly as hard-nosed know-how – a drift that makes it even 
more crucial to keep the door open for the unpredictable see-feel-think processes of 
no-how.479 
Maharaj’s no-how resonates with Stefano Harney and Fred Moten’s call for a self-
aware and avowed ‘Undercommons,’ and their emphasis on ‘fugitivity’ and ‘refusal’ 
as key tactics.  We propose the fictive suggests an alternative to Maharaj’s polar 
refusal of institutional labelling.  Our commitment to the fictive material-
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cognitive agency of things that think reclaims both the cognitive and the 
algorithmic as conditions of embodiment.  Jack Halberstam claims that  ‘[t]he 
path to the wild is paved with refusal… the refusal of the choices as offered’.480  
Our first refusal has been to reject out of hand ~ axiomatically, from first 
principles ~ any and all traditional dualistic oppositions, not least those between 
feeling and thinking, ar t and science, poetic and technological, figurative and 
literal, named and un-named.  Our second refusal is to reject the conflation of 
the conceptual with the linguistic rather than the embodied, exposing the 
reliance of all such dualistic oppositions on fictive spatial constellations.  Third, 
we refuse to accept the status quo self-image of established knowledge-
producing institutions: a bureaucratic mythology of knowledge or Image of 
thought, obscuring its own condition as fictive space.  Such kyriarchal structures, 
are self-inconsistent, glitchy and nervous, rife with explanatory gaps, and 
continually open to radical contingency effects: they are ripe for the hacking, and 
ours for the taking. 
 
The situation of ar tistic research must not be allowed to collapse into that of 
André Breton’s famous argument with Roger Caillois over the Mexican jumping 
bean: do we cut reality to see how it works, dispelling the mystery (Caillois), or 
do we leave the mystery intact and unknown (Breton)?481  Broadly aligned with 
Caillois’ own ‘form of the Marvellous that does not fear knowledge but, on the 
contrary, thrives on it’, we never theless lament his self-confessed inability ‘[a]s a 
child… [to] really have fun with toys…constantly ripping them open or 
dismantling them’.  The question is not to cut or not to cut the bean, but having 
cut some beans, to re-approach the rest with a renewed understanding of the 
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fictive – that is, the actual, trans-material, embodied-cognitive – workings of 
mystery.  Neither to break all toys, nor to passively play with what happens to 
be given us, but to adapt things to our own purposes.  Maintaining, meanwhile, 
our intuitive awareness that drastic, unforeseeable consequences often result 
both from cutting things, and from acts of labelling.  The findings of experimental 
psychology, mathematics, and philosophy only lend suppor t to our effor ts.  We 
claim philosophy as an inevitably sculptural pursuit: both spatial and æsthetic.   
 
In emphasising the inescapably embodied, distributed, fictive nature of cognition, 
the fictive museum has the potential for what Freire labels a ‘radical-liberatory 
pedagogy’ ~ the potential to re-inscribe the form that thinks of ar tistic research 
at the hear t of our project of critical, decolonial knowledge production.  This 
project has begun to outline the as-if, the fictive heuristic and fictive space as 
(mis)labels for re-thinking knowledge, associated with a range of contemporary 
challenges to established understandings.  New models of thought cannot be 
generated from established labelling structures, laden with the same old dualistic 
baggage.  The fictive is not a matter of fact|fiction, any more than the cognitive is 
a matter of mind|body, or trans* is a matter of male|female.  However, these 
paradigmatic dialectic constellations are so powerful, so pervasive, and so 
inherently bound into the kyriarchal Model of thought, that they are inevitably at 
play.  These fictive structures alter perception, cognition and memory even when 
our engagement with them is ostensibly one of critique.482 It is for this very 
reason the fictive must be applied to factual knowledge production, and the 
cognitive must be applied to material assemblages, to things that think.  In this 
way, our (mis)labels have a chance of retaining some paradoxical, counter-
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intuitive potential, an embodied criticality generated by their glitchy, associative, 
reflexive structures.   
 
Never theless, we have found ourselves struggling at every point with the 
indefinite, the unlabelled, the unnameable constrictions of our own embedded 
Model of thought, our endemic memetic infection.  It is our fervent hope that 
from some fictive space generated in assemblage amongst these matters, from 
some associative centre of gravity or moment of balance, future fictive museum 
researchers may find their own productive points of depar ture, the means of 
instituting their own collective voices of dissent. 
 
We have now assembled our twenty points.  Not an argument, but an 
arrangement.  A discursive space of anthology, rather than a discussion.  Neither 
figure, nor ground, but a model of that patch of ground obscured by our view of 
the figure, and reflexively inferred.  Each point a knot~cluster~collection, 
generating amongst its elements a fictive centre of gravity.  Twenty hollow 
centres, where nothing is located but association, staring without eyes.  And in 
their midst, a twenty-first:  The Fictive Museum.  Our museum is not the 
collection, but its performance.  A We, operating as-if institutional.  A We who 
will never cede the labels knowledge, reality, and the cognitive to the kyriarchal 
establishment, nor ever accept their bloodless, blood-soaked, dualistic rationales 
as preconditions for our scholarship. 
 
 
468 This definition does not, of course, exclude real, ordinary museums. 
469 Deleuze, 1994, 152. 
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470 Drawing on Edmund Husserl, Freire (1996, 64) describes this ‘zone of background 
intuitions’ or ‘field of background awareness’ as coming to the fore in a revolutionary-
liberatory pedagogy.  Freire’s ‘problem-posing’ model for developing a radical critical 
awareness resonates with the claims of Broodthaers and Mary Beard: the posing of 
‘interrogative points’ functioning as ‘an extension of radical hardline academic rigour’ 
through passionate irony. 
471 Foster, 1996, 23. 
472 Le Couteur, 2018. 
473 Eg. The Ship of Theseus. 
474 Gomm, 2009, 299. 
475 Research doubt that we should be proceeding with other points of reference, other labels, 
other means, threatens crippling anxiety: the paralysis of praxis (Candlin, 2008). 
476 Stimson, 1999, xlv. 
477 Maharaj, 2009, 10. 
478 Maharaj, 2009, 1. 
479 Maharaj, 2009, 9. 
480 Halberstam, 2013, 8. 
481 Caillois, 2003, 85. 
482 Nick Land’s Lovecraftian taboos of naming and the horror of knowledge, make sense, of 
a kind.  Will we – like so many cultures –once again use euphemistic slights-of-language to 
label those demons that are so uncannily agential, that even invoking them generates a 
terrible centre of cognitive gravity?  Is our only escape from the strange looping topologies 
of dualism to stop up our ears, refuse to speak its name?  Current debates around identity 
politics, which so often centre on forbidden labels, appear especially relevant here. 
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Appendix A:  A Collection of Fictive Museums 
Selected Fictive Museums & Related Works 
 
Abish, Cecile; Museum Reconstructed: Fogg (1980) 
Affey, John Henry; The Transnational Whaling Museum /  
 The John Affey Museum (1968–ongoing) 
Amerika, Mark; Museum of Glitch Aesthetics (2012) 
Bijl; Guillaume; Documenta Wax Museum (1992) 
Blake, Peter; A Museum for Myself (1977) 
Blanchly, J. & Shaw, L. The Temporary Museum of Vaseline in Perth Amboy (2010) 
Bloom Barabara; Never Odd or Even (1992) 
Blum, Michael; A Tribute to Safiye Behar (2005) 
Bradford, Elaine; The Museum of Unnatural History (2009) 
Brisley, Stuart et al.; The Museum of Ordure (2001–ongoing) 
Boltanksi, Christian; Réserve Du Musée Des Enfants (1989) 
Boltanksi, Christian; The Archive of the Carnegie International 1896-1991 (1991) 
Broodthaers, Marcel; Musée de l'Art Moderne (1968–72) 
Chapman, Stanley et al.; The Pataphysical Museum and Archive (2000–ongoing) 
Charmatz, Boris; Musée de la danse (2015) 
Clegg, David; The Imaginary Museum (2003–ongoing) 
Cook, Greg; The Invisible Museum (2007) 
Cornell, Joesph; Museum (series c. 1940–48) 
Costa, Claudio; Museum of Man (1974) 
Costa, Claudio; Ontologia Antologica (1994) 
Daly, Norman; The Civilization of Llhuros (1972–2008) 
Dellbrügge & De Moll, Museum Boutique (1991) 
Dion, Mark; Tate Thames Dig (1999–2000) 
Dion, Mark; The Museum of Poison (2000) 
Dion, Mark & Williams, Robert; Theatrum Mundi: Armarium (2001) 
Dion, Mark; The Marvellous Museum: Orphans, Curiosities and Treasures (2010) 
Distel, Herbert; Museum of Drawers (1970–77) 
Duchamp, Marcel; Boite-en-valise (‘editions’ of 300 unique boxes c. 1935–68) 
Durham, Jimmie; On Loan from the Museum of the American Indian (1985) 
Feireiss, Lukas et al.; The Institute of Imaginary Islands (2011–12) 
Fraser, Andrea; Museum Highlights: A Gallery Talk (1989) 
Greenaway, Peter; The Physical Self (1991) 
Häussler, Iris; The Legacy of Joseph Wagenbach (2006) 
Hill, Peter; The Museum of Contemporary Ideas (1989) 
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Hiller, Susan; From the Freud Museum (1991–96) 
Jarr, Alfredo; Museum (1991) 
Kabakov, Ilya; Ten Characters: The Man Who Never Threw Anything Away (1985–88) 
Kabakov, Ilya; Incident at the Museum, or Water Music (1992) 
Kallnbach, Siglinde; The Museum of Ashes (1995) 
Kosuth, Joseph; The Play of the Unmentionable (1990) 
LaFarge, Antoinette; The Museum of Forgery (1990–ongoing) 
Lattin, ‘Dr’ James; The Museum of Imaginative Knowledge (2013–ongoing) 
Lyons, Beauvais; The Hokes Archives (1980–ongoing) 
Malraux, André; Le Musée Imaginaire (1935–47) 
Martin, Drew; The Museum of Peripheral Art (2012) 
Miranda, Maria; The Museum of Rumour (2003) 
O’Doherty, Brian et al.; Aspen 5+6 (1967) 
Oldenburg, Claes; Mouse Museum / Ray Gun Wing (1965–77) 
Pamuk, Orhan; The Museum of Innocence (2008–ongoing) 
Ra’ad, Walid; The Atlas Group (1999–ongoing) 
Readymades Belong to Everyone; Backstage (1994) 
Salley, Neil; Le Musée Patamécanique (2007–ongoing) 
Schelle, Susan; Musée (1994) 
Scott, E. J.; Museum of Transology (2016–ongoing) 
Silver, Sean; The Mind is a Collection (2015) 
Simonds, Charles; Dwellings (1970–ongoing) 
Shaw, Jeffrey; The Virtual Museum (1991) 
Spoerri, Daniel; Musée Sentimental (1977–89) 
Starr, Georgina; The Nine Collections of the Seventh Museum; The Collection (1994) 
Szeeman, Harald; Museum of Obsessions (1974–2005) 
Thurman, James; The McMuseum of Anthropological Archaeology (2009) 
Tooby, Mike; Museum of Amazing Coincidences (2012) 
Vallance, Jeffrey; The Travelling Nixon Museum (1991) 
Van Der Pol, Bik; Fly Me to the Moon (2006) 
Van Geluwe, Johan; The Museum of Museums (1975) 
Aby Warburg; Mnemosyne Atlas (1927–1929) 
Wilson, David & Diana; Museum of Jurassic Technology (1984–ongoing) 
Wilson, Fred; Mining the Museum (1992) 
Wilson, Fred; The Museum: Mixed Metaphors (1993)
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Appendix B:  Mary Beard Interview 
‘Hauser & Wir th: THE BRONZE AGE, c. 3500 BC - 2017 AD’ 
Professor Mary Beard in conversation with Clair Le Couteur  
(edited from email correspondence, 5 October 2017) 
 
 
Clair Le Couteur : 'Bronze Age' looks ver y much like a conceptual art piece in the 
tradition of institutional critique.  How were you approached about participating in 
the project, and how do you see your role?  Do you consider it to be a kind of 
collaborative artwork? 
 
Mary Beard: I bumped into Neil Wenman by chance at JFK Airpor t, and he 
explained the project to me… I saw it as an oppor tunity to show some love to 
underfunded regional museums, but also to raise some questions about regimes 
of display.  I was intrigued and interested.  Many years ago, with a friend, I had 
done a small show in the Ashmolean, ’The Curator’s Egg’, which explored some 
of the same issues – for example, we put cheap fakes in some of the cases, and 
we put price tags on some objects – and raised questions about the 
conventions of the museum.  This was a chance to explore those questions in 
different ways. 
 
The installation deliberately references underfunded regional institutions, and part of 
your contribution is about raising money and interest for the participating museums.  
Great attention was paid to getting details right, a kind of 'material poetics' of the 
minor museum.  It has been received ver y differently by different reviewers.  Some 
have seen the piece as merely an ironic joke, and it is certainly playful, while the 
ver y anti-Frieze Guardian angrily dismissed it as 'meaningless,' saying 'cramming all 
of these modern artists into a deliberately archaic museum wrecks their 
individuality.' Both the museum and the art fair have ver y similar powers to re-
contextualise the things they bring together.  Was there a sense you were making a 
more serious, provocative point?  How do you feel about the tone of the work? 
 
It was a humorous and playful celebration of underfunded museums.  I was not 
responsible for the details of the display, but I thought that that they got the 
tone just right.  I was very concerned that this should be a supportive play with 
the conventions of regional museums, that it should not just point the finger of 
satire at them.  And I felt it was.  I watched people going into the booth and 
smiling in recognition.  I have to say that there are few jokes that are ‘merely’ 
ironic.  It was ironic of course, but was making a serious point about the very 
nature of display.  How we show things makes an obvious difference to how we 
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see them.  It was funny that Jonathan Jones made the point but didn’t realise 
that he had! 
 
In your short recordings, you moonlight as something between an archaeologist and 
an art historian.  Each uses the object in question to make a more general point, 
whether it's the ver y different associations we make with something when it is 
'turned upside down,' the great difficulty in dating bronze, or how we think 
differently when we know what an object is used for.  The recordings function a little 
like museums labels in this respect.  How scripted were these inter views?  Did you 
feel you were performing a part, or were you involved in the writing, the decisions 
about which points to make? 
 
They were not scripted at all.  We discussed the pieces a bit beforehand, and 
had fun thinking about what points they raised, to make sure that I didn’t say the 
same thing about each one.  But apar t from that there was no script, it was 
entirely improvised.  And in most cases, except where I went on too long, it was 
just ‘one take.’ I was playing myself, and was talking as I would to my students. 
 
In stating the difficulty of dating bronze and the power of context to radically 
redefine something, it seems like a more general, unstated argument is being made.  
Associating these points together with the setting, the labels and the objects on 
display, the installation begins to work as a gestalt, to make a kind of space.  Do you 
have a sense of a 'central point' the installation might be making?  Is this something 
that can be expressed in verbal language, or something beyond it? 
 
Not sure on this one.  Mine were pretty interrogative points. 
 
The interrogative points you raise could well be used to argue for a nihilist, relativist 
'anything-goes' approach to things as unknowable.  It seems instead you are 
advocating something ver y different, a sensitive attention to detail, context and 
ambiguity.  Could you describe how your commitment to knowledge and scholarship 
informed this project? 
 
Well, that is hard, but you might say that it is an extension of radical hardline 
academic rigour. 
 
There is a common misconception that irony signals a lack of seriousness, of 
passionate commitment.  Or equally that humour can't be used to make important 
obser vations in a gentle way, that it must be an act of aggression to be considered 
critique.  Could you talk more about the value of irony and 'supportive play' in the 
context of critical thinking? 
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You seem to have it exactly.  Humour and irony have always been impor tant 
vehicles for hard thinking! 
 
Many of the interrogative issues you raise about context, perspective, and categories 
are not just old, but ancient; Odysseus and the winnowing oar, for example, or the 
paradox of the Ship of Theseus.  Are these issues timeless, or do you see them 
having a particular relevance today? 
 
Well, they get differently configured, but many of the basic issues are the same.  
How you look and what you see depends on where you stand and what else is 
in your field of vision. 
 
The display places artworks side by side with both ceremonial and functional pieces.  
Do you see the issues raised here primarily in the context of art, or in culture more 
generally? 
 
What was in the top of my mind was the context of display, but you could 
cer tainly widen the frame.  
 
Fictive and self-aware museum displays are becoming increasingly familiar to 
audiences.  For contemporar y art, in its endless desire for novelty, this is seen as a 
negative, removing the element of surprise and innovation.  Is an interrogation of 
display conventions ever something that is in danger of being conventional? 
 
Well, anything risks becoming conventional if it is done conventionally.  I think 
that most people actually are not familiar with fictive museum displays.  The 
reaction to the Bronze Age booth suggests that it had the capacity to make 
people think.
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Appendix C:  Antoinette LaFarge Interview 
On the Fictive: 
Antoinette LaFarge in conversation with Clair Le Couteur,  
(edited from Skype recording, 10 October 2017) 
 
 
Antoinette LaFarge: I’m a big fan of online communication, I have been for 
decades. 
 
Clair Le Couteur : I just hope the signal is kind to us.  At least we’ve now seen each 
other, I think that does change the kind of conversation you can have. 
 
I come from the ‘90s.  We spent a lot of time in places like MOOs and MUDs.  
There would be people I would know for years before I met them in real life.  
So, it does change the conversation, but I don’t find it as necessary as some 
people do. 
 
I was also a ver y early adopter of computer stuff, so I remember actually floppy 
‘floppy disks’, messing around with my Dad programming DOS, stuff like that. 
 
We can always follow up with clarifications later, I’m always more comfor table as 
a writer than a speaker. 
 
You’re still at UC Ir vine, is that right? 
 
Yes. 
 
One of the things I wanted to ask you is how much you know Wolfgang Iser’s work.  I 
don’t know if you were there when he taught at Ir vine? 
 
He was, and I never met him.  I didn’t get interested enough in what he was 
talking about until he had died.  I missed him by like a year.  But I have been 
leaning on him quite heavily for my book, yes. 
 
The thing about his writing for me, and I must say I wish I’d read more of it… I’ve 
read a small number of words but in some detail, because I started off in the literar y 
department, so ‘close reading’ is something I can’t not do.  But I find him to be the 
best in the sense that he’s actually a writer : he can write, and he’s good to read.  It’s 
moving, even when he’s talking about the most abstract things, you know, writing 
about language can go ver y wrong. 
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Two people I’m working with heavily are him and Nelson Goodman, and I find 
Iser generally an easier read than Goodman, but they’re both very impor tant to 
the way I’m thinking about this subject.  Goodman’s book on ‘ways of 
worldmaking.’ Do you know it?  
 
I know it, and it’s another one I haven’t… Partly because I’m practice based, and 
partly because I’m tr ying to cover much too much for a PhD, I think I have a ver y – 
how to describe it? – roll the dice, open a page, bibliomancy approach to theor y. 
 
[Laughs] You know, you sound the way… you research the way ar tists do.  
Ar tists as a rule aren’t systematic researchers.  I like that, I’ll now describe what 
we do as bibliomancy, that’s very nice. 
 
I feel kind of weirdly, superstitiously strongly about it, to be honest.  It does work.  So, 
tell me: the specific choice of word.  I mean it crops up in earlier writing, but you 
seem to be using it in a way that’s different from Iser, and different from most other 
people that I’m reading.  And actually, more similar to the way that it’s used in 
anthropology? 
 
Which word are we talking about? 
 
Fictive. 
 
Ah.  Um.  
 
I’m hoping you’re still using that word! 
 
No, it’s interesting: I’m actually working with the term ‘fictive ar t,’ and so… How 
am I using the word fictive specifically?  I haven’t actually attacked the word 
separately from the term, only various aspects of how it per tains to the term. 
 
I’m kind of against definition, in a technical sense.  I’m ver y happy for you to talk 
about it in as vague terms as you like, without needing to be held to them. 
 
Talking about the word fictive specifically, I guess I’m interested in mostly how it 
operates as an element within the term.  So, I look at this aspect, from the Iser 
point of view, as things that aren’t made up out of whole cloth, the selection and 
assembly of new elements from old, and how that operates within the kind of 
work that I call fictive ar t.  I’m looking at it from a kind of as-if speculative fiction 
development, as a form of speculation.  Something that is not – and again this is 
Iser – something that is put in opposition to the True or Real, but rather a way 
of working with materials that are both true and real.  I’m almost trying to drain 
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the fiction out of fictive, because I think the term itself is so problematic.  it’s 
always being put in opposition with things I don’t think it’s truly in opposition to. 
 
The as-if, Iser is borrowing that from Vaihinger, r ight?  A German philosopher from 
the early twentieth centur y.  And both Vaihinger and Iser are using it as something 
which is active in the world.  Not some kind of abstract unreal thing, but something 
that is a kind of inter vention. 
 
The idea that we are always engaged in a making-real, a world activity through 
physical and material engagement.  I don’t know enough about Vaihinger to 
know who he’s leaning on, but in this specific area, Hegel is also someone I’m 
looking at. 
 
The idea that these are new or, perish the thought, postmodern concerns is totally 
wrong.  They’re active questions in the entire histor y of literature for as far as we can 
find it, two thousand, three thousand years back.  I mean obviously Hegel’s 
important, but you can find a lot of similar material in the Greek philosophers, but 
not the most popular ones!  Heraclitus was also talking about that… 
 
There’s a kind of neo-Platonic move going on, in the attempt to make the idea 
real or connect indissolubly the idea and the thing in the world, in so far as the 
idea is also the carrier of the Spirit.  Neo-Platonists as a group are far more 
mystically oriented than the Platonists, they amped up the mysticism that’s 
inherent in it.  I actually have not found postmodern theorists for the most par t 
very useful in this project, par tly because while fictive ar t is a matter of 
fragments or modularity, but it’s this attempt to assemble a whole that interests 
me, rather than this idea that we are all trapped within an ever-fragmenting 
systematisation of the world. 
 
I completely agree with you, and I think in a way the fragment is bound up with the 
Romantics, Schelling-type stuff, for better or worse, that’s the first time it enters 
theor y.  But I think this idea of modularity works better for me than the fragment, in 
the sense a module has to work in and of itself, but is always connected with a 
larger system.  So that whole binar y between whole and fragment doesn’t work, it 
doesn’t operate like that. 
 
No, it’s not like a collage or any of those things where we’re thinking about 
fragments assembling.  For me modularity is an extremely impor tant aspect of 
the fictive ar t projects I’m interested in, par tly because I see fictive ar t as a 
deeply generative way of working.  With analogies to other generative 
processes, such that you have this operative fiction or idea at the centre of it, 
which churns out; the project grows out of the idea.  And it assembles in pieces, 
so that each section tends to lead to the assembly of more bits, and they all can 
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be plugged in.  In fact, they can’t be par t of the project unless they can be 
plugged in.  But I’ve never seen a really interesting fictive ar t project that 
essentially was whole cloth, in the way a painting star ts out.  A painting can be 
built up, but it star ts out as a whole that isn’t the interesting thing about the way 
fictive ar t projects develop.  So, I’m interested in the psychology of how they are 
made by ar tists, more than any kind of taxonomy that you can construct from 
them.  It’s a different way of working than you seen in a lot of ar t. 
 
This idea of the generative… and I guess also the emergent also figures with that.  
That you once you have a certain number of modules operating together, they 
produce between or around themselves – among, I like the word among ver y much – 
amongst themselves, something else starts to happen.  Certainly, for me, because I 
work as a research artist.  So, it’s kind of weird doing research, because my art is 
research, so I guess it means that my research is art, which then becomes another 
kind of research, or something… The thing that I’m interested in is the idea of the 
heuristic , but the fictive heuristic , where the project starts looking for things on its 
own terms, almost in spite of you.  In terms of a psychology, that’s why I like it.  It 
speaks back to you, in some way. 
 
I hadn’t thought about that, that for the ar tist it begins to operate as a kind of 
heuristic.  I had thought about it in terms of almost the negative of that, a kind 
of internal censorship that the ar tist has to operate on themselves within the 
terms of the project, so that what develops can stay within the terms of the 
project.  So there’s a rule system that operates.  A heuristic is something that 
operates to solve problems, to get you out into a set of solutions, but there’s 
another sense in which the constraints are at least as impor tant. 
 
With Iser, he does still seem to be… he uses the word fictive alongside, as a 
companion term of the imaginary.  Which seems for him to be a kind of internal, 
mental, dreamlike, fantastic process, whereas the fictive is more of an agential, out in 
the world process.  He talks about them together a lot, but that binar y distinction 
doesn’t work for me, as somebody who’s into the cognitive.  I have difficulty with the 
idea of ‘interiors,’ or the disembodied.  I’m sure you’re more familiar with his work, 
and I don’t know if you get that sense from him? 
 
More familiar, I doubt that’s true.  I have had trouble with how the word 
imaginary operates, because I also have trouble with the distinction he wants to 
make between the fictive and the imaginary.  I’ve come to a similar conclusion in 
that he sees the fictive as the actualisation of the imaginal.  But how he 
separates the imaginal from other kinds of ideas, all of which he understands as 
actual, is very difficult for me to parse out.  And I tend to think that the 
pragmatic way in which he’s trying to locate the way in which we process 
culture, the way in which we process the ideas… it’s almost like there are ideas, 
 
 
 
229 
there’s our processing them by creating pieces of ar t, and then our way of 
operationalising them into various forms like genres.  That distinction: I haven’t 
really dealt with it, and I haven’t been able to find it useful in my work to talk 
about the imaginary.  I’m much more interested in the fictive’s relationship to 
the actual.  Things we make up in our heads are almost a given, I don’t have a lot 
more to say about it. 
 
And I guess it’s also ver y ver y difficult for me to… if you’re tr ying to approach things 
in a radical, meaning ‘first principles’ type way, then as you said, making the 
distinction between imagination and perception is really not that easy.  Making the 
distinction between different kinds of mental events, between formal knowledge, 
between concepts… Really drawing those lines in terms of these words that we 
have – which are just contingent, historical accumulations of meaning, multi-lingual 
tracks, baskets we’ve got – that actually in terms of how the brain, how the mind, 
how the cognitive system is working, they don’t seem to represent anything ver y well. 
 
A problem of all words, no?  It’s a problem of language; we’re stuck with them, 
and their baggage. 
 
But at least when we’re talking about a hammer : it has a handle and a head, we 
look at those and they’re named after things that we can touch and see.  Whereas 
with the brain we haven’t had that access before, so we don’t tend to talk about it 
in terms of tangible units. 
 
I wanted to ask: I’m ver y focused on this one particular area of fictive art, which 
shades into institutional critique, about the museum.  I wonder if you’re looking at 
any of those as a case study? 
 
I’m looking at a lot of case studies, maybe sixty, but I’ve collected them in 
different groups of practice.  I know that Peter Hill and also Carrie Lamber t-
Beatty talk about institutional critique.  I’m writing something closer to a general 
interest survey, or an introduction to a subject.  But yes, since I have a fictive 
museum of my own, it’s of great interest to me.  I’m rolling most of that under a 
general idea of ‘Institutional Facades,’ because I’m par ticular ly interested in two 
things.  First, the facade aspect of these pop-up institutions, and second the 
facade as a way for individuals to assume authority.  I like the institutional 
critique aspect of some of the projects I’m looking at.  I think that assuming 
authority is obviously a very practical way to produce critique as satire. 
 
For me, it’s not a word that I have been using, but it makes ver y good sense to me.  
I’m quite interested in the idea of the mask, the institutional mask, and I think that 
facade captures that even better, because it’s less bodily, less personal, and more 
architectural. 
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One of the reasons I moved in that direction is that it seems to me one of the 
things Internet did was produce a very large number of institutional facades in a 
very shor t amount of time.  There are so many of these online, and there are 
cer tain affordances you gain from that.  It seemed to me that it made fictive ar t 
not just easier to produce, but easier to achieve the reality effects.  There’s a 
series of constraints that operate in physical space; you have to work in a very 
different manner to produce the reality effect and the authority effect. 
 
Something that isn’t discussed in the art world as much as it perhaps should be is 
budget.  We like to pretend that these things just appear or ever yone gets the 
funding they need.  Material investment is an enormous part of it.  The thing about 
mail art, which is one of the places it started – or as we might call it over here ‘post 
art’ – is that it’s similar ; on the internet you can spoof sites, and just as with postal 
fraud, people do for nefarious purposes.  The difference between a hoax and the real 
thing on the internet is maybe only in the domain name, or maybe it’s in the amount 
of typos, or something.  But that material investment that you would need to spoof a 
place in real life is ver y different. 
 
I’m extremely aware of the economic realities of the ar t world for many 
different reasons, in terms of my own history, the kind of the work I’ve been 
doing, and some of the ways I think about our culture.  I think it’s actually 
incredibly true that the economics of ar t are under-discussed.  Par ticular ly in our 
current 1% take all ar t world. 
 
And if the economics are discussed, they’re discussed in a kind of pseudo-critique of 
the million-pound scale, they’re not really discussed in terms of casting in bronze and 
casting in another material because it’s several thousand pounds, which is a huge 
amount to most people, but in terms of the art world that’s seen as a relatively 
insignificant sum, as ridiculous as that is.  I don’t know if you’ve heard about Damien 
Hirst’s current installation at Venice?  But he has made an installation called The 
Wreck of the Unbelievable, which is a kind of fictive museum, or at least a fictive 
art project.  He claimed to have lifted up a bunch of artefacts from a wrecked ex-
slave’s ship, to have brought up these incredible sculptures from the bottom of the 
ocean.  So, there’s videos of divers down there, finding these sculptures covered in 
coral.  And it is on a scale where lavish doesn’t even cover it; the multi-million-dollar 
level.  You really know that fictive art’s hit the mainstream when it’s worth a hundred 
million, r ight? 
 
He’s such a great thief of ideas, I guess it was inevitable he would eventually 
steal this one!  I don’t know if I’ve ever seen an original idea come out of him, 
you can easily figure out what he’s stealing.  But the question of the hoax is a 
very interesting one.  A lot of the terms that are used around fictive ar t are 
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intended to dismiss it, and create a way to make it ethically unsustainable, or 
morally beyond the pale.  And I find that very interesting.  I don’t think that all 
fictive ar tists are trying to be transgressive.  A lot of them don’t act or speak the 
way radically transgressive ar tists do, but their work ends up being among the 
most transgressive out there.  I feel that that’s shown not by what’s said about it, 
but the way people react to it; an almost universal reaction is to push it away. 
 
Or to align it with culturally demeaned areas: that it’s childish, or that it is 
intentionally misleading, with a kind of malign purpose, or that it’s not serious… 
 
…it’s not serious, or that it’s crossing the kind of boundaries that are now very 
much contested: people taking on identities of others they have no right to, and 
of course the issue of forgery and impersonation. 
 
And I think that comes down to one of the things that Lambert-Beatty discusses in 
her parafictions piece of a few years ago.  She’s talking about Michael Blum’s A 
Tribute to Safiye Behar (2005) in Istanbul.  Actually, a lot of roads lead to Istanbul in 
this kind of work, somehow.  I guess maybe because it’s that East-West borderline 
place, I dunno, it’s a personal theor y… But the thing about Blum’s piece is that it 
was critiqued both for being unrealistic , and – by another group of critics – as boring 
because they don’t understand it’s a fiction.  So, they think it’s pedestrian, whereas 
the other group who realise – or who have been told – think that it’s unconvincing: 
you can’t have it both ways, I don’t think. 
 
No, and that brings up another question that has been of great interest to me; 
the question of the degree to which fictive ar t is self-outing, which is something 
that Iser talks about also, that the fictive is always to some degree self-revelatory.  
Threading the needle of outing the self without outing the self is an incredibly 
operational aspect of fictive ar t. 
 
The thing that I’m interested in about it is the implicit.  The fact that you can say 
something to the careful reader that you’re not saying explicitly to the casual reader.  
That it fractures the audience; you can’t pretend that there’s one audience, that 
ever ybody thinks the same. 
 
It’s an inferential ar t form rather than a denotative ar t form, so that inferential 
gap: you don’t know how big it’s ever going to be.  
 
And in a way that seems to be one of the crucial operative concerns of it, that the 
inferential gap is in a way one of the things that’s being investigated. 
 
So, my turn for a question.  I’ve read a good deal in previous years about 
impersonation in various forms.  Avatars and impersonation are a very strong 
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interest for me, I have an ar ticle on impersonation as a form of improvisation 
that came out a couple of years ago.  But since you’re actually living some of the 
cultural madness around who you get to present as, under what circumstances 
in your culture, I’m wondering if you have a par ticular thoughts about how 
impersonation operates within many of these fictive ar t projects, especially the 
ones where people play roles in their own works. 
 
I would say that impersonation does come up, but impersonation kind of gives the 
impression that there is another real form that you are impersonating.  And I think 
for me, a lot of the fictive stuff that I’m interested in, particularly stuff that has a 
kind of ‘passionate irony’ – I keep re-reading the way that Donna Haraway discusses 
irony at the beginning of her ‘Cyborg Manifesto’ as a kind of heresy.  That you 
actually have to care about something you’re being heretical about, it’s not just 
pastiche.  I think there’s a relationship with drag and there’s a relationship with trans 
there for sure; a kind of I need to pretend to be something else to be myself or to 
express something.  There’s this weird thing about drag; I think it’s Butler writing 
about drag as a kind of doubled form, because by putting on a different appearance, 
you see something about me that you can’t see from what you consider to be my 
natural appearance.  So, there’s this kind of flipping that goes on with drag.  I think 
there’s a relationship with queering the institution in that sense, that it is unsettling 
and it does mess with people’s reality boundaries.  And the kind of dismissive 
responses that you were talking about, are about it being kind of superficial, or 
untrustworthy, and these are the kind of cultural responses to queer and trans 
identities more generally.  A friend of mine who’s a kind of mentor, a sort of 
academic fair y godmother, put the question to me after I’d come out ver y delicately: 
Do you think that this has anything to do with your interest in that field?  And the 
more I think about it, the more I’m convinced that it does.  Not in a kind of 
derivative way, but I think there is a genuine link.  What it really pushes against is 
binaries and dualism.  When you’re talking about taking fictive away from a dualistic 
relationship with fact, and putting it in another space, where it’s actually discussing 
the ways that performance and belief systems and material contingency and all of 
this kind of thing combine, I think that that’s really relevant for trans identities.  And 
this idea about co-opting the institution, the institutions of normality or authority, I 
think are also extremely valuable for feminist concerns, for queer concerns, for 
decolonial concerns, particularly. 
 
This links back to what you were saying ear lier about masks; masks are of equal 
interest to me, par ticular ly because of traditions in the commedia that the mask 
is a revelatory device rather than a concealing device.  This is not how most 
people understand it, but it’s absolutely critical if you’re going to talk about 
masks in a meaningful way.  This is what I’ve discovered through avatarism; my 
avatarism in the ‘90s was the revelatory experience. 
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Building on that, what comes to my mind is the way that Julia Kristeva is discussing 
the intertext, and her interest in Bakhtin’s term carnivalism, this idea of turning 
things on their heads, and the mask being something that actually reveals what’s 
happening beneath the surface rather than obscuring it.  And again, these ideas 
we’re talking about were obvious to ancient thinkers, these are by no means new 
theoretical concerns, again, though they might be little known.  Anyone who thinks 
that a mask is covering up, rather than revealing something, has never worn a mask. 
 
Or never worn the right mask.  It’s often a matter of the right mask, if you want 
to create that psychic explosion. 
 
And I think this is one of the reasons fictive art is simultaneously vulnerable to being 
disrespected, but also so powerful with audiences, though often not with art world 
audiences – with professional audiences, who feel ver y uncomfortable about it 
because they can’t laugh with the jokes, or because they don’t know how seriously to 
take it – but with more general audiences of people who might come in off the 
street.  I think it is a powerful way of approaching things. 
 
I think it’s at the centre of fictive ar t, concealing and revealing always as a double 
move.  An intentional double move that the audience can’t avoid; there’s a 
pretence of authenticity which is a performance of authenticity, but which is 
more explicit than the performance of authenticity we ask of ar tists.  The 
performance of authenticity is par t of the unspoken ar tistic milieu for the last 
century, since we star ted to have cyclical avant-gardes.  Especially since ar t got 
connected to the idea of the pseudo-event and the stunt; the things you do to 
generate the publicity that generates the career. 
 
And also the idea of the pose, and the signature.  The problem is these things are so 
fraught with economics and politics.  This relates to one problem I have with 
institutional critique, that it tends to be a critique of the art world.  There’s a sort of 
tail-chasing ouroboros recursiveness with this; what they’re critiquing is the art 
museum, and then it’s in an art museum.  It just goes round and round, whereas I 
think that fictive art is, like Lambert-Beatty’s talking about, a parafiction, in the sense 
that it’s out in the world, it’s not in the quarantine, it’s not in the clinic , it’s not 
behind closed doors, it is out in the mess of reality. 
 
It hasn’t been separated into the sacred space.  That’s a very impor tant point.  
My interest in institutional critique dropped off very quickly when I realised that 
I didn’t know of a single institutional critique ar tist who wasn’t trying to get into 
the museums through the back door.  I’m very antithetical to that, my whole 
ethos, my practice, my social views are all completely antithetical to the current 
system.  I happen to be inside as a teacher, as a way of making a living, but I am 
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more than a little conflicted about the idea that I am producing ar tists, most of 
whom want to go into the gallery patronage system. 
 
And if that works, and they do that, there are much worse systems.  But I agree with 
you.  I’m also by vocation an educator, in that I absolutely love running workshops 
and I love talking to people.  I’ve recently been running workshops on trans theor y 
and the question of dualism, and it’s so so interesting running workshops for 
students – and these are postgraduate students – because you can introduce things 
in a ver y accessible way, using trans as an example of where the cracks in reality 
are.  And as soon as you get near them, things start getting weird.  Public discourse 
gets uncomfortable and aggressive and hypersexualised and institutionally repressive 
and people start saying the maddest, maddest things, ostensibly sensible 
commentators start putting together completely insane sentences.  And it’s because 
reality flickers there. 
 
But speaking about being an educator, I was recently reading Peter Hill talking about 
The Glass Bead Game by Herman Hesse, have you read that?  I think a lot of those 
concerns about what it is to be institutionalised, and what your position is as a 
teacher, and so on, really resonate with a lot of people from that book.  Written in 
the ‘30s, popular in the ‘60s in translations, maybe time for it to come back again.  
Peter Hill of course did the PhD by practice in Australia in 2000 on what he called 
superfictions, and produced a website as part of that.  I think it’s important to 
recognise his pin in the map there. 
 
He was ahead of the curve on this, in terms of defining the field that we’re both 
interested in, but situates it closer to a whole set of practices like Fluxus and 
Situationism, which are discussed a lot but I’m not so interested in. 
 
And of course, what we talk about when we talk about Fluxus and Situationism, in 
the same way as when we talk about Dada, what we’re talking about now is an 
institutional canonised categor y, which has nothing to do with what people were 
actually doing.  The way that people write about that kind of thing, and the way that 
it’s been co-opted by the institution, is radically against what they were tr ying to do, 
and ignores the characters of the people involved, who were often ver y socially 
different, who absolutely hated the galler y system, and died young, and perhaps 
wouldn’t like their work in a glass box. 
 
And it’s not an incidental aspect of fictive ar t that so much of it is essentially 
uncollectable.  Relics can be collected and treated as relics, but essentially what 
you’re left with is documentation.  Is it a time-based medium?  I actually don’t 
think it fits into any of the easy categories that we have, it’s a trans-genre 
practice. 
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I think that it’s ver y much like conceptual art could have been, or was at one point, 
in terms of documentation and a kind of anti-institutional aesthetic .  A lot of the 
early conceptual art stuff was ver y ver y ironic, and people tend to re-present it as 
though it’s this kind of po-faced pseudo-philosophical concern, and a lot of it’s not 
like that.  If you really look at it fresh, a lot of it is a big fuck you, as well as being a 
serious investigation. 
 
You’re into this term passionate irony, which I think is great, and I think it’s 
important the point Haraway makes because it helps position the cheaper forms 
of irony that dominate the ar t world.  But I would also make an argument for 
passionate pastiche, rather than saying something is ‘just pastiche.’ There are 
different aspects of pastiche that are honoured in fictive ar t. 
 
For me, I tend to think of that as drag.  But again, pastiche is one of those things 
that because we’re so obsessed with novelty, the cult of the original, the cult of the 
signature, pastiche is not something that we can handle ver y easily at the moment.  
You know, Tristram Shandy is pastiche… 
 
Don’t you love that book.  One of the first books I fell in love with, long ago. 
 
And there’s a big link materially between Tristram Shandy and Orhan Pamuk’s 
Museum of Innocence, have you been? 
 
No, I haven’t been there, I’ve only read about it. 
 
Well, if you go, call me and I’ll meet you in Istanbul.  But there’s a black page in 
Tristram Shandy… 
 
The famous black page. 
 
And we’re talking… this is the earliest novel on record, this isn’t 1980.  So, there’s a 
black page in Tristram Shandy, and there’s a ticket in Orhan Pamuk’s Museum of 
Innocence, which in 2008 when it came out, looked like a Tristram Shandy 
gesture… but you can get it stamped and go into the museum now.  I don’t know if 
you’ve read the book?  It’s, it’s horrifying.  And I haven’t read any critiques about it 
that really read it; it’s Pamuk’s Lolita.  If you’re in the mood for a ver y self-aware, 
and ver y destabilising investigation of misogyny from the inside, and how that relates 
to culture, that’s what it’s doing. 
 
I will say that I’m a contrarian at hear t, I’ve noticed this since I was very little.  
When I hear things, dogmas, I tend to go to the opposite pole.  One of the first 
things I was interested in was forgery for that reason, the last taboo.  And so, I’m 
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very interested in the many ways in which fictive ar t serves a contrarian impulse 
within the ar t world.  It’s not just one thing; it’s so many ways. 
 
I’m also ver y interested in reading the writing and thinking of the Sufi thinkers, and 
that idea of contrarianism has a lot to do with particular mystical techniques for the 
Sufis, or rather practical – mystical is the wrong word – practical, social techniques of 
literally doing the opposite of what you are supposed to do.  But performing such a 
perfect opposite position, that it reveals the ridiculousness of the opposition. 
 
I know the tradition you’re talking about.  I’m very attracted to that.  The Sufi 
parables par ticular ly. 
 
Yes, the Nasruddin stories.  And I wonder if that contrarianism is also about a kind of 
practical critique, a praxis of anti-dualism. 
 
Yes, because it isn’t just about doing the opposite, but asser ting the opposite in 
a way that makes clear the enormous excluded middle. 
 
Asserting such a precise opposite that it reveals the extreme… it’s ver y difficult to 
describe other than diagrammatically.  For some reason that’s making me come 
back to the thing that I’m really tr ying to write about and propose in my research, 
which is about space.  About cognitive space, by which I’m not meaning mental 
space or imaginar y space, but a kind of dimensional space which is really created 
between, or created among things, but requires the mind, requires the embodied 
mind to work.  And the diagrammatic I think, when we’re talking about modularity, 
and things operating together to produce something else, and it requiring different 
sorts of audiences as a plurality, and all this kind of thing.  Somehow, I’m tr ying to 
formulate, in terms of a theoretical contribution, I’m tr ying to discuss things in those 
kinds of terms.  And I wondered if you’d been drawn to the idea of making space, at 
all?  Or to the diagrammatic? 
 
I was going to ask about what the central thesis of your approach was, and so it 
sounds like we finally hit that.  You’re interested in fictive ar t as stemming from 
and producing par ticular cognitive spaces?  And why is the diagrammatic so 
important to this?  That’s the par t I want you to elaborate on. 
 
OK, there’s a wonderful image that C. S. Peirce talks about in ‘Signs and their 
Objects’, which I learned about through a wonderful new media artist and theorist 
called Anna Munster, who has a book out with MIT, which is called An Aesthesia of 
Networks.  Peirce’s image is of a map of an island, on that island.  And once you’ve 
put the map on the island – maybe it’s been blown there by the wind – there’s a 
point of correspondence somewhere on that map which links the map to exactly 
where it is on the island, you can put a pin through the map at that point to touch 
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the same spot on the island.  So they produce a kind of diagram together, but not an 
abstract diagram.  There’s something material going on there, it requires physical 
space and time to do its diagramming, it’s not in an abstract space.  It’s more I can’t 
think of a better word than diagrammatic to describe a cognitive, sculptural 
interaction between elements, between place and things, which for me in my work – 
at least in my experience of it – make a kind of tangibly spatial relation between 
things.  I think these are things which are easier to diagram than they are to say.  
Which is one of the reasons I love conceptual art; that you can show something by 
doing it, in a way that it’s ver y difficult to describe without falling into the problems 
of language.  So that’s why I’m interested in the diagrammatic, and also why I’m 
interested in montage.  Not montage in terms of the Histor y of Art, but the still 
radical thing of putting one thing next to another and it changing them. 
 
The gaps, yes.  I haven’t thought about it from this angle at all.  It sounds like it 
might be loosely related to the question of the degree to which a fictive ar t 
project is essentially a system, or a machine for generating cer tain kinds of 
products. 
 
I would also say for generating knowledge and thought. 
 
Before it’s anything else, it’s a system, and therefore it’s diagrammable.  And 
some of them, the things that produce taxonomies, are the project that make it 
most explicit; some of the speculative science projects are very over tly 
concerned with taxonomies.  But diagrammatic is not a word that had really 
crossed my threshold. 
 
I’m interested in modelling, but model has such an overblown, overdetermined sense 
in terms of sculpture, it’s a ver y ver y heavy word. 
 
I’ve thought of similar terms like prototype as well, but it’s never a prototype for 
anything. 
 
The thing about modelling for me, is that if you use it in a mathematical way – and I 
love mathematics from a distance, I know nothing about it really, I’m a kind of literal 
amateur, in the sense that I really feel passionately about how great it is, but not 
from anywhere near it – but modelling in that sense is something that you use to 
help you think about another system. You’re not pretending that the model is the 
thing, but there are particular relationships within the model, that ‘model’ 
relationships of the thing that you’re thinking about.  But because the word model is 
so overdetermined in a sculptural context, that’s one of the reasons I like 
diagrammatic more.  But model is better in the sense that a model is generative, in 
the sense that a diagram is not usually considered generative. 
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And I may even have used the word model somewhere because it ties back to 
this idea of worldmaking.  That all the worlds are temporary, fugitive, possible, 
equally actual worlds, so that each time you construct a world it’s a model for 
all the others that don’t exist or that you haven’t thought of yet.  With each 
thing, par ticularly with fictive ar t projects, is this very interesting question of 
them being open ended; they could always be scaled up.  The only other place 
you really see that in ar t is with something that is specifically self-announcing as 
a series, like Monet’s Haystacks, or Cathedrals, clear ly there could have been 
infinitely more cathedrals.  But it’s really not common; ar t is very much about 
closing things off, finishing them, declaring them done and perfecting them. 
 
Well, it’s about framing.  And I think what we’re told about, again, the way things are 
presented by the institution to us, aestheticizes and quarantines and frames them.  
So, a lot of performance art, a lot of body art, and again a lot of material related to 
Fluxus, Situationism, and many other things including Surrealism, were ver y ver y 
open-ended, but the way that we consider them isn’t. 
 
We institutionalise them to be fixed.  That has not been the dominant discourse, 
so even though they’re all doing that, my students still come in thinking you’re 
supposed to finish an ar twork and make it right.  
 
And I guess that’s why the blog and now Twitter is such a perfect medium for me, as 
I can put something on there and it doesn’t have those kind of concrete boots, you’re 
not expected to chain it up and drop it in the sea, it’s still sort of live. 
 
This is one reason that I like the web also, but I’ve been on it long enough that 
I’m now somewhat burdened by the fact that websites are never finished, they’re 
only abandoned. 
 
Absolutely right. 
 
There can be a psychic unease to that as well.  
 
And also this radical contingency of the web which is that you just don’t know when 
it’s all going to disappear, r ight?  You know, there’s ever y chance that 20,000 years 
from now, this conversation might be listenable, and then there’s ever y chance that 
20 minutes from now, it might all be lost forever.  It’s ver y much live in that sense 
too, I think, the Internet.  Or rather, it brings to the fore the reality of archiving. 
 
And that brings us back to the fact that a lot of fictive ar t projects end up being 
engines for producing documentation.  Often when they’re even shown in 
museum type spaces, what you’re looking at is documentation of something that 
happened outside the view of the viewer, who is not privy to the real and the 
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actual.  This whole idea of the fake is doubled, because you’re withholding from 
them the hear t of the fictive ar t project.  And I think that viewers sense this, 
that’s par t of the resistance; I’m not getting the full experience. 
 
The qualification that I’d want to add for that, is that there is no heart of it.  I’m… 
obsessed is not too strong a word, with donut shapes, donut shaped things, and the 
heart of the project is a centre of gravity, you know, it is an imaginar y point about 
which things turn, it is not a point that’s ever occupied. 
 
Correct. 
 
And so, I think that that’s also something that fictive art projects confront the viewer 
with, and say – implicitly perhaps – that you too can inhabit this position, but only if 
you do the cognitive work to build it. 
 
I try not to use this word, but I probably have to come to terms with it; the 
word that I’m trying to avoid is rhizomatic because of the way it builds out.  
Often people think with the rhizomatic that there was a centre of production 
from which everything moved out.  But this point at which you say everything 
revolves; it’s almost as though that point changes every time the piece expands.  
The centre moves with the piece.  The piece itself constantly transforms as it 
produces itself. 
 
I completely agree with you, and that’s one of the reasons I like ‘centre of gravity,’ 
because once you’ve bolted something onto the side, the centre of gravity moves.  If 
you’re spinning something around and you glom other stuff to it, it spins in a 
different way. 
 
A similar term that has crossed my mind although I’m not actually using it in this 
draft is ‘strange attractor’. 
 
So, in terms of rhizomes, you mentioned the centre, the seed, which is of course 
absolutely un-rhizomatic.  The whole idea being multiply-seeded or spored systems.  
But people do love to get the wrong idea of them, even people who write about 
them. 
 
Rhizomatic: yes, technically, of course.  I was thinking about how my students use 
the word; there is often an implication in their minds of a centre from which the 
rhizome spreads outward.  This misunderstanding so common that I believe it is 
inflecting the definition, against itself. 
 
Exactly, the revenge of the arboreal. 
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Nice.  The trees are coming for us. 
 
Ver y much like literal meaning figurative. 
 
Yes, I am an inclusionist grammarian but the literal/figurative thing still gets my 
goat. 
 
The only way I can handle that is by disbelieving in any distinction between literal 
and figurative at all, á la George Lakoff. 
 
Yes.  Like David Wilson’s strategy for the Museum of Jurassic Technology.  I 
wanted to ask you about Vaihinger.  Have only glanced in passing for my book.  
Recommendation? 
 
Vaihinger, an anecdote: So, a couple of years ago I went to LA, to see the Museum of 
Jurassic Technology.  And Mr Wilson was ver y nice to me, and drove me somewhere in 
his car, and I asked about Vaihinger’s ‘as-if’. 
 
He is a lovely man indeed. 
 
And he said: Yes, I’ve got a copy of Vaihinger’s Philosophy of As-If on my nightstand, 
but I must admit I haven’t made much progress with it, have you?  And I said: No, me 
neither.  And that’s the extent of my knowledge on the subject. 
 
Hmm… well that makes three of us. 
 
But thanks Vaihinger : as-if is a useful term to appropriate.  Or, as we say in the 
fictive museum business, ‘accession.’
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Craig Sherwood: I’ll have to apologise for my ramblings in advance. 
Clair Le Couteur : No, ramblings are good… So, I wanted to ask you a couple of 
slightly weird technical things about de-accessioning and destroying objects, about 
how often you need to do that and how difficult it is.  So, for example, I came across 
– in one of the accessions books – a note about some birds being destroyed.  
Presumably… 
Is that in 1963? 
It was in the 1960s, yes. 
Quite a few were. 
And was that because they were just old and tatty?  Or was there another reason 
for that? 
I can’t speak for it directly, because it was ten years before I was born.  And a 
long time before I moved here!  But reading through the records it seems to be 
that there was a major review of the taxidermy collection at that point.  And 
those specimens which were disposed of from 1960 to ’63 largely were ones 
that were in poor condition, deteriorating.  I don’t have any more details than 
that unfor tunately. 
You had a whole Bird Room, that was changed into the Cabinet of Curiosities, which 
seems to be going really well. 
Yes, it was birds and insects. 
And so presumably a number of those birds are in storage now? 
Yes, cer tainly a lot of the smaller passerine birds – the smaller perching birds – 
are in storage now, yes. 
Do you anticipate that they just live, if you like, in the store?  Indefinitely? 
Anticipate, no; I’d like them to be used in some way.  I think we will have to take 
another look at the bird specimens, because some of them are in a condition 
now where they are past the point where we could actually repair them. 
And it’s ver y expensive. 
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Indeed.  Yes, it’s expensive but also it involves very specialist taxidermy 
conservators.  So, it may well be that we will find another use for them, maybe 
as display settings.  We recently had an ar tist from Priestley College who 
reinterpreted one of our magpies by dressing it as Robin Hood.  [3:00] The idea 
of magpie being a thief and Robin Hood robbing from the rich and giving to the 
poor… And so that’s another possibility. 
And where’s that now? 
Well, the ar tist has taken back the little hat and quiver and so for th that she 
made… 
It’s not living with the magpie? 
No, oh no.  We might approach her at some later date and see if we can get 
that back. 
Well, what’s she going to do with it otherwise? 
…anyway. 
And where’s the magpie now? 
The magpie has returned to its fellow birds in storage. 
One of the things that I am interested in doing as part of the project… this being a 
completely – how to put it – jumpy, patchy sur vey of ever ything, from plug sockets 
to light-fittings and ever ything in between, almost at random really, just whatever 
turns up.  And I’m really interested in including other artworks inside that, if you see 
what I mean.  There are some other interesting things: your Canned Tuna is 
particularly… 
Oh, it’s one of my favourites.  It’s great to watch visitors walk past that and then 
stop, and then back up and take another look at it: ‘there something… different 
about that one.’ 
‘That one doesn’t look like the others…’ But of course, a lot of the other ones are 
models as well.  I love it in many, many ways, because it begins to make the whole 
museum craft a bit more self-conscious. 
Oh yes. 
It adds another layer, instead of that kind of po-faced, ‘No, this is all absolutely true, 
there’s no illusion going on here,’ kind of attitude.  Which you do find in some 
museums, that kind of straight-faced thing, which I find a bit odd… Is it possible 
sometime in the next couple of weeks to visit the birds in the store, to see where 
they live? 
Yes, no problem. 
That would be really great, because it’s one of the things that I’m missing, a picture 
of inside the off-site stores.  I’ve looked in the Painting Store, in the… 
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The birds are actually stored on-site still. 
Where? 
The birds are in what used to be our Spirit Store, and that’s a small 
antechamber which is off our social history Time Tunnel gallery.  I don’t know if 
you’ve had a look at that, the one with the fifties kitchen?  They’re just off that. 
That’s not one I’ve seen.  [6:00] And that used to have all of the specimens in 
formaldehyde and stuff in it? 
Not formaldehyde, formaldehyde is relatively… 
…unpleasant… 
…recent in terms of preservative material. 
In alcohol. 
Yes, industrial alcohol. 
And do you still have those?  But they’re stored off-site? 
We still have those; they’re also stored on-site, but in a small building. 
A highly flammable small building.  Yes. 
It’s entirely safe. 
I hope so.  Can I see that too? 
Yes. 
I’d love to see that.  Um, actually these little annexes… The wonderful thing about a 
building like this, that’s been here for so long and evolved organically – as you say 
about the collection, sort of haphazardly and organically – is that it has these little 
strange… 
…nooks and crannies… 
…multi-functional nooks and crannies.  The other thing that I wanted to ask you: I 
was looking through some of the museum committee reports, some of the earliest 
ones, which are ver y interesting.  There’s a gap, actually, of a few years which is a 
shame.  They might just have been in another box.  But I was looking through them, 
and they were talking – and this is, oh, about 1900 – about having some 45,000 
specimens.  Some sort of astonishing number of things.  Presumably they’re counting 
ever y single butterfly in that list. 
Mmhmn. 
But I wondered if you had an estimate about how many things you think the 
museum has?  
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Uhm, the best estimate… 
I mean, it’s a ridiculous question in a way. 
I know, and it’s actually a question we get asked a lot.  And it’s always one that’s 
very difficult to answer because, as you say, what do you define as an object?  If 
you have a cabinet containing, I don’t know, five thousand butterflies – is that 
one object?  Or is that five thousand and one objects: five thousand butterflies, 
and the cabinet itself? 
Exactly, not to mention the handles and the labels and the pins. 
Well, yes.  You can get down to that level if you like, yes indeed.  So, the best 
estimate that we have was carried out in 1998 as par t of a project called The 
Collected Collections, which looks at museums across the Nor th West.  It 
examined what holdings they had in which areas; so, archaeology, Egyptology, 
yada yada… And at that point, the best guide that we had was the card index.  I 
believe it was calculated from the card index of the time, and I think the total 
came to about 170,000.  [9:00] Obviously a lot of time has passed since then, 
and we have re-estimated it at probably around about 200,000 now.  And that’s 
the figure that we cite.  But as you have so rightly said, it is a ridiculous question; 
it’s not one we can give a hundred percent accurate answer to. 
In a way, it’s not really asking how many things you’ve got, it’s asking in a sense how 
many things you’ve accessioned; how many things are in the catalogue, rather than 
how many objects are in the museum.  And even the things in the catalogue are 
sometimes like, you know, four plates. 
In terms of the actual catalogue, we have around fifty thousand entries, but as 
you say some of those contain, say, ten thousand insects. 
So, the catalogue: I heard that there was a bit of a kind of blackspot, institutionally, 
in terms of keeping records and cataloguing? 
A specific blackspot? 
Yes, some sort of lost years in the latter half of the Twentieth Centur y… 
The 1950s.  The documentation went a little bit South, I think it’s probably fair 
to say, yes. 
So, this is a post-war kind of situation. 
I think so.  I mean, I would probably extend that into the end of World War II, 
into the ear ly ‘50s.  And I think the curators really got a handle back on it in the 
1960s.  But yes, if anyone does enquire about anything that came in in the 1950s, 
we always have a little bit of a groan because that’s the… 
…that’s the Dark Ages in terms of what you’ve got. 
Yeah. 
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And it was interesting looking in the Accessions Safe, where all the accessions books 
are kept, because there are distinct – if you like – institutional epochs, in terms of 
the binding and the quality of the accessions books.  Some of them being ver y 
beautifully printed and bound, in a set… 
…others less so. 
…others less so, yeah.  Others more the Red & Black book from Smiths, written in 
biro.  Presumably now, ever ything gets entered in Modes….  do you keep paper 
copies of that? 
Well, as an accredited museum, we do follow the accreditation procedure as laid 
down by Collections Trust.  And we do have an Accession Register, which has all 
the information in a similar way that it was recorded historically. I’d like to think 
a lot better than… cer tainly more than the 1950s. [12:00] And there’ll also be 
the catalogue records. The Accession Register and the catalogue are distinct, so 
one doesn’t supplant the other ; they work in tandem. 
So it’s entered in ink? 
Yes, in the register that will be entered in archival quality ink, and the registers 
are supplied by the Collections Trust… 
…a standardised museum register… 
…yes, who are the body that oversee the documentation for museums in the 
UK. 
So, the thing I really wanted to talk about, getting a bit more abstract; you obviously 
come into this sort of job inheriting a certain arrangement of stuff. 
Yes. 
There is a kind of status quo. 
Oh yes. 
In terms of what goes in what box, what we display, why we display them, how we 
display them.  And I wondered if you would talk a bit about how, during your time, 
that’s shifted.  How you found it when you came in, and which direction you’ve 
attempted to steer it.  I mean it takes a long time to steer a big ship, r ight? 
Just like turning a tanker.  Well, cer tainly when I came here there was a big 
problem with the documentation backlog, specifically location control.  The 
museum relocated its stores in the 1990s and – due to circumstances which I 
won’t go into – it had to be done rather hurriedly.  So there was a difficult 
actually locating things, which is fair ly fundamental for a museum. 
It’s pretty important, yes. 
So, a lot of my time, and latterly Hannah the collection assistant’s time, have 
been spent trying to… 
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…tr ying to find things… 
…trying to find things, trying to catalogue things, trying to improve the level of 
information that we have about things.  And very often – we can work on 
cataloguing things to a higher quality, finding out more information – but very 
often there will be information that comes to us from a random direction.  
Members of the public will come in, [15:00] or – like yourself – you sent that 
information about that Aleutian seal gut hat.  We didn’t know that there was 
one in the British Museum, we didn’t know that the BM had the parka.  We 
didn’t know that the BM had conserved the parka, and we’re looking at our 
parka now and looking at the pictures of the BM’s crumpled parka that they had 
in the stores, and saying, oh, that’s an uncomfor table parallel, but we know it can 
be done. 
It can be done, and we know that they have done it, and might know how.  And 
might be able to help, also. 
Absolutely, so that’s great.  So, as well as us as curators, working to look into the 
collections to improve our knowledge about it, we also have people very kindly 
giving information that we are collecting in, and we are adding to our records.  
And that can happen quite randomly and organically in itself. 
To me, talking to different people with different collections, it does seem in a way 
that some of the most valuable information comes in the least systematic way.  That 
actually you can spend a month looking at all the reference books, tr ying to find 
what something is, but actually how you usually find out is that it seems to happen 
as if by magic. 
Yes, a very good example of that is the Peruvian collection.  We had a phone call 
out of the blue from a production company who are working on a programme.  
It was called CSI Mummies at the time, I think they’ve toned down the title a 
little bit.  And they were looking at a Peruvian mummy in the collection of the 
Bolton Museum, but they had found out the same donor had given some 
collections to Warrington.  And we are, sor t of: did he!? And we looked in the 
register, and we looked at the names, and it was all correct, and the timing was 
correct.  And obviously we were able to facilitate a visit by the production crew.  
But we then looked into this donor ourselves, and found out he actually lived 
next door to the museum at one point, and that – we can make the supposition 
– is presumably why he donated all this Peruvian material when he moved to 
Peru.  We found out he was the manager of a local textile mill, which is 
interesting because a lot of the Peruvian collection focuses on textiles… 
…and of course they have incredible textiles there… 
…indeed, so can reasonably suppose that that’s why his interest was in that 
area. 
Incredible.  What’s the name of this collector? 
This is a Mr. Smithies.  
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Smithies – and there is something in the Ethnology Galler y which says ‘maybe found 
by Smithies’ I think.  Is it a skull?  A ver y strange wrapped skull.  [18:00] 
There’s the skull, and there’s – and I’m going to pronounce this completely 
incorrectly, I do apologise – falsas cabezas, which are the false heads that sit on 
the mummy packs.  They’re both from the Smithies collection.  Unfor tunately, 
because he was not an archaeologist – and we’re talking about a period where 
archaeology was actually still being firmed up… 
…well, it was pretty cowboy at that time. 
His information as to where he found these ar tefacts unfor tunately hasn’t 
survived, which archeologically speaking is a little bit of a head-scratcher.  But it’s 
quite interesting that these ar tefacts have made their way to us, a relatively small 
museum in the North West.  But again, up until we had that phone call from the 
production company who happened to speak to Bolton, he was just a name in a 
register.  We’d had no details about him. 
Just a sort of blank name, in a way.  Just Mr. Smith, in a way. 
Mr. Smithies, yes.  And as a result of that, we were able to turn the information 
that we’d got… we got in touch with his descendants, his grandsons… We made 
a little exhibition.  Our exhibition went on to win a national award, which was 
fantastic. 
That is fantastic . 
It’s all just coming from one single phone call. 
One of the things that I’m fascinated by about museum craft is how you have all of 
this data, but you need to turn it into information, in some way.  You need to turn it 
into a coherence, some sort of narrative. 
A story. 
A stor y.  And perhaps a stor y in the broadest sense.  Maybe a kind of stor y that no-
one’s told before, that you can’t tell in a different way.  Like, what do teacups look 
like from different countries?  That’s not a normal stor y that you have in a book, 
often.  There’s that sense that you have a mine of raw material, this huge collection.  
Some of it from the nineteenth centur y, which means some of the most bizarre and 
unlikely priceless things.  From this period of Victorian imperialism, basically, where 
we as a nation went all over the world and pinched or bought anything that we 
could find, and brought it all back to a small building in the north of England.  
Thousands of miles away from where it came from.  And that’s the interesting thing: 
even if you do know where somebody picked something up, that doesn’t necessarily 
tell you where it came from, because there was an enormous trade in curios, all over 
the world. 
Absolutely. 
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And where they were told that it came from may not… In the Feejee Mermaid case, 
for example, it’s not from Fiji.  Certainly not a mermaid.  [21;00] 
No. 
So, I was wondering about that more free-wheeling, going into the stores and sort of 
wandering about… Do you have a programme?  Do you do it by room and location, 
where this month we’re attempting to find out what’s on this shelf?  Do you have 
the time for that? 
Well, less time than we did, I’ll be honest.  Cer tainly, in terms of ‘tackling the 
backlog’ – which sounds a very prosaic thing – it’s a case of opening up the 
boxes, seeing what’s there, making sure you know the history and the story 
behind it, and trying to put it into some kind of context. 
And then tr ying to enter that data into some kind of table.  You can say, well, how do 
you work out what year this came from?  We kind of know when we got it, most of 
the time.  It might have a note about when the person picked it up.  We think it 
looks a bit like this.  At what point do you…?  I’ve noticed something about your 
labelling, which is rare in other museums, and I really like, which is a kind of 
transparency about ’this is our best guess,’ rather than, ‘this is what it is, we’ve 
stamped it with this date.’ 
Well, I think that springs from the fact that we are, historically at least, a small 
municipal museum, rather than a museum that’s attached to a university.  
Manchester Museum is attached to Manchester, the Ashmolean is… Even though 
we’ve got this very diverse collection, we don’t have specialist curators of 
Egyptology or something.  It’s always a laugh to me when we have letters, often 
from abroad, who don’t know how small we are, saying ‘To the Curator of 
Egyptology’. 
Yes…er, I suppose that’s me! 
It’s a Wednesday, so… So, it would be difficult for us to speak with authority.  
And actually, maybe it’s not always helpful for museums to speak with authority.  
I mean, historically, museums always did. 
Well that was the point, in some sense; it was a kind of authoritarian project.  We 
organise and catalogue The World.  We know better about your culture than you do, 
kind of attitude.  Which does persist.  [24:00]  
Oh, absolutely.  Absolutely.  But because we’re not in a position to do that, we 
don’t really do that in our interpretations.  At the moment, we’ve got the display 
by the young women of Warrington Youth Club. 
That just opened, didn’t it? 
That just opened at the weekend.  And they’ve taken objects from displays, but 
they’ve recorded their own responses to them, which very rarely has anything to 
do with the historical context of the object. 
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Right.  Why would it? 
But to my mind it is just as valid an interpretation as anything we can write 
about the history of the object.  So, I think we like to try and play a little bit 
with interpretation.  Not too much, but if we can find a different way of looking 
at things – or even admit we don’t know and maybe ask some questions – then 
we can come back with some interesting responses. 
It’s in a sense about subjectivity.  Not that ever y stor y is equally true or worthwhile, 
not relativity, but subjectivity in the sense where you say: we’re not just ‘the 
museum’s voice’, we’re people who work here, and we think this, and we’d like to 
know what you think.  And that has the possibility… You know, a lot of the revolution 
in the ’90s about public engagement, and asking questions on labels, asking people 
what they think, is often done in a ver y patronising way.  A tone I find in many larger 
museums, where they say ‘What do you think?’ meaning ‘We don’t care what you 
think.’ But you actually genuinely do care, because you have to care what people 
think; visitors can give you information that you’re missing.  Rather than the 
approach of a major institution, which might be that visitors aren’t going to possibly 
give us anything that we don’t know already. 
Well, an interesting case was: we had a marching banner for the Primrose 
League, and we loaned it to the People’s History Museum for election year.  The 
People’s History Museum – being the People’s History Museum – didn’t have 
any Tory banners in their collection, as you can imagine!  They knew that we had 
this one, but they asked for some more information about it.  And, 
embarrassingly, it turns out we have no information about it.  So, we put an 
adver t out in the local paper, saying we’ve got this in our collection, does anyone 
know anything about it?  [27:00] Can anyone help us with this?  We got a little bit 
back, we have to hold our hands up and say we didn’t have a lot, but I like to 
think that’s a nice example of a little bit of museum engagement. 
In a way, there’s all of this engagement for engagement’s sake: it’s on the list, so we 
have to do ‘engagement’, how do we do engagement?  And then there’s what to my 
mind seems genuine engagement, where you say ‘We really want to know about this 
thing and we’re asking people; we put an advert in the paper because we need to 
know.’ Not like, we’re tr ying to draw people into the museum, let’s make up a 
reason.  There’s a kind of genuine-ness about it, about that kind of engagement. 
Yes, I like to think so. 
That’s ver y nice.  I wondered also… Obviously, there’s a whole complicated histor y 
about the separation of archives and librar y and museum, which were all at one-
point kind of a family unit in one building. 
If you look at the ear liest donor books which, for the latter half of the 19th 
Century, were the accession registers, if you like, it’ll have ‘A Roman Coin Found 
at Stockton Heath’ and then the next entry will be… 
…fifteen volumes of Lord Lytton, or something… 
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…yeah, exactly.  Or ‘A Report on Cholera in England’ or something like that.  
And these two things will be mixed; it only really separated in the 1870s, I think, 
off the top of my head.  That’s a guess.  So historically, it was all one thing. 
Books were objects amongst other objects, although there was a separation between 
museum and librar y.  There was a librar y room, and there was a museum room. 
In terms of physical space, yes, but conceptually not so much. 
And then – I may be getting the administrative histor y completely wrong – the South 
Kensington museums, which had a huge collection of books, got separated into the 
British Librar y and the British Museum.  And that started a big administrative fissure, 
which carried on through a succession – this is, again, off the top of my head, an oral 
histor y, if you like, of museums – then in the ‘60s and then again in the ‘90s, about 
what constitutes a museum and what constitutes a librar y.  There’s a kind of 
administrative crack, which continues to widen.  And I wondered: the archives seem 
to sit between the librar y and the museum, in a way?  Are they part of your 
collection?  You presumably have some manuscripts in your collection?  [30:00] 
Yes, I mean it’s even more confusing than that, in a sense, because the donor 
book – which is the museum’s ear liest accession register, if you like – is actually 
par t of the archive collection!  So historically, we’d actually have to go to the 
archive to see our ear liest records.  When we were two separate bodies, which 
was the most bizarre thing I’ve ever encountered. 
And run by two separate councils, did I get that right? 
At one point.  I mean, obviously Warrington’s been a unitary authority since the 
‘90s, I’m afraid I don’t know when, but yes, prior to that there was a division 
between Warrington and Cheshire, different floors of the same building.  It’s 
something that we’re actually going full circle with now, with the Archives and 
Local Studies collection having come over from Livewire, who manage the 
libraries, to Culture Warrington.  We’re now back in the same organisation, and 
we are hoping to knock down some of the museum / archive barriers, in a way.  
In terms of researching the history of Warrington. 
It does seem to make a lot of sense, doesn’t it? 
Indeed.  The fact that you’ve got to go to one floor with one database to find 
one area, and then go out downstairs to another database to look at another ; 
that beggars belief, in a sense.  It’s difficult, in terms of pulling those spaghetti 
strands apar t, and then recombining them, in a way. 
It is a small museum, in a sense.  But it’s small on the scale of museums, which is 
vast in terms of the amount of data and information and objects, the length of time, 
and the kind of administrative histor y.  You know, no museum – or really ver y few 
museums – start with a blank slate.  You inherit this enormous labyrinth of different 
systems, and eras of stuff.  You’ve got different registers, and different cataloguing; 
you’ve got the broadsides, which Philip was telling me about, which are relatively 
unusual, and really lovely to handle.  And then you’ve got the card index, still.  
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[33:00] Is that archive or museum, who owns that?  I guess you’ve got more than 
one card index. 
There’s a card index for the museum collection; there’s a card index for the 
archive and local studies collection, yes. 
The other interesting thing for me is about backlog, accessions, and then these kind 
of ‘shadow’ objects, like interstitial things that just end up in the stores, lying about, 
and aren’t necessarily… No one knows… Particularly, I guess, donations? 
Well, no, I mean, donations… If something is definitively a donation it has 
entered the process, if you like.  If something is a donation it’s an offer, it’s 
officially par t of that… 
…it’s officially been accepted as a donation… 
…not necessarily!  One would like to think it has, if it’s been lying around in the 
store for quite some time.  Occasionally, there will be material that people just 
leave on the doorstep and run away. 
Foundlings. 
Yes!  About once every couple of years, someone will do that with a collection 
of birds’ eggs.  Because obviously the law shifted; people are finding collections 
of birds’ eggs… 
…in attics… 
…in attics, often when parents die, or they move, or whatever.  And they don’t 
know what to do with them, they’re worried if they take them to the police 
they’ll get arrested.  So, the common thing is to just to leave them on a museum 
doorstep and run away.  It’s the museum’s problem then!  And of course, we 
don’t collect birds’ eggs; we have to get in touch with the police, and go through 
a whole procedure then about whether they are retained for educational 
purposes, or destroyed, or… 
Because, I mean, they last ver y well; they’re good specimens, and they are 
fascinating, beautiful, beautiful things.  I guess it’s just a question of how much space 
you’ve got and what you want to display. 
Indeed, I mean space is always the thing.  [36:00] I sound like Doctor Who here, 
but space and time are the two biggest factors in museums. 
Space, time, and I guess resources, although putting up a display if you’ve got the 
cabinets is – as you say – about how much time you’ve got, and the space.  But I 
came across a couple in the store.  The on-site store, let alone the off-site store, 
which must be just full of… How many myster y boxes do you think that there 
are?  A lot fewer than there were!  There are still a number of mystery boxes 
on the ground floor, but we are now moving more into an era of mystery 
drawers of geology, which are a little bit beyond our ken. 
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Right, I mean if you know, you know, and if you don’t… it takes years of study to 
work out what rock is what. 
Yes, thankfully most specimens look like they were reasonably well-labelled.  In 
terms of needing to be able to go to a specific drawer to find a specific 
specimen, they’re there, but… we don’t really have a way into them, if you like.  
But yes, the off-site stores.  You do get these… interstitial is probably a very 
good word for this kind of material.  It’s a situation I’ve encountered here that 
I’ve not encountered in other museums, that you do have a lot of material that 
has been kept perhaps to use as display material, some secondary material etc., 
that was never intended to be par t of the permanent collection.  Never 
intended to be accessioned, it’s intended to be retained and used for a display.  
A good example is our ‘50s kitchen; the majority of stuff in there is interstitial 
material, it’s been retained with the plan of sometime in the future doing a 
1950s kitchen.  But when you come into the collection, that material was never 
intended to be par t of the collection. 
It’s not accessioned, and it’s not going to be… 
…but unless it’s marked as such, when you’re coming to the collection 
cataloguing… 
…how do you know?  
…and you end up often having to treat it as accessioned material.  [39:00] 
Well, if in doubt… 
Yes, you need some way of tracking, to know what you’ve got.  So then, this 
interstitial material, unless it’s actually identified very explicitly as such, becomes 
par t of the backlog problem. 
Sort of accidentally accessioned.  When something’s accessioned, it’s given a number, 
and it’s given an entr y into all of the relevant databases.  This kind of secondar y 
collection, or interstitial objects; do you have a system for identifying them which is 
not the formal accessioning system?  Or just in the back of the mind? 
No. At the moment, what we are… The trouble with coming up with a system 
for identifying and logging, tracking interstitial material, is if you go to all the 
effor t of having – I don’t know – an interstitial register, and an interstitial 
database, you might as well accession it anyway.  So, at the moment, the 
approach is to make sure that that is labelled explicitly as secondary material, or 
display material, yada.  So there is no confusion; it wandering into this grey area 
where we’re not sure whether it’s par t of the permanent collection or not. 
…it kind of sneaking into the collection… 
 …because that has happened in the past, and that is a tear-your-hair-out 
moment from the point of view of someone who works with cataloguing, 
interpretation, etc. 
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I haven’t looked into the codes and stuff because I’m not trained, but I am aware 
that there are certain kinds of legal obligations with regard to conser ving and 
protecting accessioned material, and that de-accessioning things isn’t so easy. 
No. 
And there’s a national framework for that, or is that up to you? 
Yes.  Well, there is a disposals toolkit produced by the Museums Association, 
which is the go-to flowchar t for how things should be de-accessioned and 
disposed of.  That’s too detailed to go into here, but broadly speaking when we 
talk about ‘de-accessioning and disposal’, they’re very emotive words.  I mean, 
disposal would also include for instance transferring something to another 
museum.  For instance, we recently – a few years ago, now – acquired a heater 
made by a Warrington company that Leeds ‘disposed of ’ and offered it to us.  
[42:00] It being more appropriate in our collection than theirs; I think they’d just 
collected it as an example of a heater from a par ticular period.  We didn’t have 
any examples of this par ticular manufacturer in our collection, so that works like 
that.  And I think no-one would have a problem with that, because it’s still in the 
public sphere, and it’s gone somewhere that’s more appropriate due to its 
provenance.  But you know that’s still a disposal: a disposal by transfer.  The 
phrase ‘disposal’ can often be quite emotive, but it can be a good thing, and a 
practical – and a pragmatic – thing. 
In terms of the emotion: obviously these things are in the public trust.  But also, we 
as a culture – maybe a species, I don’t know, but certainly as a culture – love to 
hang on to things.  Ever ything’s a memento if it’s been around long enough.  The 
disposal of things from an attic , which you’re never going to use, they’ve just been 
stored, maybe they belonged to someone else; it’s incredibly fraught, emotionally, as a 
process.  So, I wondered if what tends to happen to this interstitial material if it 
sneaks its way in to the accession register – and it’s complex to go through de-
accession and disposal – that the tendency is then to just sort of keep it. 
Yes.  Yes, and that is a big problem.  Where I’ll sor t of modify what you said 
slightly: the interstitial material shouldn’t go into the accession register, because 
if it goes into the accession register there should be some sor t of clear intention 
that the museum wanted or intended to acquire it. 
…it should be justifiable… 
…it should be justifiable.  Because when something goes into the permanent 
collection – it’s called the permanent collection for a reason – the idea is that 
material will be preserved as long as possible… 
…in perpetuity… 
…we say in perpetuity; some items will eventually… 
…like the birds, sort of expire… 
…they will eventually, well, they’ve already expired… 
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…expire again… 
…yeah.  There’s also what you call the education collection, which is also I 
suppose par t of the interstitial material, if you like, but the distinction there is 
that anything that goes into the education collection, there is a possibility that it 
will be ‘used to destruction’. 
Like, the handling collection?  [45:00] 
Yes, handing is another term for it: education / handling.  So, you get this sor t of 
weird categorisation.  And nowadays, when we take an object in, we clarify with 
the donor whether they would be happy if something does not go into the 
permanent collection, for example, whether they are happy for it to go into the 
education collection, with the possibility that it may be used to destruction.  The 
vast majority of people are actually fine with that; they’re just happy it’s being 
used, it’s finding a purpose.  Occasionally some people feel that, no they want… 
…it’s precious.  I’d rather it be in a box… forever… than in the hands of children. 
Well!  I’ll put my curatorial hat on here, Clair, and say that we don’t like things 
that are in a box forever.  We try not to have anything in a box forever ; we do 
try to get things used as much as possible.  ‘Mobilising collections’ is something 
that museums talk about a lot of the time, so things aren’t in boxes forever.  
Even if we digitise them: we’re able to put them online.  Access and use is 
increased by that method.  But yes, occasionally people do not like the idea of 
that, so in those cases we say, well… Have Hannah or Michelle gone through the 
acquisition procedure with you? 
Nope.  [Par t 2] 
Well, as quickly as I can: essentially, if someone brings something in, we will 
capture as much information as we can on point of entry.  Because, very often, 
you go back to someone at a later date, and they’ve moved… 
…you can’t remember… 
…you can’t remember.  So, the impetus is to capture as much information as we 
can when we have the person there, and even if for some reason someone can’t 
stay, we capture their contact details, and get some information when they’re 
available.  And that goes back to what I’ve already talked about, about narratives.  
The objects themselves, without the information – contextual provenance, story, 
narrative – that lessens them as exhibits. 
It’s a kind of value, isn’t it? 
Yes.  It’s a horrible old cliché, but every object tells a story; if the object and 
story get separated, both the story and the object lose out, because you’ve not 
got the materiality, you’ve not got the narrative.  So, someone will come in, and 
we’ll take that, we’ll take the information and we will meet – myself and my 
colleagues who work with the collections – will meet on a quar ter ly basis, or 
sometimes a bit more regularly if there’s a par ticular issue, and we’ll discuss 
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what’s been offered to us, and assess it against our criteria.  These used to be 
known as ‘collecting policies’, now they’re known as ‘collections development 
policies’, and that outlines broadly what we do and do not collect.  In 
Warrington now, broadly speaking, our collections development policy is that we 
collect anything linked with the town.  With the secondary policy that we would 
collect things that are representative of life in the town at a par ticular period, 
where that par ticular specimen doesn’t necessarily have to have a demonstrable 
link with the town… 
…or maybe not only the town… 
…exactly.  The example I always give is a Rubik’s Cube. If we were looking to do 
an exhibition on the 1980s, if someone brought in a Rubik’s Cube, it wouldn’t 
matter that that par ticular Rubik’s Cube hadn’t been used in Warrington, 
because Rubik’s Cubes identical to it would have been. Obviously, if we could 
get a Rubik's Cube that has a story linked to Warrington, that’s the crème de la 
crème.  But we won’t shoot ourselves in the foot and not take something that 
represents the par ticular era, the par ticular life, [3:00] the par ticular period that 
people would have experienced in Warrington, when it doesn’t have any 
demonstrable link with the town.  
That it can be, if you like, a specimen not a relic . 
Indeed.  That’s a very good way… I’ll remember that, thanks Clair.  We’ll gather 
as much information as we can from the person depositing the ar tefact, so that 
if we decided not to take it into the permanent collection, would they be happy 
with it going into the handling / education collection… 
…or just being used in a display… 
…being used in a display, or if we cannot find a home for it anywhere within the 
museum’s remit, what would they like us to do with it then?  And sometimes 
people would like us to dispose of it on their behalf, sometimes people would 
like us to return it to them, sometimes people would like it to go to a local 
charity shop, to generate money for a par ticular charity.  So that’s broadly how it 
works; we’ll get together and we’ll assess the objects against these criteria that 
we have, and see whether we can find a place for it in our own collection.  Or 
sometimes we will – with the donor’s permission – offer it to another museum 
where it’s more appropriately placed. 
So, I’d also like to know about – and it’s also a big question – about the place of 
photography, because sometimes photography falls between the chairs of archive 
and museum.  That archives don’t really keep systematic registers of photography or 
slides, particularly glass lantern slides that ever ybody has.  I don’t know if you do, but 
many institutions have cases and cases of glass lantern slides that they don’t know 
what to do with.  And so, I wanted to know what your experiences have been, 
because also the question connected to that is photographs of objects.  Digitising, as 
you were saying, which is a super important task right now.  A wonderful thing, that 
we as the public can look at things from the comfortable surroundings of our own 
kitchens.  We can find out a lot of things about, I don’t know, Sumerian potter y, if we 
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wanted to.  So, I wanted to know your experiences about the place of photography, 
or the places of photography in your collections? 
Actually, photography occupies a similar space to the wider permanent 
collection, [6:00] in that we will have a cer tain number of photographs which 
are accessioned into our collections.  And the digitisation process is very useful 
for those, because obviously that provides a surrogate.  The digital scan is a 
surrogate, and photographs being fragile as they are, it removes a lot of the 
need for that item to be handled, which would put it at a greater risk.  So that’s 
the photographs in the permanent collection, but you do – as you so rightly say 
– have a large amount of secondary material.  Material that people bring in to 
museums for you to scan, and then they take the photograph away.  And 
museums are now moving towards accessioning those scans as objects in their 
own right… 
…those digital files… 
…yes!  Yes, ‘digital-born’ I think they call it.  And this is something that, probably 
in a lot of other frames of work, other workplaces are a lot more advanced in 
terms of digital assets, and museums are only just star ting to get a handle on this 
sor t of area.  Museums are moving to a stage where digital-born content is as 
important as the actual physical objects, because very often the original is not 
available. 
Quite.  And actually, with some ver y old photography, the things that you can do 
when you digitise it can make it much more visible.  Can actually bring out a lot of 
information in the faded or over-exposed photographs that you can see in the digital 
image, which you can’t see in the original. 
But you do have a cer tain amount of people questioning: is that authentic then?  
Because the way that an image degrades, or fades and so for th, is par t of its… 
…its aura… 
…nature as an item of material culture.  So, there’s a lot of debate around 
that… 
…and of course, what you want is both… 
…and it would cer tainly fill your phone if we went into that whole area!  Yeah, 
what you want is both.  And as well as the items that you have in the permanent 
collection, you have a cer tain amount of secondary… What’s the word?  I’ve 
forgotten the word that you came up with, the grey area. 
You were talking about interstitial things… 
Interstitial, that was it.  There’s a cer tain amount of interstitial photography, as 
you described; photographs of objects in the collection… 
…or photographs of displays… [9:00] 
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…photographs of displays, that were very often taken as an aide-memoire for a 
curator of the time, but then become a historical record in terms of looking at a 
how a museum has developed.  Lots of the material I sent you, photographic 
records of the displays from 1920s-30s… 
 …precisely, which at the time seemed just incidental, but now are vital for museum 
histor y and museum studies.  Those are sort of priceless artefacts. 
Indeed, it gets to the stage where you have more enquiries about those than 
you do actually about the objects themselves!  Cer tainly, from museum studies 
students.  We used to have quite an interesting relationship with the Manchester 
course… 
…as a living specimen… 
…they would come and be very disapproving about our historic displays: ‘It’s 
appalling how they’ve not changed anything since the 1930s!’ Well, what can we 
do?  ‘Oh, you can’t change it!’ It was a really weird relationship.  Unfor tunately, 
one of the drawbacks of having redisplayed some of our historic galleries in 
2010, the number of visits from Manchester museums has lessened off, because 
there’s not the oppor tunity to come and be appalled.  
There’s an enormous, an incredible irony with the fact that was the Ethnology 
display.  Which is something I’m fascinated by, ethnology as a field, because in a way 
what you’ve got is an identical situation to a post-colonial situation about ‘primitive 
culture’. 
Yes. 
Where we, the advanced nation – ha ha – visit people who live in the forest, and 
say, ‘Oh, isn’t it appalling how you’re living 2000 years in the past.  But you can’t 
change.  We don’t want you to change, don’t change anything!  We’re not going to 
sell you anything or give you any equipment; we’re ver y hesitant about making any 
changes, because it’s part of our culture to come over and stare at you.’ Then you 
have that attitude fossilised in the Ethnology galler y, and you have people from 
upstairs, the fancy museum studies people, saying, ‘We want to come over and look 
at you being stuck in the past, you’re not allowed to change.’ An astonishing layering 
of the same structure, in a way. 
Yes. 
But you’ve got some of that material still, in storage?  In your secondary collection?  
You have labelling and things? 
We’ve retained a lot of the historic labels because they are interesting ar tefacts 
in their own right… 
…fascinating, yes… [12:00] 
…I mean some things are… Like so many other workplaces, there’s a lot of 
things we’ll get around to, but I think there’s a very good case – and this is the 
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ultimate ‘museum eating itself ’ – for actually entering these into the collection as 
ar tefacts. 
Well, certainly that’s my feeling; these are actually priceless artefacts about the 
histor y of twentieth-centur y culture, and academic culture.  Studying the way that we 
study things, which does sound a bit – as you say – tail-chasing and recursive but is 
actually really important.  Thinking about how we think, for example, is ver y 
important.  So, would I be able to see some of those physical things? 
I mean, I can cer tainly send you transcriptions. 
Because for me, partly because I’m from a design background, I’m really interested in 
the type, the card stock, the layout; the aesthetics, if you like, as much as the 
content.  But again, it’s a question of taking up time.  But if you wanted an excuse to 
go and look at them, and accession them, we can do that, if you like. 
Cer tainly, we’d be able to pick some up… 
…but it needn’t be exhaustive.  Just whatever’s handy. 
Unfor tunately, one that I don’t know where it’s gone right now… 
…speaking of location… 
…yes, which is why we need to maybe accession them so we’ve got that 
covered.  But the one that accompanied the Chinese collection would make you 
wince.  We’ve cer tainly got a transcription of that.  But yes, we cer tainly still 
have a number.  I mean, that one was thankfully removed in the 1980s, but some 
of the others stayed on… 
…right up until the ‘90s… 
…right up until in fact the 2000s.  But the worst ones, thankfully, were removed 
quite a while ago. 
It’s funny though isn’t it, because you’ve got the worst ones, which are the easiest to 
identify, but then the subtlety just increases.  You get this sliding scale, where you can 
definitely go: oh, we look twenty years back, that’s racism.  Draw a circle round it.  
But it’s ever ywhere all the time, it’s the way that culture operates, this kind of 
othering; not being nice about people on the other side of the world as a way of 
dealing with your own unconscious problems. 
Has anyone talked to you about the evolutionary paradigm of the gallery? 
I have heard a little bit about it, but not enough!  I’d certainly like to hear more. 
I don’t know how true it is, but a lot of speculation on how the gallery was laid 
out comes from the fact that, historically, it was put together in the 1920s, 
1930s… 
…eugenics peak… 
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…yes, exactly.  A lot of unpleasant ideas going around.  And this may explain 
why there are a number of casts and busts and so for th of Cro-Magnon man… 
…physiognomy, the study of facial shapes. 
A lot of those ideas going around.  And as far as we can ascer tain, the way that 
it was originally laid out, with basically Western civilisation from Stone Age up to 
Iron Age / Bronze Age and so for th, and then it would go into Ancient Egypt, 
and all the other cultures of the world.  Interestingly, Ancient Egypt separated 
out from Africa, historically. 
The imaginar y white Africans. 
And so that would be the first gallery, and then you’d go on into the second 
gallery, where you’d have Romans.  Obviously, the next development of ‘Western 
Civilisation’.  And then you’d move on to the large ar t gallery, which would be 
Western Art, the flowering of… 
…the flowering of the Renaissance? 
Well, fewer Renaissance; we don’t really have any Renaissance material, but 
cer tainly Victorian Western and Continental works.  So, whether it was 
intentional or subconscious at the time, you can see what was going on there. 
There’s no hard line, and I think we still – you look at school books from the ‘80s 
when I grew up 
– that kind of linear evolutionary paradigm is totally in control still, I think. 
Yes.  we’ve tried to shatter that a little bit, and when we reorganised it, we put 
Egypt back with Africa, for example.  We took out the Stone Age, Iron Age, 
Bronze Age from that gallery, because that was making uncomfor table parallels.  
And I think probably sending out messages that we didn’t want to send.  [18:00] 
So hopefully we’ve then mitigated against that somewhat, but because here we 
walk a little bit of a tightrope… Back to Manchester saying ‘Oh, this is all 
outdated, but you can’t change it.’ We’re aware that that sor t of Victorian 
municipal museum feeling – the museum-of-museums thing – is our unique 
selling point, if you like.  So, we don’t want to throw the baby out with the 
bathwater.  We want to preserve an element of that, because in so many other 
places it’s been completely gutted, and replaced with stripped-pine IKEA type 
displays… 
…well, the fake art galler y look.  Something I’m interested in: the way that I work, 
the way I’m drawn to put things together is a kind of typology, which was ver y big in 
the 1800s.  And I think, in a way, died with eugenics, because what tended to 
happen is – if you put things which look visually similar together in that same way 
that you were talking about – you can paint an incredibly ugly but ver y convincing 
picture about ‘development’ of different people, and value of different people.  If 
people are still making things out of flint, and we’re not making things out of flint 
anymore – even though things made out of flint work really well, it’s ver y sustainable, 
ver y sharp, easy to fix, free, you don’t need to pump loads of coal up a chimney to 
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make them – then we still see that as primitive, and ‘primitive’ as a bad thing.  So, I 
wondered, what would you think about the possibility; what happens if we put all the 
shoes together?  Rather than saying, ‘Here are our Chinese things,’ and ‘Here are 
our North African things.’  What happens?  How do you feel about that, that kind of 
Pitt-Rivers approach? 
Well, the minute you mention the P-word… I love the Pitt-Rivers, just because I 
grew up in Oxford, so I’m very familiar with it.  And one of the attractions, 
coming here for my interview, was I recognised a cer tain amount of 
commonality between the two places.  Cer tainly not something I expected to 
find when I walked in.  I think it might be an interesting way to approach it, 
having moved away from that typology, historically, to actually try something 
[21:00] – maybe on a small scale initially – along those lines and see what the 
reaction is.  When we were looking at redisplaying the World Stories, the 
Ethnology gallery, one of the options that we considered was basically a 
typological approach.  And, for instance, a lot of the South African material is 
made from bound wire.  And obviously Warrington is famous for wire drawing, 
so we can make some parallels there and have bound wire objects next to one-
another from completely different cultures.  I think, in the end, in terms of our 
remit, and I think probably curriculum-based as well, the approach we went for 
was the right one.  But I’m still kind of intrigued as to what we would have come 
up with… 
…how might it have looked, this other possible World Stories galler y.  Because, in a 
way, is it then a design museum?  If you display all of the wire-produced stuff 
together, and you start talking about different sorts of wire-producing techniques and 
different means of making things with wire, that different people have come up with 
around the world, and the similarities… That’s ethnology, in a way. 
Yes, absolutely. 
That’s the study of different cultures together ; it’s also design histor y and material 
culture histor y.  What would you need, to be allowed – in terms of remit – to do 
that? 
Remit’s probably the wrong word.  I don’t know if it may have been as easy to 
use as the gallery that we have.  In the end, the reason why we didn’t go for that 
approach is as much due to pragmatic issues as notional, or ideological 
approaches.  I’m not sure, but I think in the end… [24:00] It’s very difficult to 
talk about, to even remember ; it’s a few years ago now, passed a lot of water.  
The exact details escape me, but… I think remit’s probably the wrong word.  I 
think it’s… We felt that that was too much of a break with our ‘Victorian 
municipal museum’ unique selling point, museum-of-museums feel.  So, I think it’s 
something we’d like to do on a smaller scale, but maybe not in terms of 
completely redisplaying, a permanent redisplay.  Something we could try out in 
the honorary curators’ display at some point. 
And particularly in terms of wire, and locality in Warrington, the histor y of wire: 
there’s a lot.  I found some wonderful stuff in the archives.  ‘Live Wire’ magazine, the 
magazine of the Rylands Brothers company, has some great things about the histor y 
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of wire making.  So: a Victorian histor y of pre-historic wire making… The other thing 
about how Ethnology, or the World Stories galler y, is laid out now, is that you can use 
it for many different education things.  You can still go, ‘Look for all the fish hooks, 
there’s fish hooks from many places.’ You can still use it for that kind of stor y, 
whereas the thing about typologically arranging things is that it is didactic , in a quite 
limited way, or can be.  That what we’re looking at here; we’re not looking at 
different cultures and time periods, we’re just looking at shoes.  It’s just, it’s so rare 
to see that kind of arrangement now, although it was so popular in the ver y earliest 
museums.  
Oh, absolutely.  Absolutely.  There’s an element of that in the botany gallery.  
There are some ethnological items mixed in there, where they have taken the 
route that the material, the process and the plant as the central things, rather 
than necessarily what culture produced it.  And that’s another very interesting 
and rare approach; our botany gallery is still an industrial botany gallery, showing 
the uses of plants.  [27:00] 
Well, quite.  That’s one of the things I loved about it, this ‘The Plant as Beverage’ 
thing.  That it’s not about botany for its’ own sake, it’s about a kind of functionalist 
botany; how do we use these woods, what are they for?  Which is a kind of design 
question, as much as anything else. 
But there is also a botanical approach.  Right up in the corner, there’s a sample 
of ‘mummy wheat’; wheat from an Egyptian tomb, I can’t remember which one, 
sorry.  Thousands and thousands of years old.  And it’s in the section on wheat; 
people don’t notice it or have their attention drawn to it, because it’s par t of a 
display on that par ticular family of plants.  Which I always feel is really, really odd, 
because, coming from another point of view, that’s really fascinating.  The fact 
that it’s a kind of wheat is – arguably, and I’m not a botanist – one of the less 
interesting par ts about it.  But in the end, curation is all about how you put 
things together, as much as it’s about cataloguing. 
Arrangement, constellation.  But when you do have – as you would say in computer 
game language – ‘Easter eggs’, when you do have hidden gems like that in what 
seems to be one display, but actually you can read it in another way, that does give 
a museum depth and longevity. 
And I’m going to go contrary to what I’ve just said, though, because I completely 
love that that piece of mummy wheat is there.  Because whenever I take anyone 
into that gallery, I can point it out and say, ‘You might not have noticed this, 
but…’ And it’s interesting because of the context it’s in, which is impor tant as it’s 
totally out of context there, or arguably so. 
I mean, context is a ver y complicated subject, isn’t it? 
It really is.  
It’s about framing, as much as anything else… So, the only other thing was, in terms 
of material, whether you have a slide collection?  35mm, or glass lantern slides, or 
both? 
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Both. 
And where are they kept? 
The more modern slides are kept largely in the Print Room, which is on-site.  
Glass slides are largely kept in drawers in the Library Top Store, though I think 
there are some in the Print Room. 
So they’re on-site?  [30:00] And relatively easy to see, to visit? 
Although I have to admit, the glass slide collection is another area where there’s 
been very little cataloguing done up to now.  So that’s another area I need to 
pay more attention to. 
But actually, this is not unique to Warrington.  So, there’s a huge project – I don’t 
know if you know about it – in Oxford at the moment about glass lantern slides… 
[The HEIR Project.] 
Will you send me some information? 
I will.  They’re digitising them.  They got a good amount of, I think, Lotter y money 
[this is not the case], because they found out they had – in the colleges and in the 
museums in Oxford – just boxes… even after boxes of them had been skipped over 
the last thirty, forty years.  Because people thought that they were useless, you know, 
people thought that because they weren’t accessioned, because they were 
interstitial… But now are precious, absolutely precious objects.  Slides which before 
were considered completely meaningless – because they were just street scenes, 
who cares – are now vital information about fashion, about architecture, displays, 
about a limitless amount of historical information… So, they’ve got lots of money to 
digitise them, and to preser ve them and clean them up.  The great thing about glass 
lantern slides is, as long as you keep them in a box, relatively normal temperature, 
they last for ages.  They’re excellent archival material.  I’ll send you the information 
about it. 
I would love to hear about that. 
They’ve got a huge project, and they’re really fr iendly too.  I saw somebody [Dr Sally 
Crawford] give a talk from them.  They’re ver y excited about their project… But 
yes, I’d love to visit the birds, particularly the magpie – Robin Hood Magpie – and I 
would ver y much like also to visit the slides, and also the physical, historical display 
materials, I would also like to see.  And if you fancied formally accessioning one while 
I was there, I could take a photograph of it.  That would make me ver y happy. 
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Appendix E:  A Proposal for Decolonising the Label 
Decolonising the Label 
Clair Le Couteur 
 
A version of this proposal was given at the 2017 SOAS Conference ‘Decolonising the Cultural 
Institution.’ Following that event, I was asked to present at ‘Museums Showoff, Season 6, No. 1, 19 
September 2017,’ and to write up the presentation as an article for publication in Shades of Noir : 
Terms of Reference (forthcoming). This is the Shades of Noir text. 
 
I’m currently finishing a PhD-by-practice on what I call fictive museums.  These 
are elaborate ar tworks – like the Museum of Jurassic Technology in Los Angeles, 
or the Museum of Innocence in Istanbul – which not only weave together facts 
and fictions, but claim to actually be museums.  My subject area is a cross 
between literature, installation and conceptual ar t, but my research has led me 
to question the workings of institutional power.  I star ted asking myself what 
really distinguishes fictive museums from museum labelling in general.  I’m going 
to describe some conclusions I’ve come to, touching on a residency I was 
involved with at Warrington Museum and Ar t Gallery, in a town between 
Liverpool and Manchester. 
 
Roots Between the Tides (2016) is an installation of 188 photographs, taken in 
Warrington’s displays, museum stores, and local archives, forming a kind of 
diagram or por trait of the museum.  The images are connected together with 
giant elastic treasury tags into an associative assemblage, hanging in a mezzanine 
space.  Above is the Fish Gallery, and below – with the lights off – is what’s now 
called the World Stories Gallery, though it still has the original sign ‘Ethnology’ 
above the door.  Before getting into detail, I just want to state here that I’m a 
huge fan of Warrington.  It’s no exaggeration to say I fell deeply in love with the 
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town, its beautiful museum, and its kind, hardworking staff.  It’s an under-
recognised, under-funded national treasure. 
 
Founded in the 1840s, Warrington was probably the first municipal museum in 
the UK.  It was created by wealthy local industrialists for the education and 
civilisation of their workers, many of whom lived in conditions of extreme 
deprivation.  During the twentieth century, the profits, the ownership, and 
eventually Warrington’s industries themselves were removed from the local area.  
Today, many households in central Warrington – and the wider North West 
region – continue to live in conditions of endemic, long-term pover ty.  The 
residents of these areas are predominantly white.  Right up until the ear ly 2000s 
when it was completely refurbished, Warrington Museum’s 1936 Ethnology hall 
Slide X29.1:  Roots Between the Tides (2016–ongoing) 
Installation view, Warrington Museum and Art Gallery 
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featured labels of the most eye-wateringly racist type.  The displays had 
remained in their original condition, organised on the principles of scientific 
racism and progress mythology.  The race, technology and culture of the white 
English were depicted as the most evolved, advanced, and morally superior in 
the world; ‘lesser races’ were systematically dehumanised. 
 
When the gallery was re-hung, the curators included an interesting little panel, 
featuring an image of one of the previous labels.  Like almost all ‘real’ museum 
labelling I’ve seen, this double label has four features I’d like to point out.  Firstly, 
it’s very brief, about fifty words.  This is the current best practice for museum 
labels.  As the Victoria & Alber t Museum’s style guide states, ‘visitors have come 
to look at objects, not to read books on the wall.’ Secondly, the text means far 
Slide 309.1:  Slides JAM.RBTT.0X0;0 and 772;0 
Labelling and Signage at the Entrance of the World Stories Gallery, WMAG 
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more than it says.  There is a lot of thought, debate, and tension behind labels 
like this.  What appears to be simple, literal, direct language is in fact highly 
euphemistic.  The historic label shown is not itself explicitly racist, at least, not in 
comparison to some that were replaced.  The new label is about racism, but 
racism is not mentioned, only alluded to by the mere presence of the word 
‘Race’ in the image.  The panel implies something like this: Local visitors may ask, 
perhaps even angrily, why we changed the galler y.  We removed the labels, 
eventually, because they were offensively, embarrassingly, obviously racist, but we 
won’t state that directly.  Nor will we state that the information on the labels was 
factually incorrect.  Replacing the labels is evidence of our progress; we’ll settle with 
‘out-dated’ in order to avoid a public discussion.  A potentially heated discussion, in 
which it might emerge that ‘people’s view of the world’ may not be so ver y different 
after all – especially those generations living in Warrington who grew up learning 
about the world primarily by visiting this ver y museum. 
 
Before the re-hang, Warrington Museum was itself used as a specimen, a field 
trip location for nearby museum studies courses, who were both appalled by it, 
and insisted that it didn’t change.  An interesting symmetry, ethnology acting on 
its own past.  A past and present that this double label implies, hints at, but does 
not engage directly.  We jump directly from the 1920s to ‘the 21st century 
world,’ a different world, supposedly, with different conditions signalled by the 
word ‘diverse,’ which is used as a kind of code.  But what this code means is not 
specified, open to interpretation.  For many of the UK’s more extreme right-
wing nationalists, the word ‘diversity’ is indeed seen as a code: A Globalist code 
word for ‘#WhiteGenocide,’ in which all racial diversity and anti-racist sentiment 
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is depicted as a programme of genocide-by-stealth against white Europeans.  In 
not addressing race directly, this label takes responsibility for neither the 
museum’s past nor for the present conditions of reception.  The message of the 
previous labels is not discussed, nor contradicted in any way.  Instead, the new 
message is simply: times have changed, and it is no longer appropriate to speak 
about race at all. 
 
So first, the label is really shor t; there is no room for discussion.  Second, it is 
euphemistic, meaning far more than it says explicitly.  Precisely what it means is 
unclear, and it does not mean the same thing to all audiences.  Thirdly, the label 
is unsigned, undated.  The words ‘different than’ hint that the curator who wrote 
this wasn’t British.  He was Canadian, in fact, but the only way to find that out is 
by contacting current museum staff.  Overworked, underpaid staff – continually 
subjected to ‘restructuring’ over the last ten years – who themselves may or may 
not know.  Many museum labels, perhaps the vast majority in existence, are not 
only unsigned and undated, but do not have paper trails.  We don’t know who 
exactly wrote them, when, or under what conditions.  The label doesn’t tell us 
when the gallery was re-hung, or by whom.  And, crucially, it’s not a question 
we’re really meant to ask.  The museum’s voice is institutional, timeless authority.  
Unless a famous guest curator is involved, museum labels are meant to be 
anonymous. 
 
The authorship of anonymous labels – and I want to stress this point – is fictive.  
The label is written as-if by the museum itself; as timeless, anonymous and 
neutral as a street sign.  As Elaine Heumann-Gurian pointed out in 1991, 
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although we may be reluctant to admit it, museum exhibitions are more like 
theatre than anything else; they involve sets, props, and performances.  In the 
past, when museum curators were on site, and the attendants were active 
guides and teachers – rather than passive security staff sitting alone on chairs – 
the role of performance and authorship was more evident.  More evident, more 
oral, more discursive, and, of course, far more exclusive.  But if you are writing a 
label with no date, and no signature, you are also engaged in a performance.  
Museums are buildings with things in, they do not write their own labels.  You 
are writing from the character of your museum, and no matter how seemingly 
simple or factual your statements, the devices of fiction – allusion, metaphor, 
implication, elision – inevitably come into play. 
 
Let me give a contemporary example.  We’re in the 1990s section of the Making 
the Modern World exhibit at the Science Museum, September 2017.  A panel on 
the wall nearby tells us: ‘These displays are intended to paint the broadest 
picture of technology in each period… Not only have people in different 
periods owned and used different things, but they have understood them 
differently.  To convey this… we have laid out the objects according to a 
classification that was devised at the time.’ Apparently, looking at the display 
according to the wall text, visitors are meant to conclude that during the 1990s, 
some kind of classification was devised that linked: speed cameras; wheel clamps; 
a test sample of a motorway; and… dowsing rods.  There are two wooden sticks 
on the left that are not dowsing rods, though they are a roughly similar shape.  
Beside them, below the speed camera, however, are four right angles of metal.  
These are commercially produced dowsing rods.  
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The label nearby says only:  ‘Dowsing rods, 1994.  To search for hidden 
substances.’  Why are they here?  Are they considered road-building technology?  
Is this a curatorial in-joke?  Behind their inclusion, and the brief, allusive wall text, 
is clear ly some kind of attempt to convey very complex information about 
technology and belief systems.  But this information is not conveyed.  What 
results instead is an inadver tent seal of approval from the Science Museum for 
the dowsing rod industry.  Dowsing, unfor tunately, is more than just harmless 
New Age fun with the ideomotor effect.  Throughout the ear ly 2000s, a British 
company was selling what amounted to extremely expensive dowsing rods at 
military fairs as a way of detecting controlled substances, including explosives. 
They are still in use by some security services around the world, another legacy 
Slide 31E.2:  Wishbone-shaped sticks and commercially produced dowsing rods 
‘Making the Modern World’ exhibit, Science Museum, 2017 
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of colonialism. People have died as a result, and in 2013, some of the ringleaders 
were sent to prison. 
 
Another, very different example.  An ancient clay cylinder, par t of the British 
Museum’s vast collection, number 1927,1003.9.  It came to the museum from Sir 
Leonard Woolley’s dig at the Babylonian city of Ur in 1927, and he claimed it as 
the first known museum label – the Ur-label, perhaps.  It was made as par t of 
another collection near ly three thousand years ago, kept in the palace.  It was a 
label, translating an even more ancient clay tablet, which the Babylonians had 
found when digging their foundations.  Labels are objects themselves and can 
tell us a lot about what information technologies were being used at the time; 
this clay cylinder does in fact name who wrote it, when, and why.  Today, some of 
this is hinted at in highly condensed form by the museum labels around it; the 
information is there, encoded, but almost impossible to work out unless you 
already know the story.  The cylinder is one of the very few items from the 
British Museum’s estimated three million ar tefacts that is actually on display.  
Perhaps being possibly the oldest museum label in existence had something to 
do with its selection, but unless the British Museum tells us that by email, we’ll 
never know.  What Woolley thought it represented – the oldest known museum 
label – is not mentioned anywhere by the British Museum: neither in the labels 
around it, nor in the online catalogue entry. 
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So, on to my four th point: unlike the clay cylinder, most labels are not 
considered par t of the museum’s collection.  Cardboard labels are ephemeral, 
treated as-if they were not really objects at all.  If old labels happen to be kept 
in the documentation file for an ar tefact, this is generally done on an ad hoc 
basis, not par t of the museum’s formal operating system.  Labels are not 
routinely archived or conserved for future generations.  Keeping records of 
historic labelling, adding them to catalogues, and making them publicly available 
for research, are not recommendations of the UK Museums Association.  When 
the Daily Mail is caught publishing falsehoods, it must then print a retraction, 
however small, and this becomes a matter of public record.  Museums are an 
important par t of the way we learn about the world.  Though labels have a 
hugely powerful impact on how the public understand what a museum 
Slide 327.1:  Woolley's Museum Label 
‘Digging Up the Past’ exhibit, British Museum, 2017 
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collection means, when they are replaced, labels often simply disappear without 
a trace. 
 
In 2007, a landmark exhibition at the Victoria & Alber t Museum – 
‘Uncomfor table Truths: The Shadow of Slave Trading on Contemporary Ar t and 
Design’ – made visible the presence of colonial slavery in the permanent 
collection with interventions from eleven international ar tists.  Today, no physical 
traces of these interventions remain in the galleries, and the accompanying book 
is out of print.  Temporary exhibits, usually involving ar tists, are given the task of 
‘celebrating diversity’ and ‘coming to terms with history’; these are festivals, 
special occasions outside of the day-to-day life of the museum.  No matter the 
visibility or the budget for temporary exhibits, unless the permanent collection 
changes its labelling and display, nothing really changes. 
 
In my research, I think a lot about the fact that we are labelling things with other 
things.  I star ted investigating the slightly absurd idea of what might happen if we 
really took this to hear t, removing any category distinction between an object 
and its label.  In fact, removing category distinctions entirely, and just connecting 
things together in extended kinship networks of association.  But that’s not what 
I’m recommending today, as a queer, non-binary ar tist researcher, an amateur, 
with no formal museum training or experience.  I’m recommending first, let’s 
accept that labels are par t of the collection.  In 1894, the Smithsonian Museum 
curator George Brown Goode wrote: ‘An efficient educational museum may be 
described as a collection of instructive labels, each illustrated by a well selected 
specimen’.  He was right; to a great extent, the labels are the collection, 
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especially in the permanent displays.  They tell us what things are, and what they 
mean. 
 
The failure to formally accession past and present museum labels, to accept 
them as par t of a museum’s collection, amounts to the destruction by neglect of 
archival material.  Vital material not only for the discipline of museum studies, 
but also for an understanding of cultural history, the material production of 
cultural reality, par ticular ly those aspects of reality that our colonial, kyriarchal 
British culture would rather deny, ignore, downplay, or forget.  This issue of Terms 
of Reference is themed around the ethics of voices vulnerable to erasure.  
Historic labels are unique ar tefacts of public heritage held in the public trust, for 
which museums must bear a duty of care.  Unless we insist on this, the voices of 
the museum’s own material past and present, par ticular ly those colonial voices 
for which Britain most needs to take responsibility, will continue to be erased.  
 
This is not to say that British archiving is itself a transparent process.  Only 
within the last ten years – as a result of the Mau Mau trial currently taking place 
– has it come to light that the British Empire had a named policy for archival 
conspiracy on a vast scale.  Operation Legacy was the semi-official name for the 
systematic destruction of hundreds of thousands of files, and the sequestering of 
others as ‘migrated archives’ outside the regular classification system, carried out 
by hundreds of governmental officers around the world over a period of 
decades.  Evidence continues to build that huge numbers of files are still being 
held in breach of the Public Records Act, many at Hanslope Park.  In 2015, for 
example, the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) notified government 
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that it had ‘found’ 170,000 files overdue for release.  Records of the Kenyan war 
crimes, and files demonstrating the destruction of other incriminating 
documents, were discovered largely thanks to the tireless effor ts of the legal 
team at Leigh Day, and Edward Inglett, FCO desk officer for Kenya.  Inglett was 
repeatedly told by Hanslope Park they had no such records, but evidence was 
presented to him by David Anderson that thousands of files had been ‘retrieved’ 
prior to the handover to Kenya’s first independent government in 1963.  Only 
after Inglett threatened to visit Hanslope Park in person did they release 
documents relating to the Mau Mau case, over 1,500 files.  The 2011 Cary 
Repor t concluded, predictably, that no intentional wrongdoing had taken place.  
It did however include this telling observation: ‘how well FCO paper files in the 
last century “told a story”, and how much more difficult it seems to be these 
days to piece together a coherent reconstruction of recent events.’ (p.19) The 
electronic records of contemporary decision-making processes are even more 
vulnerable to erasure, often through a failure to be archived in the first place. 
 
The ongoing Operation Legacy scandal may seem to have little to do with 
museum labels; I include this information here for three reasons.  It 
demonstrates that the voices of archival material are both vulnerable to erasure, 
and remain culturally and legally powerful decades later.  It also demonstrates 
that colonialism was never a matter of top-down hierarchy, but a hugely 
distributed decision-making system of shared responsibility between multiple 
institutions and the individuals within them, which continues to this day.  Lastly, it 
demonstrates that the British Empire was within living memory a colonial power 
that committed atrocities similar to those of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, 
 
 
 
275 
and that there are powerful cultural forces at work which do not want this 
information to become public knowledge.  Evidence of the true nature of Great 
Britain is even now being effaced.  This includes not only missing official files on 
detention camps, and ongoing governmental obstruction of justice.  It also 
includes the quiet tidying away – perhaps with the best of intentions – of the 
ubiquitous white supremacist propaganda which filled Britain’s knowledge-
producing institutions throughout the twentieth century. 
 
We must insist that new labels are signed and dated; if we wish institutions to 
become transparent, then authorship must be transparent.  There is no escaping 
the fictive condition of our cultural work.  Facts can mislead even more 
effectively than fictions.  ‘The museum’ has never written anything; people write 
things, and other people edit them.  For so long, in performing factuality, 
museums have been indulging in unselfconscious fictive strategies.  Not only 
does this obscure the real workings of the museum, but it adds to a lack of 
public accountability.  The kind of lack of accountability that, for example, pays lip 
service to its past acts, wipes away decades of racist ideological programming 
with a wave of the hand, and takes no responsibility either for present 
conditions or for preserving the voices of its own past.  Let’s make the actual 
material conditions of co-authorship transparent to the public.  Let’s make sure 
everyone involved in the creation of public culture is publicly credited.  And, 
while we’re at it, why not also make public precisely how much each person is 
being paid for their time? 
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I recently presented these ideas before a group of museum professionals, and 
one young woman – who operates the Twitter account of a major London 
institution – explained that labelling transparency would work not only to make 
institutions more transparent and accountable, but to humanise the heritage 
professions.  Perhaps, she said, if the public knew the person who was sitting 
behind the screen – rather than imagining they were fighting the faceless 
institution – she would need to deal with less daily online abuse.  Museum 
professionals study extensively, work hard, and care deeply about what they do.  
Many people work in museums for very little pay, on uncer tain contracts, and 
under increasingly difficult conditions.  They often feel under attack not only 
from their management structures, but from the incompatible demands of 
different public groups, who take out their various frustrations with the 
institution – and even with history and culture as a whole – on the staff.  
Museum staff are people who care passionately about conserving, 
commemorating, and communicating our shared history.  Signing and dating 
labels humanises the institution, and more humane institutions not only function 
better, but are more humane environments in which to work. 
 
Colonialism is dehumanising; large numbers of individually minor acts combine 
into an abusive system.  Institutional mechanisms not only work against the 
victims of the system’s abuses, but equally work to diffuse the responsibility of 
its perpetrators among its perpetuators, who may themselves suffer institutional 
abuse.  It is simply not enough to chase details, insist on corrections, argue every 
point, uncover the facts, though these are things we must continue to do.  We 
also need to change the way institutions operate at the systemic level.  We need 
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to make sure every text, every document, every label bears the traces of its 
human authorship.  And we need to recognise that every text which continues 
to obscure those traces behind an institutional mask is a work of colonial fiction. 
 278 
Appendix F:  A Note On Our Typeface 
 
This project is set in Gill Sans Light, based on a typeface designed by Eric Gill in 
1926 and released by Monotype in 1928.  Inspired by Edward Johnston’s font for 
the London Underground produced a decade ear lier, Gill Sans has been reissued 
repeatedly, the most recent being the release of the born-digital Gill Sans Nova 
in 2015.  Gill Sans was one of the first fonts to be digitised, included with both 
Mac OS and Microsoft Windows.  The typeface, known as ‘the English Helvetica’, 
has become iconic for the twentieth-century British ‘humanist’ establishment, 
employed by both British Rail and Penguin Books.  Gill Sans is also often used in 
popular and commercial replicas of the KEEP CALM AND [enter text] meme, 
based on a1939 British war time poster that was never actually issued, 
rediscovered in 2000.  The original was typeset in Caslon Egyptian (1816).483 For 
most of the twentieth century, Gill Sans was ‘ubiquitous in England’.484 
 
Eric Gill (1882-1940) was named Royal Designer for Industry by the Royal 
Society of Ar ts, and was a founding member of the Faculty of Royal Designers 
for Industry.  Since the publication of Fiona MacCar thy’s ‘morally blank’ Eric Gill: 
A Lover’s Quest for Art and God (1989) – and arguably far ear lier,  given Graham 
Greene’s review of his letters – it has been public knowledge that Gill was a 
serial abuser.485  Gill ran a pseudo-religious patriarchal commune where, 
seemingly with the consent of his wife, he continued a lifelong incestuous 
relationship with his sister, he sexually abused his daughters and even attempted 
sexual intercourse with his dogs.  Ar tworks depicting his daughters nude are on 
show in the Ditchling Museum of Ar t and Craft’s current retrospective, the first 
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to include the question of Gill’s ‘biography’ in a show of his work.486 487  In 
publication after publication, Gill’s work continues to charm cultural 
commentators; child abuse is downplayed, excused, sidelined – his daughter 
Petra led ‘a productive and happy life’ – and his work described in glowing 
terms.488  Given the multiple ongoing enquiries into British establishment 
collusion in widespread child sexual abuse, and countless other despicable acts 
besides, whilst maintaining a façade of rational, institutional propriety, Gill Sans 
thus seems the perfect emblematic typeface for our project: a fictive museum 
concerning ethnology, cultural heritage, and colonial British modernity at the 
dawn of the digital age. 
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